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The focus of this thesis is on the process of myth-making (mythopoeia) in the Dutch National 
Socialist Movement (NSB) and the Swedish National Socialist Workers’ Party (NSAP), using a 
cultural pragmatic approach to analyse the practicalities and implementation of mythopoeia 
comparatively. A variety of fascist performances, scripted and unscripted, are considered as 
having mythopoeic potential, and understood as performative in character, i.e. constituting the 
thing they claimed to represent. 
 
Multiple parts of this mythopoeic process are analysed: the resources, organisation, and 
technologies required to implement it, and the nature of the process, the events, performances, in 
other words the actual implementation, and reception by audiences. Secondly, it uses 
respectability as a means of seeing how in a national context this process was limited, inhibited, or 
otherwise defined by the standards of the public and media, to which fascists ultimately tried to 
appeal, thus providing an external perspective on fascist activities to contextualise them. 
 
The thesis is divided into four chapters, which deal with the party apparatus, leader myth, political 
uniforms, and the role of aesthetics and spectacle respectively. Together these chapters explore 
the relationship between mythopoeia and respectability as refracted through party organisation 
and administration, as embodied by the ‘charismatic’ fascist Leader, in the day-to-day behaviour 
and appearance of the rank-and-file, and ultimately the holistic experience of fascist aesthetics, i.e. 
the fully scripted and organised spectacles of party congresses. 
 
Ultimately it is shown that the fascist movements of Sweden and the Netherlands were highly 
innovative organisations. Mythopoeia had a powerful mobilising capacity, which could make up 
for the diminutive financial power and low membership figures of fascist parties. Finally it appears 
that the relationship between myth and respectability was not a straightforward dialectical one, 
but multivalent, and highly dynamic. 
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So it has come to this in the civilised world. But do not believe that the degeneration of judgement 
is limited to the countries in which extreme nationalism has been victorious. Whoever looks 
around can repeatedly observe how, with developed persons, often youths, a certain indifference 
has come about to the reality of the figures that have entered their intellectual world. The 
categories of fiction and history … are no longer clearly separated. It is no longer of interest if the 
intellectual material can be verified. The rise of the idea mythus is the most important example of 
this. One accepts an illusion, in which the elements of wish and fantasy are consciously 
permitted…1 
—Johan Huizinga, In the Shadows of Tomorrow (1935) 
 
I 
Myth occupied a peculiarly prominent place in the politics of interwar Europe. Rather than the 
post-war settlement leading to the firm establishment of rationalistic and moderate forms of 
democratic politics, interwar mass politics saw the rise of new political possibilities and profound 
uncertainties.2 With new forms of politics on the Left and Right, myths seemed to underpin much 
of the appeal of emergent mass movements.3 Myths are here understood as moral narratives that 
are not strictly fictional, but ahistorical, with strong connotations of the fantastical,4 or in a 
simpler sense ‘an image which can inspire men’, with ‘some element of truth in it, but it is twisted 
into a vision that conforms to the desired ideal’.5 Myths had been exploited politically before, but 
in the new era of mass politics brought on by technological modernity, acquired new forms and 
                                                             
1
 „Zoover is het in de beschaafde wereld gekomen. Men meene niet, dat de verwording van het oordeel zich 
beperkt tot de landen, waar het extreme nationalisme heeft gezegevierd. Wie om zich heen ziet kan herhaaldelijk 
waarnemen, hoe bij ontwikkelde personen, veelal jongeren, een zekere onverschilligheid voor het 
waarheidsgehalte van de figuren van hun ideeënwereld is ingetreden. De categorieën fictie en historie ... worden 
niet duidelijk meer onderscheiden. Het intresseert niet meer, of de geestelijke stof op haar waarheidsgehalte 
beproefd kan worden. De opgang van het begrip mythus is hiervan het belangrijkste voorbeeld. Men aanvaardt 
een verbeelding, waarin de elementen wensch en fantazie bewust worden toegelaten...‟, Johan Huizinga, In de 
Schaduwen van Morgen: Een Diagnose van het Geestelijk Lijden van onzen Tijd, 6th edn (Haarlem: H.D. 
Tjeenk Willink & Zoon N.V., 1936), p. 93. 
2
 Mary Vincent, „Political Violence and Mass Society: A European Civil War?‟, in The Oxford Handbook of 
European History, 1914-1945, ed. by Nicholas Doumanis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 388. 
3
 Myths are a particularly relevant form of symbol in the emergence of mass political movements, as Edelman 
argued: Murray Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence (Chicago: Markham, 
1971), p. 53. 
4
 Peter Burke, History and Social Theory, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Polity, 2005), p. 113. 
5
 George L. Mosse, Nazi Culture: Intellectual, Cultural and Social Life in the Third Reich (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1986), p. 93. 
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significance. Cultural pessimists of the preceding decades, commenting on the explosive growth of 
print journalism and new technologies of mass production, appeared to be proven right.6 ‘The 
masses’ had acquired an ominous significance in European political culture already since the late 
nineteenth century, but it was the 1920s which really brought their political relevance to the fore.7 
‘The new politics drew the masses into rituals which connected to myths and symbols, which 
dramatised politics in spectacular ways.’8 From the perspective of the new political parties, Left or 
Right, mythic narratives could turn the inchoate masses into unified communities, create a sense 
of belonging and re-impose social order on a fractured society, through participation in ritual.9  
In the early 1930s, a new wave of rightist organisations hit Europe, in the shadow of the 
established Fascist regime in Italy and the rise of Hitler’s NSDAP in Germany. The small liberal 
democracies of the continent were no exception. In December 1931, the civil engineer Anton 
Mussert (1894-1946) founded the Nationaal-Socialistische Beweging (NSB, National Socialist 
Movement) in the Netherlands. Mid-January 1933, a young Swedish soldier, Sven Olov Lindholm 
(1903-1998), broke away from the Swedish National Socialist Party, and founded a new fascist 
organisation, Nationalsocialistiska Arbetarepartiet (NSAP, National Socialist Workers’ Party). 
Sweden and the Netherlands were not strangers to fascists, which had already caused noise in the 
previous decade, but these movements caused more of a stir in public life than any of their 
predecessors. Lindholm’s NSAP never managed to enter parliament, failing to collect more than 
0.7% of the national vote (1936), but quickly established itself as the largest (with circa 12 000 
members) and loudest of Sweden’s fascist groups. Mussert’s NSB on the other hand grew rapidly in 
its first years (up to about 50 000 members), and attained a highly unexpected 7.94% of the vote 
in the 1935 provincial elections, breaking the mould for newly formed parties, and focusing Dutch 
political debate on fascism for most of the 1930s. The NSB lost about half of its voters in the 
general elections of 1937 however, while the NSAP went into slow decline until it decided to 
rebrand itself as the Svensksocialistisk Samling (SSS, Swedish Socialist Union) in November 1938, 
                                                             
6
 Patrick Brantlinger, „Mass Media and Culture in Fin-de-Siècle Europe‟, in Fin de Siècle and Its Legacy, ed. by 
Mikuláš Teich and Roy Porter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 98–114 (pp. 99–104). 
7
 Stefan Jonsson, Crowds and Democracy: The Idea and Image of the Masses from Revolution to Fascism (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2013), pp. 7–17. 
8
 George L. Mosse, The Nationalization of the Masses: Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany 
from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich (New York: Howard Fertig, 1975), pp. 2–9. 
9
 Mosse, The Nationalization of the Masses, pp. 207–10; Jimmy Vulovic, Reform eller Revolt: Litterär 




and tried to diversify its appeal, to no avail. The NSAP/SSS dissolved itself in 1950 after more than a 
decade of further marginalisation. The NSB was dissolved in 1945 with the end of the German 
Occupation, and Anton Mussert executed the year after for treason. While some have seen these 
parties as a parenthesis in the political life of stable democratic regimes, they showed that, as the 
contemporary Dutch historian Johan Huizinga observed, no countries were immune to this new 
phenomenon in European politics, and the appeal of wilful myth-making was a crucial part of that. 
While not unique to fascism, ‘the most self-consciously visual of all political forms’,10 
fascists were the most open in their reliance on myth, and did so most visibly when they came to 
power in Italy and Germany.11 Benito Mussolini openly proclaimed the value and use of myth in 
his own politics.12 Adolf Hitler, echoing Gustave le Bon, affirmed the ‘feminine’ masses could be 
easily manipulated through simplistic narratives of good and evil, love and hate.13 While fascists 
also offered more or less feasible political programmes to the public and appealed to 
constituencies’ material interests, they constructed a myth of not just the utopian fascist 
community, but of themselves. This was a myth that aimed to transcend daily politics, and 
represented fascism in fantastical terms, as a crusade against evil and chaos. Fascists in the two 
countries that will be compared in this thesis, the Netherlands, and Sweden, were no exception. 
In the absence of international consistency in fascist party programmes and ideological 
rhetoric, fascism’s mythic constructions arguably formed its principal expression.  The fascist 
myth of fascism functioned as both identity and propaganda, as it mobilised members and 
attracted followers.14 Fascist myth was highly performative in character, and expressed 
aesthetically: mass rallies, visually striking propaganda, fantastical sloganeering, and moving 
rituals. Fascist performances were a political theatre with a penchant for spectacle, a ‘hothouse 
fusion of violence, myth, and aesthetics’ - and served to construct a fascism that was dynamic, 
                                                             
10
 Robert O. Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (London: Penguin, 2005), p. 9. 
11
 Peter Fritzsche, Rehearsals for Fascism: Populism and Political Mobilization in Weimar Germany’ (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 6–10. 
12
 Mark Neocleous, Fascism (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997), p. 20. 
13
 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf: Eine kritische Edition, 2 vols (Munich & Berlin: Institut für Zeitgeschichte, 2016), 
I, p. 193/507. 
14
 For the connection between fascist propaganda, aesthetics, and self-identity, see also: Thomas J. Saunders, „A 
“New Man”: Fascism, Cinema and Image Creation‟, International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 
12.2 (1998), 227–46 (pp. 235–36). 
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disciplined, and impressive.15 On this plane fascism was not a historically contingent political 
movement, but a history-making force destined to transform the eternal nation.16  
Historical literature has dealt extensively with the themes of myth, spectacle, and 
aesthetics in fascism, and this thesis shares some of that literature’s concerns about the function 
and impact of fascist myths, though it is not interested in analysing or defining fascism through its 
mythology. The principal queries of the thesis are about the processes at work behind fascist 
myths, how myths were actually produced in practice, here termed mythopoeia, myth-making. 
While myths have often been explained as a form of propaganda, mythopoeic processes highlight 
limitations to myth-making, revealing it as a pragmatic project that required resources, 
technologies, competencies, and money, thus tying what some might dismiss as nebulous fantasy 
to matters of organisation, finance, and infrastructure. By drawing attention to the connection 
between fascist myths and their production, other functions of myths within the party are 
revealed, as the role played by different sections of the party organisations and the cadres are 
foregrounded. Thus mythopoeia can explain the influences behind the shaping and changing of 
fascist myth over time, how it repeatedly mobilised fascist activists, and helped maintain party 
loyalty through long years of struggle. Consequently it also delineates the integral place of the 
mythopoeic process in the structure of fascist activism, while painting a diachronic picture of 
fascist myth. 
 The second concern of this thesis is to ground the analysis of fascist mythopoeia firmly in 
the context of a cultural-political struggle over the semantic meaning of ‘fascism’ and ‘national 
socialism’. In the words of David D. Roberts: 
 
The word ‘fascism’ was new in 1919, and no one knew what it meant; no one knew how whatever it 
denoted would develop. So even to say that ‘they’ - The Italians, the Fascists – ‘invented’ fascism is 
misleading. It was not something that could be invented. It simply emerged contingently from its 
                                                             
15
 David E. Apter, „Politics as Theatre: An Alternative View of the Rationalities of Power‟, in Social 
Performance: Symbolic Action, Cultural Pragmatics, and Ritual, ed. by Jeffrey C. Alexander, Bernhard Giesen, 
and Jason L. Mast (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 218–56 (p. 223). 
16
 Cf.: Paul Betts, „The New Fascination with Fascism: The Case of Nazi Modernism‟, Journal of Contemporary 
History, 37.4 (2002), 541–58 (p. 544). 
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contingent birth. It was through that contingent process that what came to be called fascism, first 
just in Italy, but then gradually more widely, came into the world.17 
 
The point to emphasise here is that fascism from its inception was very much an empty signifier, 
and that through the production of myths about fascism, fascists were contributing to a public 
discourse about the meaning of this new political phenomenon of the interwar period.18 Thus 
mythopoeia was a process in argument with liberals, conservatives, and socialists especially, in 
which fascists actively tried to construct fascism for the public as a transcendently fantastical force. 
But non-fascist outsiders were not politically blank slates, without any prior notions of their own 
about fascism, especially not in Sweden and the Netherlands, which in many ways were entangled 
with Germany,19 not least culturally and economically.20 Fascists had to confront competing 
discourses about fascism’s meaning, conflicting ideological hermeneutics that mediated the 
reception of fascist discourse and performance. The themes of contested interpretations, 
competing discourses, and challenges to what ‘fascism’ signified, make this thesis a cultural history 
about the political struggle for meaning in two different societies, connected by one of the crucial 
signifiers of interwar European politics.21 The centrality of myth pushes analysis towards the 
assignation of meaning through narratives. ‘Narrative is an arena in which meaning takes form, in 
which individuals connect to the public and social world, and in which change therefore becomes 
possible.’22 The research into myth is in the area of cultural history – the exploration of the 
generation of meaning and the structuring of the symbolic order23 – while the focus on the process 
                                                             
17
 David D. Roberts, Fascist Interactions: Proposals for a New Approach to Fascism and Its Era, 1919-1945 
(New York: Bergahn, 2016), p. 53. 
18
 Daniel Chandler, Semiotics: The Basics, 2nd edn (New York; ;London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 78–80. 
19
 Much as expectations of the NSDAP in Germany were conditioned by prior perceptions of Fascist Italy: Hans 
Woller, „Machtpolitisches Kalkül Oder Ideologische Affinität? Zur Frage Des Verhältnisses Zwischen 
Mussolini Und Hitler Vor 1933‟, in Der Nationalsozialismus: Studien zur Ideologie und Herrschaft, ed. by W. 
Benz and H. Mommsen (Frankfurt am Main: Geschichte Fischer, 1993), p. 47. 
20
 On the transnational reading of national comparative histories, see: Philipp Ther, „Beyond the Nation: The 
Relational Basis of a Comparative History of Germany and Europe‟, Central European History, 36.1 (2003), 
45–73 (pp. 67–70). 
21
 For a definition of culture as a site for the struggle over the terms of (collective) meaning, see: David Chaney, 
The Cultural Turn: Scene-Setting Essays on Contemporary Cultural History (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 
11–23. 
22
 Introduction to: Beyond the Cultural Turn: New Directions in the Study of Society and Culture, ed. by 
Victoria E. Bonnell, Lynn Hunt, and Richard Biernacki (London: University of California Press, 1999), p. 17. 
23
 „Central to all forms of cultural history, is the process of symbolic mediation through which human beings 
make sense of their world.‟ Anna Green, Cultural History, Theory and History (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008), p. 9. 
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of myth-making, mythopoeia, draws attention to the practical and material dimensions of cultural 
production. 
 The Netherlands and Sweden provide the comparison to understand the significance of 
fascist mythopoeia in this context of public discourse about fascism. As two (supposedly) stable 
liberal democracies, both of which remained neutral during the First World War, they raise 
interesting questions about the operations of fascist movements and the dissemination of fascist 
myth within their borders. Swedish and Dutch fascists did not typically have a background of war 
experience, nor did the national political and legal cultures permit extensive violence, which did 
so much to shape the experience of Italian squadristi and German SA-men. Carrying arms risked 
an effective ban of the party organisation. Political uniforms were prohibited in 1933 – earlier than 
most countries24 – and paramilitaries soon followed.  In other words much of the organisational, 
experiential, and aesthetic structures that shaped fascist myth-making in other countries was 
missing or limited here. At the same time public discourse about fascism was heavily influenced 
by the examples of the Italian and German dictatorships, which by the 1930s had a largely negative 
image in the small democracies, which felt threatened by their German neighbour in particular.  
This was unpromising ground for fascist movements, yet nevertheless many movements 
did emerge throughout the interwar years, persistent in the face of repeated failures to break 
through. This provides an opportunity to answer questions about how fascist organisations 
retained a loyal following for decades, and sustained fanatical activism under discouraging 
conditions. It also elucidates the barely understood connection between fascism’s international 
image as propagated by the fascist regimes and their enemies, and indigenous fascist movements’ 
efforts to construct their own image of fascism, in a trying and ambivalent relationship with their 
counterparts in other countries. This was an ‘era of fascism’, in which most of the continent 
seemed to contemporaries to be turning fascist;25 the situation of self-defined fascists in these 
more or less resolutely democratic countries provides a fertile basis from which to study the 
cultural construction of fascism in Europe. How did established international ideas of fascism put 
pressure on smaller national movements to conform in their myth-making, while their own liberal 
democracies forced them to adhere to the norms of political respectability? Did their mythopoeic 
                                                             
24
 Vincent, p. 394. 
25
 Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism: Action Française, Italian Fascism, National Socialism (New York: 
Times Mirror, 1965), p. 21. 
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efforts shape the public perception of fascism at all, and how was it tied to the development of 
fascist subjectivities? And could Swedish and Dutch fascists really manage and afford the 
apparatus required to create a convincing mythic construction of fascism for themselves and their 
constituencies? How did their diminutive size, legal limitations, and international context shape 
mythopoeic processes?  
The comparative method is particularly valuable here, as the two broadly similar 
democracies help identify the common effects of democratic conditions on fascist movements, 
while the fascist movements in question were different enough in character, and trajectory, to 
pinpoint what was unique. Sweden and the Netherlands shared enough characteristics to set them 
apart from other European states in this regard: neutrality during the First World War, 
constitutional monarchy, lasting parliamentary democracy during the interwar period, cultural 
ties to Germany, and so forth. But at the same time the fascist movements in question turned out 
quite differently, with Dutch fascists managing to acquire a significant following in the 1930s. 
 While fascism as a regime has been researched a great deal, there is tremendous analytical 
potential in studying fascist movements under trying and unpromising conditions, even (or 
especially) if they ‘failed’. The Swedish National Socialist Workers’ Party and the Dutch National 
Socialist Movement are – still under-researched – movements which can provide insights into the 
conditions of success and failure for fascism in Europe, the efficacy and limitations of fascist 
organisation, and the dynamics of mythopoeia within party culture and public discourse. 
 
II 
The cultural approach to fascism, which analyses fascism ‘from the inside out’, grappling with the 
world view it constructed through discourse, performance, and aesthetics, has been gaining 
ground since the 1960s. George L. Mosse’s Nazi Culture (1966), presenting a wide-ranging 
collection of original Nazi texts with commentary, was one early such work, which tried to answer 
the question of how fascism impinged on the consciousness of its subjects.26 ‘Fascism considered 
as a cultural movement means seeing fascism as it saw itself, to attempt to understand the 
movement on its own terms. Only then, when we have grasped fascism from the inside out, can 
                                                             
26
 Mosse, Nazi Culture, p. xix. 
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we truly judge its appeal and its power’.27 With the 1970s cultural turn in political history such 
approaches became more common. Aesthetics and spectacle have occupied a privileged position 
in the cultural analysis of fascism, often understood as part and parcel of its appeal. Historians 
such as Ernst Nolte described it as a ‘spellbinding of the senses by pageantry and parades’;28 
Modris Eksteins saw Nazism as a ‘beautiful lie’ which through kitsch spectacle and excitement 
sought to displace ethical considerations.29 Gerhard Paul’s study of Nazi propaganda photography 
stated Nazism was ideologically void, instead best understood as a movement of propaganda, 
using aesthetic appeals to the emotions against the dry language and rational discourse of 
democracy.30 Works on the Nuremberg Parteitäge, the spectacular choreography of Albert Speer, 
or the Nazi Thingspiel, have relied on similar narratives of a nihilistic fascism exploiting modern 
technology to aesthetically manipulate ‘the masses’;31 in Sweden Ingemar Karlsson and Arne Ruth 
described the Third Reich as turning society into a theatre, transforming citizens into a work of art, 
guising a spiritual vacuum and ethical monstrousness.32 
 By the 1990s George Mosse assessed there had been growing awareness in the 
historiography of the role of aesthetics in fascism’s appeal, but noted there was more work to be 
done on the function aesthetics played in self-representation and fascist subjectivity.33 While 1990s 
historians like Jeffrey T. Schnapp, in Staging Fascism (1996), asserted that ‘fascism often amounted 
to little more than a complex of ethical principles, credos, myths, and aversions, held together by 
opportunism and rhetorical-aesthetic glue’, they recognised in the process that the aesthetic-
symbolic dimension of fascism played a crucial role in its self-definition.34 Simonetta Falasca-
Zamponi’s Fascist Spectacle (1997) similarly saw fascist aesthetics as building the Italian regime’s 
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 George L. Mosse, The Fascist Revolution: Toward a General Theory of Fascism (New York: Howard Fertig, 
1999), pp. x–xi. 
28
 Nolte, p. 39. 
29
 Modris Eksteins, Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age (New York: Mariner Books, 
2000), pp. 304–12. 
30
 Gerhard Paul, Aufstand der Bilder: Die NS-Propaganda vor 1933 (Bonn: J.H.W. Dietz Nachf., 1990), pp. 12–
13. 
31
 See for instance: Henning Eichberg and Robert A. Jones, „The Nazi Thingspiel: Theater for the Masses in 
Fascism and Proletarian Culture‟, New German Critique, 1977, 133–50. 
32
 Ingemar Karlsson and Arne Ruth, Samhället som Teater: Estetik och Politik i Tredje Riket (Stockholm: Liber, 
1983), pp. 16–24. 
33
 George L. Mosse, „Fascist Aesthetics and Society: Some Considerations‟, Journal of Contemporary History, 
31.2 (1996), 245–52. 
34
 Jeffrey T. Schnapp, Staging Fascism: 18 BL and the Theater of Masses for Masses (Stanford: Stanford 
University, 1996), p. 6. 
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power and asserting its authority, but at the same time creating its own story and identity.35 For 
Mabel Berezin theatre in Mussolini’s Italy was a way of forging a fascist community,36 and went 
further in Making the Fascist Self (1997), reconstructing how the regime used mass rituals to create 
a fascist identity, with the public spectacles as a point of access for participants into the fascist 
community, merging the public and private self through emotional force.37 In 1993, Emilio 
Gentile’s Il culto del littorio revived the concept of political religion to underscore the religious-
liturgical dimensions of fascist rituals, proposing that they bestowed a religious aura, exciting faith 
and devotion by imputing divine meaning to political phenomena.38 While Gentile popularised 
political religion, religion was really only one of several registers in which fascists performed, 
while, his critics argue, the distinction between the concept’s actual analytical value and enticing 
metaphorical suggestiveness remains unclear.39 
 Through the foregrounding of ritual, ceremonial, or liturgical elements in fascism, which 
owed so much to the cultural turn’s focus on rituals and symbols, as well as the ‘discursive turn’ of 
the 1980s,40 historians were more prone to take political style and rhetoric seriously, and by 
extension the myths they conveyed. Alongside the spate of works on the cultural-aesthetic in 
fascism in the 1990s came Roger Griffin’s 1991 The Nature of Fascism, which foregrounded the 
matter of ideology again in the form of myth, in a cultural context. His book argued for a heuristic 
definition of fascism that would adequately capture what was new and unique about far-right 
movements, organisations, and regimes of Europe in 1918-1945, and promote a fruitful analysis of 
fascist ideology in these terms. His minimalist ideal type definition of fascism as ‘palingenetic ultra 
nationalism’ – an extreme nationalism driven by the myth of national rebirth – clearly captured 
the imagination of many scholars in the field, and has within two decades become a standard 
reference point in the historiography.41 Griffin argued for the ‘primacy of culture’ in fascism, 
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 Simonetta Falasca-Zamponi, Fascist Spectacle: The Aesthetics of Power in Mussolini’s Italy (London: 
University of California Press, 1997), pp. 1–4. 
36
 Mabel Berezin, „The Organization of Political Ideology: Culture, State, and Theater in Fascist Italy‟, 
American Sociological Review, 56.5 (1991), 639–51 (p. 639). 
37
 Mabel Berezin, Making the Fascist Self: The Political Culture of Interwar Italy (London: Cornell University 
Press, 1997), pp. 5–7, 19–28. 
38
 Emilio Gentile, The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy (London: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. ix; 
Emilio Gentile, Politics as Religion (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 36–37. 
39
 Martin Baumeister, „Faschismus als “politischer Religion”‟, in Der Faschismus in Europa: Wege der 
Forschung, ed. by Thomas Schlemmer and Hans Woller (München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2014), pp. 
17–33 (pp. 67–69). 
40
 Introduction to: Bonnell, Hunt, and Biernacki, p. 8. 
41
 Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (Oxon: Routledge, 1993), pp. 32–55. 
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reconceptualising ideology through myth (palingenesis),  a focus on ‘the underlying ideological 
matrix of fascist thought, policies and action, not on fascist “doctrine” itself’.42 The ‘New Consensus’ 
Griffin asserted seems illusory, and it is questionable to what extent Griffin’s palingenetic 
orientation has actually led to new research contributions in the field, but his polemic is 
symptomatic of the entrenchment of cultural approaches to fascism.43 
 The significance of Griffin’s approach to this thesis is limited, but it has placed the role of 
myth in the centre stage of fascism,  and analysing it as more than propaganda. Griffin has 
proposed that myths could be used to understand fascist mentalities or subjectivities, and by 
extension their actions, moving beyond instrumental interests or programmatic ideological 
goals.44 This has been practised in cultural approaches to fascism before, but without focusing 
explicitly on myth.45 However, the insistence on palingenetic myth over any other, no matter how 
supposedly ‘heuristic’, has proven to be of little help. The same could be said of the academic 
construction of a ‘generic’ fascism. David D. Roberts is correct when he argues that the use of a 
priori frameworks such as heuristic definitions restrict our understanding of what fascists actually 
said or thought – myth and activism are far more multivalent and complex than Griffin implies.46 
The use of definitions is unnecessary, if one recognises that fascism, semiotically an empty 
signifier, was a historically contingent phenomenon which was and always remained a work-in-
progress, open to interpretation and revision from all sides. Nietzsche’s dictum, that whatever has 
a history cannot be defined, applies especially in this instance, where the focus is on tracing how 
contemporaries constructed fascism (mythopoeia) in the first place.47 
 Some historians have regarded the cultural focus of Griffin as generalising, too synchronic 
and ahistorical, as well as too idealistic, arguing the primacy of culture lacked any sense of power 
or connection to real world activism. Michael Mann asked in Fascists (2004), ‘[h]ow can a “myth” 
generate “internal cohesion” or “driving force”? A myth cannot be an agent driving or integrating 
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 Roger Griffin, „The Primacy of Culture: The Current Growth (Or Manufacture) of Consensus within Fascist 
Studies‟, Journal of Contemporary History, 37.1 (2002), 21–43 (p. 34). 
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 Arnd Bauerkämper, Der Faschismus in Europa 1918-1945 (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2006), p. 35; Baumeister, p. 
11; David D. Roberts, „Myth, Style, Substance and the Totalitarian Dynamic in Fascist Italy‟, Contemporary 
European History, 16.1 (2007), 1–36 (pp. 1–7). 
44
 Griffin, The Nature of Fascism, p. 44. 
45
 E.g.: H.R. Kedward, Fascism in Western Europe, 1900-45 (Glasgow: Blackie, 1969), p. 222. 
46
 David Roberts, „Fascism and the Framework for Interactive Political Innovation during the Era of the Two 
World Wars‟, in Rethinking Fascism and Dictatorship in Europe, ed. by António Costa Pinto and Aristotle 
Kallis (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), pp. 44–47. 
47
 Friedrich Nietzsche, Zur Genealogie der Moral: Ein Streitschrift (Leipzig: C.G. Naumann Verlag, 1907), 2:13. 
11 
 
anything, since ideas are not free-floating. Without power organizations, ideas cannot actually do 
anything.’48 But Mann, like other historians, has not been willing to disregard the cultural and 
mythic elements of fascism altogether in his research, and have acknowledged that fascists’ own 
beliefs need to be taken into account, no matter how irrational.49 In the more recent 
historiography, Sven Reichardt has developed a ‘praxeological’ or cultural-pragmatic analysis of 
fascism, which focuses on the ‘thinking within action’, i.e. how cultural-ideological forms are 
revealed through fascist action and behaviour, rather than analysing ideas about the world. This is 
a way of not getting at the ideas themselves, but at the significant energy and fanaticism that 
fascism managed to mobilise, through their ideas.50 Fascist culture, in the broadest sense of the 
word, is here tied to social practice, using concepts like Pierre Bourdieu’s habitus and corporeal 
repertoire. Repeated actions, habits, and practices had a creative dimension: fascist praxis was in 
this sense discursive, and generative of meaning, hence an element in the struggle for meaning.51 
In his book Fascistischer Kampfbünde (2009), Reichardt shows how violence was used socially to 
construct a fascist community, and culturally to create symbolic meaning for fascism as a 
revolutionary, disciplined, anti-bourgeois force.52 Rejecting an identifiable essence or nature of 
fascism, Reichardt understands fascists dynamically in their immediate context, through their 
actions and performances and the meanings they generate. In their immediate context means that, 
for instance, a ritual is analysed in its practical and material context, foregrounding the mundane 
aspects of fascist performance.53 
 This approach places political-cultural history within a social and at times micro-historical 
framework, in a way that is immediately relevant to the present purpose of analysing mythopoeia 
in the context of discourses about fascism. It brings out the aesthetic-emotional dimensions of 
fascism, questions of subjectivity and identity, and the mythic, while grounding them in pragmatic 
everyday concerns of resources, finances, competencies, and political organisation. It also favours 
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the analysis of fascism at the movement stage, instead of the regimes which have typically been 
privileged by historians. Cultural pragmatism, by placing cultural expression in the realm of day-
to-day action, underlines the contingency of fascism: constructed through mythopoeic 
performances, enacted by the party organisation and the cadres through repeated actions. By 
bringing in cadres and organisation into myth-making, the aesthetic and spectacular can be 
analysed in practical terms. Political spectacle, such as mass rallies or carefully choreographed 
rituals, required the close attentions of the party organisation, the mobilisation of the fascist 
cadres, financing, use of technologies and competencies, as well as attention to matters of space 
and mise-en-scène. The aesthetics of fascism then can be seen as not just propaganda, or the locus 
of identity and representation, but the interface of practical organisation and myth. At the same 
time it shows how fascists in the process practically engaged in a cultural struggle for the meaning 
of fascism, as the pragmatic requirements of fascist performances link them to political activism. 
Beyond fascism, this can elucidate the importance of myth in the politics of interwar Europe, how 
it related to contemporary political organisations and infrastructure, and the viability of extremist 
activism under democratic conditions. As such it touches on some of the most significant 
questions of modern mass politics in the first half of the twentieth century, such as the interface of 
myth, modern technology, and party organisations; the resistance of the democratic public sphere 
against new political-discursive techniques; and how extremist political actors participated in and 
exploited public discourse to further their ends. 
 
III 
Having set the historiographical background, it is now possible to turn to the theory and 
methodology of the thesis. The premise is that there is no need to define or characterise fascism 
politically, intellectually, socially, or otherwise; instead the background question is what 
contemporaries understood by fascism, and how those who identified with it (fascists), 
constructed it. Actions or performances will be privileged in analysing the construction of fascism, 
while textual discourse will predominantly be analysed insofar as it facilitated performative 
construction. 
 From this cultural point of view fascist political performances were not just propagandistic 
or mobilising, but mythopoeic. By means of understanding this myth-making as both performative 
13 
 
in nature and actively constructing the thing which it signifies, one can also see how this applies 
not only to organised political events, but also extends to unplanned incidents, behaviour, props, 
clothes. A spontaneous street fight between a fascist and a communist – what Reichardt termed 
‘the everyday symbolic struggles on the street’54 – could reiterate a narrative of fascism in 
accordance with its image as disciplined bulwark against Bolshevism. The individual behaviour of 
a fascist member in a public space fed into public perceptions of what fascism was; the uniform a 
fascist wore itself contributed to the myth of fascism as a violent or disciplined force. These less 
organised, unscripted types of representation and behaviour formed a repertoire that was no less 
performative.55 However, this repertoire of fascist expression could undermine the myth as well as 
reiterate it: unscripted performances carried risk, and in the interstices of mis-performance others 
significations of fascism ‘leaked out’, alternative narratives opened up for consumption by the 
public.56 This dynamic points to the open-endedness of reception, and the irregular conveyance of 
myth: fascist performances had highly variable mythopoeic potential. Focusing on the process of 
the creation of meaning in mythopoeia, in the context of alternative narratives and discordant 
hermeneutics, allows for a dynamic analysis of fascist signification.57  
 Discourse did not float freely, but was bounded by human agency. Exclusive focus on myth 
and political respectability in terms of discourse would be too synchronic; it is through attention 
to the practical aspects and (historical) contingencies of human social activity in performing, 
acting, and reacting to discourse that agency is re-inserted. The concept of mythopoeia in 
particular stresses the active engagement of actors with discourse; even as fascist subjects 
themselves were produced by the same discourse, they and their opponents engaged in a constant 
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re-evaluation and re-signification which destabilised meaning and brought about change.58 Active 
engagement is emphasised specifically through the contingencies of performance, which 
accentuates the social dynamics of the production of meaning.59 Jeffrey C. Alexander employs a 
theory of performance in relation to ritual, which is particularly apt for understanding fascist 
mythopoeic performances such as rallies or marches. Centring on the pragmatics of social 
performance, Alexander sees performance as presenting an account to an audience, where 
‘[s]uccessful performance depends on the ability to convince others that one’s performance is true, 
with all the ambiguities that the notion of aesthetic truth implies’.60 Ultimately, the less contrived 
the performance is perceived to be, the more true seems the account it presents. This depends on 
practical skills and abilities of the actors, as well as access to the mundane material things that 
make the performance possible. Elements like mise-en-scène, script, props, actors’ abilities, and 
the susceptibility of the audience, all move to produce ‘the emotional connection of audience with 
actor and text and thereby to create the conditions for projecting cultural meaning from 
performance to audience’.61 It is a theory which relates the performance to its historical material 
and social organisation and conditions, bringing out how those affect the communication of and 
identification with (mythic) narrative. It also leaves space for hermeneutics to intercede in the 
performance, as part of the social conditions that govern reception, as an antagonistic audience 
can discern the seams of the performance through their access to alternative discourses.62 
 However, Alexander’s theoretical framework is of little use for understanding unscripted 
modes of mythopoeia, such as the mythopoeic potential that resided in day-to-day behaviour and 
lifestyle, clothing, composure, etcetera. Instead, a transposition of queer theorist Judith Butler’s 
idea of gender performativity is useful here. The discursive construction of fascism through 
mythopoeia, and the performativity of mythopoeia itself, points to fascist identity essentially as 
the enactment of a fantasy. Beyond scripted spectacles, mythopoeia continued with and within 
the individual fascist on the street, when identified as such, in the way they walked, talked, 
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dressed, or fought. ‘Such acts, gestures, enactments, generally construed, are performative in the 
sense that the essence or identity that they otherwise purport to express are fabrications 
manufactured and sustained through corporeal signs and other discursive means.’ Fascism in this 
sense has no ontological status apart from the acts that construct and constitute it.63 Butler’s idea 
of performativity as comprising the entire ontological status of gender can, mutatis mutandis, be 
transposed to the political identity and image of fascism, as a social phenomenon which is not a 
discreet entity. Such performative, constitutive acts do not just constitute identity, but also 
constitute it as a compelling illusion, an object of belief.64 This is crucial to fascism’s mobilising 
potential. Moreover, Butler’s definition of performativity as being the requirement of a repeated 
performance to sustain the constitution of the thing itself is particularly useful here. ‘This 
repetition is at once a reenactment and reexperiencing of a set of meanings already socially 
established; and it is the mundane and ritualized form of their legitimation.’ The identity is then 
made up through ‘the stylised repetition of acts’.65 Performativity points not only to how 
mythopoeia constructs ‘fascism’ outside of organised spectacle or textual discourse, inscribed onto 
the ‘surface’ of the fascist body, but also the connection between mythopoeia and fascist identity 
as the enactment of fantasy. Lastly, this conception allows one to avoid the mistake of assuming 
that ‘fascism’ is something that can be properly embodied, that a ‘fascist’ is someone whose 
performance has any referent beyond themselves. Properly understood, the performativity of 
fascism means that whether outsiders perceived self-identified fascists as they represented 
themselves has nothing to do with the ‘truth’ of their representation, but the credibility of their 
performance.66 
 While cultural pragmatic approaches to fascism, if not always explicitly recognised as such, 
have been relatively common in the past decade, performative analyses of fascism remain scarce; 
if not so much in studies of Italian and German fascism, certainly among the minor movements.67 
But fascists at the movement ‘stage’, without the support of the state, or even any big investors, are 
particularly good subjects for the study of how daily activist behaviour, and the modern political 
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party such as it emerged after the First World War, could make themselves count (or not) in public 
discourse. 
 The Swedish NSAP and Dutch NSB have both left ample archival material which details 
the functioning and development of their respective party apparatuses. These sources of the day-
to-day administration of the parties are essential in providing the pragmatic basis for their cultural 
practices, and give the requisite insight into the resources and organisation at their disposal to 
perform fascism. Meetings, rallies, marches, and other elements of the fascist repertoire were 
extensively discussed and analysed by functionaries, in internal correspondence, circulars, 
minutes, reports, and similar administrative material, which gives a handle on the practical 
aspects of mythopoeia, the practice and process behind the myths. The NSAP in particular was 
also extensively monitored by the secret police, so that the police archives provide extensive 
descriptive material of party activities, the internal mood and plans for the future, as well as 
volumes of confiscated party material, both published and confidential. Often this internal 
material gives flashes of insight into the precise intentions behind the parties’ outward 
presentations to the public, and their internal aims. But much of the resulting myth-constructions, 
the performances on the ground, are supported best by the newspaper material. The weekly party 
newspapers represent a large bulk of continuous fascist discourse that was constantly involved in 
the mythopoeic process. This newspaper discourse was itself a performative, discursively 
constructing fascism, but also supported embodied performativity by guiding readers in their 
interpretation of the performances, for instance through highly ideological and verbose reports on 
rallies. Where available, non-fascist newspapers, local and national, are used to provide a 
contrasting perspective on these events, and show how the mythopoeic endeavour was actually 
received, and highlight its inevitable flaws and seams. Together these various sources, official and 
informal, public and confidential, allow us to reconstruct and compare local fascist mythopoeic 












The discussion above has shown that while the Italian and German regimes still loom large in 
fascist research, the cultural turn has accentuated the relevance of lesser known, smaller fascist 
groups in the context of a pan-European set of practices and discourses.68 Comprehensive histories 
of generic fascism such as Stanley G. Payne’s A History of Fascism, 1914-1945 (1995), Philip Morgan’s 
Fascism in Europe, 1919-1945 (2003), Robert O. Paxton’s The Anatomy of Fascism (2004), or Arnd 
Bauerkämper’s Der Faschismus in Europa 1918-1945 (2006), deploy narratives which pay attention 
to the shared practices, symbols, and discourses beyond Italian and German ‘role models’, and 
emphasise the unique contributions and variations between nations.69 However, one obstacle that 
still stands in the way of is the dearth of actual research done into some of the ‘lesser fascisms’, 
particularly in English. In 2015 Roger Griffin still complained that it ‘“stands to reason” that the 
central plot, the main dish, the top billing in this field are Mussolini’s Italy and Hitler’s Germany’, 
expressing a legitimate worry that fascism is needlessly characterised as some sort of spurious 
‘Nazi-Fascism’ hybrid.70   
Some work has been done to rectify this. The volume Fascism and Dictatorship in Europe 
(2014) edited by António Costa Pinto and Aristotle Kallis, has explored how political cultural 
practices of fascism have been opportunistically borrowed and exploited by more traditional 
authoritarian regimes in Europe, fruitfully revealing the ‘complex transnational dynamic that 
involved inspiration, political learning, reflexive cross-fertilization and competition which 
perforated and muddled the boundaries between political categories and constituencies of the 
inter-war European right’, and extending fascism’s analytical range.71 In 2017 Arnd Bauerkämper 
and Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe explored the transnational connections between fascist regimes 
and movements in Fascism without Borders.72 The turn towards the transnational has had the 
additional benefit of highlighting the contingency and malleability of fascism’s politics and 
ideology, focusing not on internationally shared characteristics, but how techniques, ideas, and 
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practices were transferred and exchanged over borders, and adopted, adapted, or rejected as they 
did so, without needing to refer back to a true original or identify a fascist essence. As Samuel 
Goodfellow showed in his excellent article on fascist organisations in Alsace, ‘[f]ascists in different 
countries shaped the idea of fascism to their own purposes. The process of transnationally 
interpreting other fascist movements altered the collective meaning of fascism, opening up new 
ways to organise, implement and understand fascism’.73 Such an open-ended understanding of 




The state of research on Swedish fascism up to this point can be succinctly characterised as dire. 
The electoral failure of indigenous fascist movements – peaking at 0.7% of the vote in 1936 – in 
Sweden during a period most notable for the entrenchment of Social Democratic hegemony has 
given scholars little impetus to look into the Swedish fascists of 1922-1945, which have been 
commonly regarded as fundamentally alien to Swedish history.74 Indeed, the bulk of scholarship 
dealing with Swedish fascism has focused specifically on anti-fascist opinion.75  It was only in 1970 
that Eric Wärenstam produced the first historical work on Swedish fascism, Fascismen och 
Nazismen i Sverige, 1920-1945 (Fascism and Nazism in Sweden), and since then new works have 
been few and far between.76 And while Wärenstam laid the foundations for future scholarship, 
doing a great deal of impressive original research and source-collecting for the book, it is too short 
for any in-depth analysis. Wärenstam’s description of the developments and failures of the most 
prominent figures on the fascist scene in Sweden were a crucial start for the historiography, and 
his plotting of the key developments still shapes how historians view the period today, but his 
understanding of fascist ideology was at times incoherent and vague, and he did little to elucidate 
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the organisation and inner workings of the fascist parties. Wärenstam had no interest in 
contemporary cultural approaches to fascism, so that his work, while comprehensive, gives no 
insight into what it meant to be a fascist in interwar Sweden.  
The 1990s saw a renewed attempt by Heléne Lööw to write a history of Swedish fascism in 
her more extensive Nazismen i Sverige, 1924-1979 (Nazism in Sweden), based on her PhD thesis 
Hakkorset och Vasakärven (The Swastika and the Wasa Sheaf), but as the chronology suggests she 
considered interwar fascism mostly as the predecessor of neo-fascism, which was attracting 
attention at the time.77 Lööw’s PhD thesis tackled matters of organisation more thoroughly than 
did Wärenstam, but her work tends to lump together the multiple fascist parties she studied, and 
analyses them synchronically. It took until the twenty-first century for a call to be made for more 
serious academic research into historical Swedish fascism, with a 2002 article by Lena Berggren in 
the Journal of Contemporary History, ‘Swedish Fascism – Why Bother?’ (also published in Historisk 
Tidskrift as ‘Swedish interwar fascism – An uninteresting marginal phenomenon or important 
research subject?’).78 Berggren, whose previous work focused on the intellectual history of 
antisemitism in Sweden, rejected the assumption that fascism was alien to Swedish history, and 
questioned the idea that Swedish fascists were merely emulating the NSDAP. Instead she 
emphasised how key fascist ideas about race, nation, and society were prevalent in Sweden and 
did not depend on any German influence, and how Swedish fascists sought to maintain 
independence from German Nazism. Moreover, Berggren argued that past scholarship has been 
excessively moralising, keen to denote fascist mavericks as outsiders in a country devoted to 
benevolent neutrality. With this starting point she hoped that the number of scholars working in 
the field would increase, and improve on ‘the as yet embryonic fascist studies in Sweden’.79 
 As Berggren’s angle suggests, she pursued the issue mainly through an intellectual history 
of fascism, as exemplified by one of her recent articles on Per Engdahl, a figurehead of Swedish 
fascism until the 1990s.80 Klas Åmark’s comprehensive 2011 work on Sweden’s wartime 
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relationship with Nazi Germany, Att Bo Granne med Ondskan (To Be Evil’s Neighbour), 
investigates fascism in Sweden with unprecedented detail, and takes full account both of Lööw’s 
and Berggren’s research, but has a rather old-fashioned moralising approach to the subject, and 
does not seek to understand the indigenous fascists in their own right.81 Åmark’s work is also 
symptomatic of a much stronger academic interest in Nazi Germany’s influence on, and activities 
in, Sweden, rather than indigenous fascism.82 Henrik Arnstad’s Älskade Fascism (Beloved Fascism, 
2013) is a work which understands fascism as a European ideology with a global reach, and relies 
heavily on Roger Griffin’s notion of palingenetic ultra-nationalism. While not presenting any 
original research of its own, it broke the mould as one of the first Swedish books to look at fascism 
‘from the inside’, although Arnstad devotes most of his attention to the neo-fascist 
Sverigedemokraterna (Sweden Democrats).83 Per Svensson’s 2014 Vasakärven och Järnröret (The 
Wasa Sheaf and the Steel Pipe) is another example of this trend, investigating the origins of the 
Sweden Democrats in the interwar fascist milieu of Lund university, showing how new research is 
being stimulated by recent political developments in Swedish politics.84 Such research tends 
towards a somewhat teleological analysis however, aiming firstly to explain contemporary 
political developments, and focusing heavily on the transfer of ideology and continuity of 
personnel over time. 
 More important to the concerns of this thesis is a 2009 monograph by Henrik Dammberg, 
Nazismen i Skaraborgs Län, 1930-1945 (Nazism in Skaraborg Province), which provides a brief but 
detailed analysis of fascist activism in one Swedish province. While Dammberg’s understanding of 
fascist ideology and inter-party differences is rather crude, his tracing of developments in party 
organisation and campaigning tactics adds flesh to the bones of fascism research. His research 
focuses on various fascist groups, particularly the NSAP/SSS and the SNSP, how they tried to win 
members and votes in the region, their electoral strategies, and the dissemination of propaganda, 
especially among school youths. His work also engages with incidents of violence with political 
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opponents, and fascist terror.85 While his work is localised in character, the case study sheds some 
much needed light on how fascist organisation and activism practically worked – it remains to 
give a more focused picture of the NSAP specifically, and gain an understanding of its operations 
nationally. 
 The first scholarly work to be focused on the NSAP specifically came from Viktor Lundberg 
in 2014, with En Idé Större än Döden (An Idea Greater than Death), which successfully employs 
some of the insights of cultural theory, particularly poststructuralist discourse analysis, in 
analysing proletarian culture in Lindholm’s party. Lundberg has based his analysis on much-
needed original research in party and police archives, which have seen little use since the work of 
Wärenstam and Lööw in the seventies and nineties. While Lundberg’s handling of Foucauldian 
and Althusserian concepts of discourse and ideology are sometimes clumsy, and often obscure the 
role of individual agency, En Idé Större än Döden nevertheless represents a hitherto rare focused, 
scholarly engagement with Swedish fascism beyond the range of an article.86 Lundberg’s work is 
one of the first to engage directly with fascist political culture in Sweden; his analysis also covers 
the role of myth in the NSAP, particularly that of ‘workers’ Sweden’ (arbetar-Sverige), but he stays 
on the discursive level alone, and does not take into account other forms of cultural construction. 




While Anglophone scholarship on fascism in the Netherlands remains scarce and generally poor 
in character, riddled with basic factual errors and out of touch with recent research, Dutch studies 
of fascism are rich in quantity and quality.87 From its historical origins Dutch fascism spawned a 
large volume of literature, polemic and academic. The minor fascist groups of the 1920s did not 
manage to attract much of the attention that was then largely focused on Fascist Italy, but with 
the rise of the NSB in 1931, public and scholarly attention shifted towards the domestic scene. Of 
course, the spectacular growth of the NSDAP in neighbouring Germany helped foster a new-found 
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interest in all things called national socialist, and this German connection would prove to be an 
irrevocable part of the literature on Dutch fascism. For instance P.A. Diepenhorst’s Het Nationaal-
Socialisme (1935) understands National Socialism as an essentially German ideology, and calls the 
Dutch and German National Socialists ‘children of one spirit’.88 
Interest in the national experience of Nazi occupation after the Second World War was 
immediate. The collection of material for a special war archive (RIOD, National Institute for War 
Documentation) started as early as 1944.89 Directed by Louis de Jong (1914-2005), this collection 
became the foundation for an innumerable mass of writing on the Netherlands during the Second 
World War. de Jong’s twenty-six volume History of the Kingdom of the Netherlands during the 
Second World War was published 1969-1994 and remains a standard reference work for anyone 
studying the period. German historians have also contributed important work on this subject, not 
least Konrad Kwiet’s 1968 Reickskommissariat Niederlande, a still authoritative analysis of the 
politics of the Nazification project in the Netherlands.90 Works focusing on various aspects of the 
1940-45 period have been forthcoming constantly since the 1950s, as literature on fascism in the 
Netherlands has gravitated around the Dutch experience of Nazi occupation.91  As Dutch historian 
Jennifer Foray put it: ‘To be sure, popular audiences and scholars alike remain highly captivated by 
– if not wholly obsessed with – the wartime years’.92 
The foundations for a historiography of Dutch fascism in its own right were laid in the 
1960s. G.A. Kooy’s 1964 sociological study of the Winterswijk community and its high proportion 
of fascist voters, Het Echec van een ‘Volkse’ Beweging (The Failure of a ‘Volkish’ Movement) remains 
a standard work on the social composition of the NSB.93 The same year saw the publication of 
L.M.H. Joosten’s Katholieken en Fascisten in Nederland (Catholics and Fascists in the Netherlands), 
perhaps the first serious study of the various minor fascist groups the Netherlands saw in the 
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1920s.94 But it is A.A. de Jonge’s Crisis en Critiek der Democratie, (1968, The Crisis and Criticism of 
Democracy) which serves as the first comprehensive study of far-right ideological currents in the 
interwar period. Together with his Het Nationaal-Socialisme in Nederland from the same year, the 
two books give a solid overview of fascist organisations and ideology in the Netherlands.95 
However, as Konrad Kwiet pointed out in his 1970 article, ‘Zur Geschichte der Mussert-Bewegung’, 
there was still need for a proper history of the largest and most notorious of fascist groups in the 
Netherlands, the NSB, as the literature was only concerned with the movement as a peripheral 
issue in the wider debate about collaboration.96  
Since then a great deal of research concerning virtually all imaginable aspects of the NSB 
has been done, generally in tandem with the social-cultural turn, but initially without any 
engagement with NSB fascism ‘from the inside out’. For a long time more in-depth discussions of 
fascist ideology or its particular political character remained rare, as they seemed to require some 
sort of empathetic engagement with the original fascist discourse, an approach indelibly 
stigmatised by the war experience itself. In 1983 Ronald Havenaar contributed a very brief 
monograph on NSB ideology, De NSB tussen Nationalisme en ‘Volkse’ Solidariteit, (The NSB 
between Nationalism and ‘Volkish’ Solidarity), but after that almost no studies were devoted to 
this area, nor have did any works try to engage with it from a cultural angle for a long time.97 Focus 
shifted instead predominantly to the organisation of the NSB, social composition, the biographies 
of its members, and their relationship with the German authorities. 
 It is only in the past decade that Dutch scholars have been keen to abandon a traditional 
approach to fascist ideology as a set of programmatic ideas and values, and have instead turned to 
culture to understand the NSB and their kind. Gerard Groeneveld’s twin studies of NSB literature 
and musical culture, published 2001 and 2007 respectively, are good examples of high quality 
original research that has been done into Dutch fascist culture. Groeneveld’s work is interesting 
for its subject of fascist discourse in published literature, which it analyses specifically with 
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reference to the context of practical production. For instance he has gone to some length to 
reconstruct the process behind the publication of the Dutch translation of Mein Kampf (1939).98 
His work on NSB musical culture stands even closer to the subject of this thesis, connecting NSB 
music to its organisation, examining the propagandistic aims of song, and the myths which poetic 
expression invoked, while also considering the reception of fascist music on the streets.99  
With a more local perspective on the subject, Damsma’s and Schumacher’s Hier Woont een 
NSB’er (2010, Here Lives an NSB-Member) is a stellar attempt to understand the NSB in 
Amsterdam as constituting a cultural community, with their own social rituals, pastimes, and 
conventions, placing emphasis on the day-to-day life of its members.100 The book also explores 
NSB relations with outsiders, and goes some way to confront the paradigm of NSB-members as 
social pariahs.101 The authors paint a picture of the NSB’s community, in which members could 
socialise with like-minded people, and find support when rejected by other communities (such as 
the Church). This is in turn used to explain how cadres could be mobilised effectively; Damsma 
and Schumacher point to the social cohesion and ‘cosiness’ the party’s organisation generated.102 
This analysis is another contribution towards understanding the connection between fascist 
organisational forms, activism, and culture, though the authors do not explore the significance of 
myth, while the analysis is strictly limited to the 1940-45 period. 
 One recent addition to these new approaches to the NSB is René van Heijningen’s 2015 De 
Muur van Mussert (Mussert’s Wall).103 The subject of his work is a ceremonial wall-like structure in 
Lunteren, built by the NSB in 1936, which fell into disuse during the German occupation, but 
stands to this day. Heijningen places the NSB rallies in the perspective of both 1930s political 
culture, and in comparison with Nazi Germany’s Nuremberg rallies and Thingstätte, inspired by 
historians of fascism like Roger Griffin (fascism inspiring feelings of mythical rebirth) and Emilio 
Gentile (political religion, and the focus on the fascist ‘symbolic universe’). He gives some good 
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insights into the political and personal decisions that lurked behind the organisation of the rallies 
associated with the wall, and many of the practical issues that beset the meetings. The theoretical 
side of his work is less strong however, using his cultural theoretical concepts more to justify his 
research rather than harnessing their analytical potential. The reader is given a great deal of 
insight into how the Lunteren rallies were organised, but analysis of the experience of the rallies 
does not go much further than noting it was ‘impressive’, generated cohesion, or had a religious 
atmosphere. In other words, Heijningen’s work does not elaborate sufficiently on the significance 
– in every sense of the word – of the performances he has investigated, for which myth and 
mythopoeia would be an excellent way forward. 
On the whole, work on the cultural dimensions of the NSB in the twenty-first century has 
been invaluable, and we know a great deal more about NSB subjectivities and myths than two 
decades ago. We also know thankfully much more about how the NSB’s organisation was 
implemented in practice, and how it related to party activism, although the picture here remains 
partial due to the selective or localised nature of research so far. As with the Swedish literature, 
there is however much more scope for the analysis of fascist myth-making, while the image of 
fascism, and the cultural production of fascism, has not been explored in performative terms, and 
tied to a wider political public discourse about fascism. 
 
V 
In the history of fascism in Europe, the Netherlands and Sweden stand out as unlikely breeding 
grounds for fascist movements. While the intellectual roots of fascism are often traced back to the 
nineteenth century, particularly Romanticism and fin de siècle cultural pessimism, as a movement 
it is most commonly seen as a product of World War 1.104 In contrast to those countries where 
fascists gained a mass following – Italy, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Romania – Sweden and the 
Netherlands remained neutral during the conflict. Without soldiers united by the experience of 
combat, and the social dislocation following demilitarisation, nor a context of large-scale leftist 
rebellion, these democracies lacked some of the strongest drives for the formation of fascist 
movements.105 ‘The northwest already had stabilized liberal regimes before 1914. Its governments 
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and electorates confronted the economic and military crises with orderly changes of government 
leaving unchanged the basic constitution of liberal democracy.’106 This seems particularly true of 
Swedish politics, which is often characterised as quiet and un-dramatic, even compared to 
neighbouring countries.107 In the words of the historian Per T. Ohlsson, ‘Swedish politics can be 
quite boring. That is exactly why it is so exciting’.108 
 But it has become something of a cliché to describe the governments of North-Western 
Europe as peaceful and stable democracies, even as peace-loving islands, mentally and culturally 
isolated from the rest of the continent.109 Sweden and the Netherlands did not escape the socio-
economic disruption of the war,110 and while they did not produce a class of ex-service men that 
could provide a ready organisational basis for fascism, there were several political groups that 
could be sympathetic to a new breed of Rightist politics. As the example of the 1918 Finnish Civil 
War demonstrated, it was perfectly possible for a country with virtually no prior combat 
experience, and a long tradition of strong civic institutions, to rapidly develop new forms of 
brutally violent politics.111  
Both the Netherlands and Sweden suffered economically from the war, especially due to 
the loss of trade with Germany, and the Netherlands had enormous debts by 1919.112 Sweden got 
into conflict with Britain over its exports of iron ore and foodstuffs to Germany; and in 1917 
Hjalmar Hammarskjöld’s Conservative government had to introduce rationing to avoid famine.113 
As bread prices on the black market rocketed, riots broke out, which were suppressed by the 
police and military. The revolutionary atmosphere in neighbouring Russia proved infectious, and a 
break-away faction from Socialdemokratiska Arbetarepartiet (SAP, Social Democratic Workers 
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Party), led by Zäta Höglund, made calls for a soviet republic in Sweden. In March 1917 cabinet 
resigned, and was replaced by a moderate right-wing cabinet under Carl Swartz.114 At the same 
time in the Netherlands, the liberal cabinet of P.W.A. Cort van der Linden had created a myriad of 
crisis committees to arrange rationing, which maintained a semblance of order while criticism of 
the government grew. At the end of the war the Dutch army, was in a state of unrest to the point of 
open rebellion, encouraging the government to speed up demobilisation. In light of socialist 
uprisings in Germany, the Dutch cabinet considered making concessions to the socialists at 
home.115 However, this provoked Pieter Troelstra, leader of the Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiders 
Partij (SDAP), to take the opportunity to call for revolution. Mid-November 1918 Troelstra was 
discussing the formation of workers’ and soldiers’ soviets to replace government, but found there 
was insufficient support, and the momentum petered out, an episode pathetically dubbed 
‘Troelstra’s mistake’.116 
 The two countries managed to avoid the extreme ends of disorder and violence at the end 
of the war, and in both cases Liberal parties managed to push through electoral reforms, which 
came to characterise the politics of the interwar period. In Sweden, after the 1917 elections saw the 
loss of further seats for the Right (Högern, Conservative party), the King failed to negotiate a 
coalition government, and was ultimately forced to appoint Liberal leader Nils Edén as PM of a 
Liberal-Socialist government. In the wake of the Russian Revolution and the revolts in Germany, 
the Conservatives supported electoral reforms, intimidated by the revolutionary atmosphere.117 
The plan to push through women’s suffrage was included in the government’s proposal, but was 
limited to a right to vote in municipal elections. Women were emancipated from male 
guardianship in 1920, while formal equality was finally assumed in 1921.118 In the Netherlands 
universal suffrage and a compulsory vote were introduced in 1918, with proportional 
representation for the 150 seat lower chamber (States General).119 As in Sweden, one of the 
immediate consequences was the decline of the Liberal Party, and the growth of the SDAP into the 
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second largest party in parliament. However, Troelstra’s mistake gave the confessional Right an 
excuse to avoid collaboration with the Left, while the Catholic party had grown to be the largest 
party in parliament, and the fundament for all interwar governments. The bishops had in any case 
prohibited cooperating with socialists bar in a situation of ‘extreme necessity’, which eventually 
came in 1939.120 
 With the electoral reforms and proportional representation, as well as the socio-economic 
dislocation of the post-war period and concerns about the growing Left, there was some basis for 
fascist parties in the 1920s. Even if the two countries in question remained beyond the perimeter 
of violence that had been generated by the Bolshevik coup and the subsequent fighting in Central 
and Eastern Europe, they were not unaffected by the fear of contagion. News reports of extreme 
violence, famine, and chaos, as well as the stories of émigrés, had their impact also in North-
Western Europe.121 This was perhaps most true of Sweden, which was immediately affected by the 
short but brutal outburst of political violence in the 1918 Finnish Civil War, reifying the 
Russophobia that had been a cornerstone of nationalist mobilisation for over a century.122 Swedish 
volunteers, in the face of a reluctant government, went to Finland to fight on the White side, not 
least the Swedish Brigade which fought up to Lempäälä, where they met up with German troops 
that had crossed from Estonia.123 Swedes also participated in the White Terror during the Finnish 
conflict.124 Few, if any, Dutch men managed to find their way into the rightist militaries that 
roamed Central-Eastern Europe in this period, but many did serve in the civil militias that 
spawned in response to Troelstra’s call for revolution.125 These paramilitary groups were formed on 
local initiative in 1918 in the major cities, to defend against ‘revolutionary turmoil’. They were soon 
put under state control, but were distinctly right-wing, and included the Reformed Cornelis van 
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Geelkerken (1901-76), later co-founder of the NSB.126 Like van Geelkerken, many militia-men came 
from an ultra-conservative religious background, and combined nationalist sentiment with a 
powerful fear of atheist socialism. 
The first self-defined fascists in the Netherlands emerged in 1922; a group of Catholic 
intellectuals around the periodical Katholieke Staatkunde (Catholic Statecraft) edited by Emile 
Verviers, which was initially a rather conservative paper in the anti-modernist tradition of Pius X, 
but which started to take a new political direction after the March on Rome.127 The group never 
grew beyond the periodical, not least because it incurred the displeasure of the bishops.128 In 
Sweden the first fascist group was a similarly limited affair, in the form of Svenska 
Nationalsocialistiska Frihetsförbundet (SNFF, Swedish National Socialist Freedom League), 
founded in 1924 by the Furugård brothers, Birger, Sigurd, and Gunnar. Their party was directly 
inspired by a meeting with Hitler’s NSDAP the year before, but in spite of an ambitious party 
organisation they never managed to grow beyond their home place in Deje, Värmland.129 
 It was in the second half of the 1920s that the first serious and lasting groups were formed. 
In 1926, after the Swedish Social Democratic government’s cuts to military spending the previous 
year, another fascist group was founded by a handful of soldiers and officers stationed in 
Stockholm. Sveriges Fascistiska Kamporganisation (SFKO, Sweden’s Fascist Militant Organisation) 
was led by the Baltic war volunteer Konrad Hallgren, Sergeant Sven Olov Lindholm, and 
Lieutenant Sven Hedengren. They were backed by Elof Eriksson, a renegade co-founder of 
Bondeförbundet (Agrarian League), who was fascinated by Fascist Italy, but also had connections 
with Erich Ludendorff and Julius Streicher.130 This black-shirted group was predominantly 
concerned with anti-parliamentary politics and the threat of communism (Hedengren himself 
monitored communist groups for the army), and attracted some attention in the media on 
account of potentially illegal arms acquisition and the military training programme through which 
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it put its members, led by a high proportion of NCOs. The SFKO may have had as many as 7000 
members.131 The young sergeant Lindholm remained active in the successors of the SFKO, until he 
broke away from Svenska Nationalsocialistiska Partiet (Swedish National Socialist Party, SNSP) in 
January 1933, and led a break-away group, the NSAP. 
 In the Netherlands it was the ‘Belgian Treaty’ (1925-27) which occasioned a nationalist 
outcry, and created the necessary pressure for far-right organisation, particularly beyond a 
confessional politics. The treaty allowed Belgian access to the Moerdijk canal via Antwerp, and 
under the treaty, supported by France, the right to pass through the canal with war ships if 
necessary. Nationalists decried what they termed a ‘Belgian Versailles’ impinging on Dutch 
sovereignty; at their head was a nationalist civil engineer, the young Utrecht Chief of Water 
Management, Anton Mussert. The treaty was abandoned under the pressure, and momentarily 
brought Mussert into the political limelight, which would eventually lead him to found his own 
party, the NSB, in 1931.132 (The decade did see the rapid emergence and dissolution of a number of 
other fascist parties: particularly the Verbond van Actualisten (League of Actualists) in 1923, led by 
Sinclair de Rochemont, and briefly supported by Verviers’s Catholic group, but it disappeared in 
1925 when it was cut off from the funds supplied by the millionaire Alfred Haighton.133 Figures like 
Sinclair and Haighton would continue to quarrel through a number of other fascist parties 
throughout the decade, but attracted little attention, and achieved less.) 
 While Sweden and the Netherlands fared very differently during the interwar period, 
neither of them possessed stable governments in the 1920s, and both presented a number of 
political opportunities which could aid the growth of fascism. Between 1918 and 1933 Sweden went 
through eleven cabinets,134 while no Dutch cabinet in this period managed to fulfil its four-year 
term.135 In 1922 the Swedish Liberal party split over the alcohol Prohibition Referendum,136 while 
the Dutch Liberals were equally divided into declining progressive and conservative parties which 
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had lost their footing after the electoral reforms.137 Sweden at the time was going through a drawn-
out agricultural crisis. Farmers suffered as sugar beet and grain prices declined, while in the north 
the lumber industry was taken over by big corporations, to the dismay of private owners. With a 
strong communist presence in northern Sweden, this led to repeated conflicts between employers 
and workers, with a series of strikes and lockouts culminating in the May 1931 shootings in Ådalen, 
where soldiers shot five workers to protect strike breakers.138 The Great Depression hit Sweden in 
1930,139 and unemployment peaked in 1933 at 23%, hitting farmers and industrial workers 
hardest.140 Dutch agriculture was also under pressure, and was severely damaged by the drawn-out 
depression. Unemployment remained high throughout the 1930s, going over 500-600 000 in 
1936.141 Desires for a more authoritative government were fuelled a year before when a Dutch 
battleship stationed in the East Indies was taken over in February 1933 by Indonesian mutineers, 
supported by Dutch communists in the Netherlands, and some members of the parliamentary 
SDAP.142 (The situation was resolved when the ship was bombed by order of PM Hendrik Colijn, 
earning him a lasting reputation as a rightist strongman.)143 Labour unrest came to a head in July 
1934 with riots in the Jordan district of Amsterdam, which saw communists and fascists confront 
each other on the streets, and brutal police suppression.144 
 The NSB could exploit a niche peculiar to Dutch politics, which was defined by the 
phenomenon of pillarisation (verzuiling), the vertical division of society into rigidly self-contained 
groups centred on their respective ‘pillars’.145 In the interwar period these were first of all the 
pillars of Catholicism and Protestantism, and thirdly socialism. While the concept of pillarisation 
has become increasingly contested in Dutch scholarship in the past decades, and its definition 
controversial, it remains a good model for explaining and summarising the Dutch socio-political 
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environment of the interbellum.146 Each pillar had its own party, but also its own trade unions, 
newspapers, clubs and schools, ensuring the isolation of each pillar from the others, as well as the 
loyalty of voters to their corresponding party.147 This was most effective in the case of the Roomsch-
Katholieke Staatspartij (RKSP, Roman Catholic State Party),148 which throughout the interwar 
period managed to hold around 30% of the vote. The Protestant vote in turn was divided between 
the Calvinist Christelijk-Historische Unie (CHU, Christian-Historical Union) and the orthodox 
Calvinist Anti-Revolutionaire Partij (ARP, Anti-Revolutionary Party), holding c. 20-25% of the vote 
between them. Government was thus largely in the hands of the confessional parties, loosely 
united against the ‘pagan’ parties. The NSB railed against these divisive social-confessional 
structures, pleading for an organic national unity, while attracting that remnant of Dutch society 
which fell outside the pillars. 
 Only in the Netherlands did fascists grow to be any kind of threat at all, as the NSB enjoyed 
a rapid rise to prominence with an impressive 7.94% of the vote in the provincial elections of 1935, 
before losing almost half of those votes in the general elections of 1937. In Sweden the NSAP 
peaked in 1936 at a dismal 0.7%. On the other hand, while the Swedish cadres were small, there 
was also widespread sympathy for some of their political goals, and they managed to attract a 
considerable audience with their street activities.149 So while opportunities for establishment and 
growth did exist, democratic parliamentary government was never under serious threat in either 
of these countries. Only in the Netherlands, from 1933 to 1937, was the NSB a serious concern to 
the establishment, a contrast with Sweden which did much to shape attitudes to fascism in the 
1930s, as well as fascist performative strategies. 
 In the Netherlands, political uniforms in public were banned in 1933. Paramilitary 
organisations such as the NSB’s Weerafdeeling (WA, Defence Department) followed in 1936. 
Parliament enacted legislation banning members of revolutionary organisations from being part 
of state-organised civil militias, the army, and then the civil service.150 While Mussert initially 
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managed to convince the Anti-Revolutionary PM Colijn not to put the NSB on the list, the latter 
soon changed his mind. In May 1934 Mussert himself was forced out of his job as Chief Engineer, 
and started to devote all of his time to the party. That same year the Catholic episcopacy issued a 
pastoral letter warning against the dangers of fascist parties, and the year after threatened to 
withhold the sacraments from whoever offered significant support to the NSB. The pastoral letter, 
Salvation in the Lord, issued 2 February 1934, speaks volumes on contemporary perceptions of 
Mussert and the NSB: 
 
it is difficult to discern in how far various fascist or national socialist currents accept the ‘total state 
[…] but sooner or later they will certainly end up under this influence of the deification of the state 
or nation. The great intellectual currents of global developments usually influence each other in 
irresistible ways… […] A certain moderation on the part of the leadership is … not the slightest 
security for the future development of a movement. […] Moreover, it is more than likely that every 
fascism and national socialism in the Netherlands will in the long run be controlled by a group of 
people, who largely do not share our world view. 151 
 
The Swedish NSAP did not enjoy any such notoriety, and during the 1930s Lindholm’s party would 
be repeatedly frustrated by the lack of exposure. Here too political uniforms were banned in 1933, 
and the party paramilitary, SA, came under repeated police investigation forcing organisational 
changes, but overall they attracted limited attention from either media or government. 
 Nor was Swedish society divided in anything like the way the Netherlands was. Virtually all 
Swedes were gathered under the Lutheran state Church, while politically the socialist party 
managed to secure an ever larger share of the vote, in compromise with the reactionary Agrarian 
League. This was the famous kohandel (horse trading), which to a large extent defined Swedish 
politics in the 1930s. The SAP had secured 41.7% of the vote in the 1932 elections after a campaign 
attacking the structural weaknesses of capitalism, and initiated negotiations with Axel Pehrsson in 
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Bramstorp of the Agrarian League, allowing for more active government intervention in the 
economy, and definitively undermining right-wing opposition.152 Whether SAP economic policies 
and kohandeln indeed brought Sweden out of the Depression remains up for debate, but 
undoubtedly it did wonders for the Social Democrats’ reputation and popularity.153 Under the 
Minister of Finance’s explicitly Keynesian economic programme unemployment was virtually 
eradicated, the economy prospered once more – not least the metal industry, which benefited 
from rearmament in Germany – while agriculture experienced the advantages of protectionist 
policies and mechanisation.154 Fascism was of minimal concern to Per Albin Hansson, PM for most 
of this period, unlike for his Dutch counterparts, who presided over parties much more threatened 
by a new force on the Right. 
 Doubtless Sweden and the Netherlands were not as severely affected by the explosion of 
violence, unrest, and political uncertainty generated by the First World War, the Central and East 
European revolutions, and their aftermath as the countries that experienced these first hand. But 
this explosion was not neatly contained by national borders, and the new sense of political 
opportunities these events generated was intrinsically transnational, especially when viewed from 
a cultural perspective.155 Democratic norms, and anti- or non-fascist constructions of political 
respectability prevailed in these two nations during the interwar period, each in their own way, 
but they were not somehow excluded from new political ideas. While they did not experience the 
same extent of political street violence that Reichardt argues was central to fascist representation 
and identity,156 violence went beyond praxis; Swedish and Dutch fascists ultimately drew on the 
same performative repertoire as their more successful counterparts elsewhere, but modified their 
challenge to parliamentary legitimacy to their own contexts. Of course in this they were ultimately 
unsuccessful, but their participation in the Swedish and Dutch public fora is an important element 
in the history of fascism’s spread and development in Europe. It also gives a much-neglected 
perspective on the interwar interaction between respectability and democratic norms, and 
transnational fascist political methods and violence, as it had settled in the second half of the 
interbellum.  
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It is in this historical context that the mythopoeic processes of the NSB and NSAP will be analysed, 
with reference to the dictates of respectability peculiar to Sweden’s and the Netherlands’ socio-
political cultures. The first chapter will analyse the party apparatuses, and reconstruct how they 
waged propaganda, organised their members, and directed mythopoeic performances with the 
resources at their disposal, in the national context they found themselves. Both parties had 
derived their party structures from the German NSDAP, but quickly adapted it to their own 
situations, and very different resources. Party rules and regulations, circulars and directives, 
organisational correspondence, and other internal documents are central to this chapter. The 
second chapter will focus on the respective leaders at the head of the parties, Mussert and 
Lindholm, and the mythopoeia of them as charismatic fascist Leaders. The myths of the Leader are 
understood principally through their discursive construction in the party organs, and the rituals 
and cults developed around them. The third chapter will move on to the rank-and-file, taking the 
political uniform as its subject, and the myth of the movement as an army of political soldiers that 
it produced. A fascist repertoire of dress, composure, symbols, and acts infused the individual 
fascist with mythopoeic potential, a repertoire which most directly connected individual fantasy 
to the wider mythopoeic project. The fourth and final chapter will look at the mythopoeic project 
in its holistic manifestations, the party conventions. On a regular basis the NSAP and NSB held 
massive conventions that mobilised a significant percentage of its cadres, meant to be the most 
impressive and spectacular representation of fascism in its transcendent, ideal form. These 
resource-intensive pieces of grand political theatre were intended as expressions of the true 
potential of the fascist party, and hoped to show the movement’s capacity to authenticate the 
myth, for members and outsiders alike.
36 
 
1. The Apparatus: propaganda, organisation, resources 
Myths abounded in the discourse of the NSAP and NSB. Putting fantastic self-representations into 
words was easy enough, but mythopoeia, the actual process of producing myths and 
communicating them convincingly to a wider audience was a formidable challenge. Reproducing 
fascist fantasies through discourse and performances that bore the hallmarks of authenticity 
required not just fascist will, but the means of symbolic production.157 It required an extensive 
propaganda apparatus which commanded the numbers, competence, organisation, and finances, 
to ensure the performative discipline of its members, orchestrate political theatre on a grand scale, 
and interpose a mythic hermeneutics between audience and performance. Converting the public 
and mobilising the cadres required practical and material resources. To this, organisation was 
crucial. 
 Dutch and Swedish scholarship have hitherto neglected in-depth analysis of the respective 
party apparatuses of the NSAP and the NSB, of the kind done by Dietrich Orlow for the NSDAP.158 
While the sources are available, the countless forms, regulations, reports, and other administrative 
documents that filled the party filing cabinets have apparently been dismissed as dull and 
uninformative. Some historians have simply assumed that the apparatuses were carbon-copies of 
the NSDAP’s (itself hardly a static organisation), without fully exploring the implications if that 
were indeed the case. For the NSB some of the work has been done, including some impressive 
studies of regional and local organisations, but never as an end in its own right, and not in any 
greater detail.159 For the Swedish NSAP this work has barely been done at all, bar a few bare-bones 
pages of Heléne Lööw’s PhD thesis.160 The initial histories on Swedish fascism have focused on 
giving a summary overview of all fascist movements, and focused on matters of ideology, member 
composition, and voting patterns.161 More recent work like Victor Lundberg’s has dealt with the 
NSAP organisation specifically, but only narrowly in relation to other questions.162 But the inner 
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workings of the party apparatus can be highly informative, and give a direct insight into some of 
the chief concerns of the party. 
 This chapter explores the party apparatuses of the NSAP and the NSB, detailing the 
organisation; outlining the chain of command to see who bore responsibility for the execution and 
implementation of propaganda; the tools of propaganda available to each party to construct and 
disseminate their myths; and the role of the rank-and-file, who were the fundament of all 
mythopoeic efforts in their smallest details. The overall purpose is to give a heuristic overview 
which can serve as the basis for the analysis of specific mythopoeic performances in the next 
chapters. Once the division of responsibility and the means of implementation are sketched out, 
the discussion will go on to describe the organisational structures that were in place in both 
movements to actually orchestrate their political performances and discourses, and connect them, 
culminating in the public meeting. The public meeting was at the performative forefront of fascist 
mythopoeia, as the party newspaper was at its discursive front.  
 This comparative description naturally relies heavily on the regulations, rules, and 
directives of the parties, but also entails an analysis of the qualitative differences between the two 
organisations, and highlights their flaws and the obstacles they faced. Here it will quickly become 
apparent that while the NSAP and NSB relied on the same organisational model, and closely 
shared a party structure, in practise they worked remarkably differently, as the workings of the 
apparatuses were highly contingent on their national context and political fortunes. 
 
I 
The NSB and the NSAP both started out as strictly hierarchical organisations, with a centralised 
command structure, with more or less dictatorial powers assigned to the Algemeen Leider Anton 
Mussert and Partiledaren Sven Olov Lindholm. Whereas the fascist movements of the 1920s in 
Sweden and the Netherlands tended to be ruled by oligarchical councils,163 the new movements of 
the 1930s took a leaf from the book of the later NSDAP.164 Correspondingly these parties tended to 
be known to outsiders as the Mussert-Movement or Lindholm-Movement. Power flowed directly 
from the headquarters in Utrecht and Gothenburg, (later Stockholm), with limited autonomy for 
local party formations. The pyramidal hierarchy was in both cases based on a flow of responsibility 
                                                             
163
 E.g.: Pauw, p. 22; Wärenstam, p. 55. 
164
 For an account of how the NSDAP power structure was centralised and personalised, see Orlow, I, chap. 3. 
38 
 
from the Leadership, consisting of a Headquarters of Departmental leaders, to the District Leaders, 
Circle Leaders, Group Leaders, down to Block Leaders. In both cases the District Leaders 
(gewestelijk leider and distriktsledare), based on the German Gauleiter, were often part of the 
Leadership (NSB) or closely cooperated with it (NSAP). This structure, as the Swedish police 
observed, was carefully copied from the NSDAP – the NSAP kept detailed diagrams of the German 
party structure at their headquarters.165 The NSB organisation, designed by Mussert, was less 
elaborate from its inception, and used the 15 member Group as its smallest unit.166  The most 
important level for political organisation and collective action in the NSB was the Circle (kring, 
theoretically 1000-4000 members), for which most of the regulatory material was written, while in 
the NSAP principal organisational action devolved to the Local Group (ortsgrupp, 75+), rather 
than the Circle (krets). Thus, the two party organisations were by no means identical, the NSB 
being a newly formed party for which Mussert developed the organisation throughout 1932, while 
the NSAP grew out of the previous organisations of the SNSP and SFKO. Comparing the parties’ 
hierarchical organisations, it becomes evident that, in spite of being significantly smaller than the 
NSB, the NSAP had a more complex, but not more functional, organisation.  
At the head of the Swedish NSAP hierarchy stood partiledningen, the Party Leadership, a 
body with significant authority, led by the Party Leader as primus inter pares. The body assembled 
at least once a week.167 NSAP leadership at times resembled a hybrid between the collegial 
structure of the 1920s and the Führerprinzip.168 The Leadership, consisting of over a dozen 
members with ever-shifting roles and responsibilities, changed far too frequently in its precise 
composition to detail in full, and in most cases there is little biographical information available on 
the individuals that held office. But a few figures are worth mentioning.  
                                                             
165
 Memorandum concerning police raid, 22 May 1935, pp. 23-24, Swedish National Archives (Riksarkivet): 
Arninge (SÄPO Archive), dossier 2H1.  
166
 Measure of the Administration No 1: Regarding the organisation, Utrecht, 1 February 1932, Amsterdam: 
NIOD (Dutch Institute for War Documentation), Archive 123 (NSB Party Archive), 1.1 (Leadership): dossier 3.  
167
 Sven Olov Lindholm, Lindholm interview with Ingemar Carlsson, 1980-81, tape 00258: b, Swedish National 
Archives: Marieberg, SO Lindholm‟s Collection, vol. 4. 
168




Figure 1. The NSAP-members who broke away from SNSP in 1933. Oscar Landahl, sitting in front row, on the far-right; Per 
Dahlberg, second row, on far-left; Lindholm, second row, third from the right; Gunnar Svalander, back row, third from the left. 
Photographer unknown. National Archives of Sweden, Marieberg, SO Lindholm’s collection, vol. 6. All photographs used with permission 
from the archive. 
The closest person to Lindholm was the Deputy Leader. Initially this position was held by Gunnar 
Svalander, a key figure in the party 1933-36, who initially held the position of Party Secretary, and 
later that of the highly influential Party Organiser.169 Svalander was in the first years crucial in 
overseeing the organisation and party projects such as the annual conventions. Eventually he 
rebelled against Lindholm after the electoral disappointment of 1936, and replaced as Deputy by 
Per Dahlberg.170 Dahlberg, the glasses-wearing intellectual of the movement, with a degree in 
political science and economics, was the party’s chief ideologist, and always worked closely with 
the partiledare.171 Perhaps politically the most astute of the chief functionaries, he was considered 
something of a moderating force in the party, and appears to have been one of the main movers 
behind the ‘New Direction’ [nyorientering] towards respectability at the end of 1938. He worked as 
party speaker, wrote numerous articles for the party papers, and held a number of other 
influential positions in the NSAP throughout the decade, including editor of the weekly party 
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newspaper, publisher and editor of the monthly theory journal Nationell Socialism, leader for the 
Political Commission (Polkom), Press Chief, Party Organiser, and head of the members’ training 
and education service. He eventually quit in 1940 after being called in for military service. Another 
ubiquitous figure was Oscar Landahl, a popular party speaker, but most importantly Party Chief of 
Propaganda in 1933-35. He was also the party’s electoral candidate for Gothenburg. As chief of 
propaganda he was replaced in 1935 by Erik Fahl, another speaker and sometime Political 
Secretary with growing influence in the party. Eventually he would become permanently 
employed as organiser of Western Sweden in 1939.172 Fahl’s replacement as propaganda chief was 
Björn Dahlström, a lawyer by training, and son of the famous socialist writer Kata Dahlström 
(1858-1923), but already in 1939 replaced by Bertil Siven.  Herbert Hultberg was a loyal colleague of 
Lindholm, who worked as Party Secretary from 1936, and organised the daily business of 
Headquarters. Bertil Brisman was a political adviser for Lindholm, and Polkom Secretary with a 
particular interest in cultural politics, was briefly Party Organiser in 1936, and a party speaker.173 
In the Dutch NSB there was no real alternative to Mussert’s increasingly charismatic 
leadership, who worked closely together with the loyal party co-founder Cornelis Van Geelkerken, 
who acted as Deputy Leader and General Secretary.174 Van Geelkerken was also briefly in charge of 
Department II (Finance), General Leader of Propaganda in 1936, and leader of the evanescent 
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Instead of relying extensively on other HQ members, individual Department leaders did not 
appear to yield much influence outside of their limited spheres. Instead political influence in the 
party was tied to Mussert’s favour, and whoever he had most use for at the time. Count Marchant 
d’Ansembourg, District Leader for Limburg & North-Brabant, and a key member of the Church 
Council for Catholics, always wielded a great deal of authority, and was NSB representative in the 
Dutch Senate from 1935. The Calvinist bloed en bodem theorist E.J. Roskam was another member of 
the Church Council (for the Reformed), and director of the National Press office. J. Hogewind was 
Commander of the paramilitary WA until its disbandment in 1936, and F.W. van Bilderbeek played 
an important role as Head of Finance and Administration. Finally there was M.M. Rost van 
Tonningen, a former League of Nations diplomat from Austria, and personal friend of Heinrich 
Himmler, who joined the party in 1936 and was immediately assigned as editor of the party’s new 
daily newspaper Het Nationale Dagblad (The National Daily). He played an important role as a 
radical Germanophile ideologist, but largely during the Occupation, and with limited success on 
account of his tremendous unpopularity in the NSB.175 These different leadership organisations 
were also reflective of Mussert’s and Lindholm’s competencies and responsibilities in the party. 
While Mussert could invariably be found in his office in Utrecht, centrally located in the Dutch 
Randstad megalopolis, Lindholm was occupied as the chief party speaker for months at a time 
during his propaganda tours, which took him as far afield as Lapland and Norrbotten.176 Mussert by 
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contrast sometimes only spoke at propaganda meetings two or three times per month, in cities no 
more distant than Hilversum or Dordrecht.177 
The structures of the organisations did not remain static, and were improved regularly, 
especially after elections which tended to foreground problems in the apparatus. It was 
particularly the geographical administration of the party branches which they had inherited from 
the NSDAP which required adjustment. In 1935, after the Dutch May elections, the leadership 
structure of the essential Circles were changed in the NSB, with the Circle Leader being integrated 
into a troika with a Head of Propaganda and a Head of Staff, so that the Circle Leader would no 
longer be swamped by administrative issues.178 After the disastrous 1937 elections, the handful of 
gewesten were abolished to instead be replaced by twenty-four distrikten, undercutting the power 
of District Leaders, and allowing more precise management from Headquarters. With roughly two 
distrikten per province, it allowed a closer connection between locality and Headquarters, also 
addressing complaints about a lack of immediate contact with the centre.179 Previous District 
Leaders d’Ansembourg and Plekker were given oversight over the new district system as a whole.180 
The headquarters were constantly expanding: new headquarters were created in Amsterdam, 
Hilversum (1936) and The Hague (1937), as new functions were created, or the dozen departments 
redistributed to match up geographically with their responsibilities.181 
In Sweden, the NSAP reformed the District system several times. Distriktschefer (North, 
East, Southeast, South, and West) were instituted gradually across the country as more branches 
were established over time and attempts at organising them were made; these were then given a 
make-over in 1936 when they were re-named landsinspektörer,182 and reduced in number 
(particularly the party gave up on the North, as the hoped-for growth there was frustrated).183 They 
were renamed ländermän in 1938,184 until the system was finally abolished in 1939, to instead focus 
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on kretschefer, the Circle Leaders, as the nexus of centre and locality.185 The reasons for these 
changes will be explored further below. The NSAP’s centre of gravity also shifted over time, quite 
unlike the NSB in Utrecht. Headquarters were initially placed in Gothenburg, where the SNSP 
from which the party broke away was initially located. But as the party started to expand in 
Stockholm in 1934-35, the organisation moved eastwards, with more and more of the organisation 
established in the capital, until Headquarters was moved there in 1937. The Gothenburg branch 
crumbled only a year later, especially as underperformance in the elections meant it lost much of 
its funds. While Headquarters remained in Stockholm for the rest of the party’s existence, there 
was a further shift in the organisation to the south, as ground was won in Malmö, where it would 
eventually hold one of the annual conventions in 1939. 
 Centrally propaganda was organised by the parties’ respective propaganda departments. 
In the NSAP, propagandaavdelningen was headed by the Party Chief of Propaganda, and 
coordinated by the Party Organiser. The department was subdivided into a Meeting Department, 
Writing Department, and News Centre.186 In November 1938, with the appointment of Björn 
Dahlström, the organisation was expanded to include a functionary for the technical side, and a 
propaganda council was formed to coordinate propaganda better.187 The NSB Propaganda 
Department (Department III) was led by a Propaganda Leader, aided by the Propaganda Council. 
The department was responsible for five areas: the speakers’ service, external propaganda, written 
propaganda (in conjunction with the Press Department), film and photo propaganda, and the 
negligible Labour Front.188 While little archival material remains to elucidate how the internal 
workings of these departments played out in practice, the resulting decisions were implemented 
through Circle functionaries. In the Netherlands, Circles maintained their own Propaganda 
Department with a corresponding Propaganda Leader, immediately subordinate to the Circle 
Leader, who received circulars with instructions from the central department, and worked 
together with the Circle Leader to implement the directives.189  
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The NSB propaganda functionaries also had, unlike the NSAP, a considerable information-
gathering organisation at their disposal. A Documentation Service was founded from the party’s 
inception. Via the Central Bureau of Documentation, the rank-and-file were instructed to send 
local news reports concerning the party to Utrecht including hostile or friendly statements, 
evidence of corruption and similar information against opponents, and generally keep it informed 
of anything relevant to its propaganda efforts.190 The Bureau in turn compiled and organised the 
information it received, combined with its own analysis of daily media and current affairs, and 
provided a digest for the party speakers,191 as well as a library that could be consulted by 
propaganda functionaries.192 
In Sweden directives tended to be issued by District until 1939; District Leaders had more 
autonomy from the Propaganda Department, and could direct regional propaganda on their own 
initiative.193 Correspondence from the NSAP/SSS archive shows that in Sweden local functionaries 
frequently needed to be privately admonished in writing, so that the formal organisation was 
supplemented by more personal connections.194 The difficulty of directing the geographically 
isolated Swedish groups was circumvented to some extent by the monthly Porg 
(partiorganisation) paper, the compulsory and ‘confidential organ for the NSAP’s functionaries’. In 
theory a supplement to the Tjänsteföreskrifter [TF, Service Regulations] written by Lindholm,195 in 
practice it helped the central departments direct functionaries nationally, although as Porg itself 
noted, not all functionaries executed its orders down to the smallest detail,196 nor, quite bizarrely, 
did all functionaries subscribe for that matter.197 In both parties the organisation of propaganda 
was intended to be dialogic in character. Local functionaries supplied monthly reports, which the 
central departments used to develop strategy. It is notable that the Dutch reports were universally 
more elaborate, consisting of several pages with an analysis of the supplied figures, while their 
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Swedish equivalents typically comprised a single page with only basic distribution figures of 
propaganda materials and the like.198 
 
II 
Next to the party leaders and propaganda departments, the party newspaper was always the most 
important propaganda organ. In fact, the NSB’s Volk en Vaderland (VoVa, People and Fatherland) 
and the NSAP’s Den Svenske Nationalsocialisten (DSN, The Swedish National Socialist) were at the 
heart of the mythopoeic apparatus of their respective organisations, fulfilling a major mobilising, 
organising, and propaganda function.199 VoVa and DSN were not only the face of the movement,200 
but also explicated party ideology, organised the rank-and-file, issued directives, and notified the 
members of news and changes. They were also the first and foremost propaganda to be distributed 
on the streets, earning money for the party. The newspapers were the glue that held the entire 
propaganda effort together, the movements’ ‘most powerful weapon’, serving to make members 
and sympathisers more militant, and making the indifferent susceptible to the ideas of the party 
(Mussert),201 ‘the very spine of our freedom struggle’ (Lindholm).202 In theory subscription to the 
papers was compulsory for all members,203 though in practice a sizeable minority only bought the 
paper occasionally.204 VoVa cost f2/p.a. for members, f3/p.a. to non-members, and 5 cents per 
individual issue.205 The intention was to keep the price as low as possible.206 DSN was sold for 12 
kr/p.a., and 15 öre per issue, though some considered this to be too much.207 One of the reasons for 
the comparatively high price was the lack of advertisements in the paper, a consequence of 
Lindholm’s distinctly anti-capitalist position and rhetoric, and/or lack of business acumen.208 Until 
the party acquired its own printing press in August 1938, DSN was printed by Simonsons tryckeri in 
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Gothenburg.209 In 1980 Lindholm claimed the income generated by DSN was actually sufficient to 
balance out the costs,210 but a post-war inquiry into SSS finances shows that at least by 1939 the 
National Socialist Press joint stock company was under serious strain and making a loss.211 The 
stock company was set up in 1937 as a means of financing a printing press and in the hope of 
turning DSN into a daily, but never succeeded.212 According to Lindholm’s diary, DSN finances 
were abysmal when it was first published, while ‘us “employees” lived at subsistence level’. 
However, it seems that hard work and donations from members and sympathisers ultimately did 
bear fruit, and between 1935 and 1938 DSN was published on a bi-weekly basis (Wednesday and 
Saturday), something VoVa never did.213 On the other hand NSB-associated publisher Nenasu 
(Netherlands National Socialist Publisher) actually published a daily newspaper besides VoVa, Het 
Nationale Dagblad, edited by Rost van Tonningen, though this was a consistently loss-making 
endeavour.214 VoVa, always dense with advertisements, like all NSB publications, made a 
reasonable profit – a VoVa Financial Report for the first quarter of 1936 shows it earned Nenasu f11 
400.215 By a rough estimate up to a quarter of VoVa’s columns were taken up by advertisements, 
compared to less than 5% of DSN’s. Nenasu was owned by Mussert himself, and evidence suggests 
he channelled some of the profits into his own pockets.216 DSN generally sold between 10 and 20 
000 of each issue,217 VoVa around 80 000 on average. 
Formally the leaders’ ran the papers quite differently, but functionally they served the 
same purpose. Lindholm was the editor-in-chief of DSN until 1935, (which earned him a prison 
sentence when one author wrote an illegal article), while Mussert’s only legal connection to the 
paper was as owner of the publishing house. The editorial office of both papers saw a relatively 
high turnover. Mussert wrote leading articles for the paper on a regular basis, and Lindholm’s 
diary shows he was occupied daily with writing articles for DSN, even when he was on tour.218 
Leading articles from the Leader helped establish a party line, and reinforced loyalty to the Leader 
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through the construction of his charisma. In the case of the NSAP, the DSN editorial office was 
subordinate to the Party Leadership, but financially run as an independent company, ‘in 
accordance with more business-like methods’.219 VoVa’s and DSN’s centralising effects were 
exploited to mobilise the cadres, especially in the latter case where the paper frequently 
functioned as a substitute for circulars.220 Initially VoVa had a similar sort of messaging board 
function, but around 1935 all internal information was strictly limited to circulars. Before then, 
reports on meetings, information about upcoming ones, requests for materials and expertise, 
notifications of promotions and changes in the party, were spread liberally across the pages, 
providing members with indispensable information about their party, and, unintentionally, 
outsiders with a window into the party’s organisation.221 The papers also encouraged and exhorted 
the members to coordinate national campaigns, or attend meetings, rallies, and conventions, so 
that DSN and VoVa were not just propaganda in their own right, but also a crucial part of the 
organisational apparatus.222 
As one of the principal means of disseminating the movements’ myths among the public, 
and supporting the organisation financially, distribution of the newspapers preoccupied the 
parties constantly. Local branches bought copies of the paper from the publisher, and sold them at 
a slight profit, to invest in further propaganda and the expansion of the local formation.223 Apart 
from subscriptions, copies were distributed via various outlets such as kiosks like Pressbyrån in 
Sweden, or tobacconists like the NSB-supported De Driehoek (The Triangle) in the Netherlands.224 
Copies sometimes had to be sold covertly under the counter, especially in Sweden where the 
NSAP was in regular conflict with LO (Landsorganisationen), the Trade Union Confederation.225 In 
January 1938 DSN was even blocked altogether, though the ban was lifted by the end of the month.  
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Nevertheless it was an encouragement for the NSAP to further develop its distribution 
apparatus.226 As was common for newspapers in Sweden at the time, the NSAP relied on the 
railway network for distribution – the papers would be delivered at a central collection point early 
in the morning in Gothenburg or Stockholm, from where they would be transported all over the 
country to the local kiosks, and for delivery at local branches. Little remains in the archive of 
guidelines developed for the further sale of DSN by party colporteurs, which made up the majority 
of DSN sales. For VoVa on the other hand continuously updated rules and regulations exist, 
instructing in painstaking detail how the paper was to be sold and advertised. VoVa 
representatives were responsible at the Circle level, being a compulsory part of the Circle 
Propaganda Department, appointed after negotiation with the Circle- and Group leaders.227 By 
comparison the organisation for DSN was far more basic – by 1938 it still did not even have a 
register of subscribers, to the frustration of local branches in particular, who were responsible for 
collecting subscriptions.228 At the Section and Block level the corresponding functionaries 
themselves were responsible for this task.229 Nationally the DSN editorial office worked together 
with the Propaganda Department and Political Secretary to coordinate propaganda.230 Group 
Propaganda leaders were in charge of colportage more locally, and Block leaders were assigned the 
responsibility of organising house visits. NSAP house visits appear not to have been standard, but 
did occur during the electoral campaigns;231 they were also commonly used in both parties to get 
rid of old newspaper issues.232 Colportage was regarded as the duty of any party member, the most 
basic form of activism which any militant ought to manage. However, unlike the NSB, the NSAP 
also employed outsiders as colporteurs, including boys as young as twelve, suggesting this 
universal duty may not have been fulfilled as reliably as desired.233 
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The VoVa and DSN distributors, colporteurs, were the most visible and regular 
manifestation of the party to the public. Every day, party members took up posts in public spaces 
or patrolled neighbourhoods, advertising the paper to passers-by.  Colporteurs were the most 
obvious fascists the public encountered on the streets, and thus functioned as immediate 
participants in the parties’ mythopoeic efforts.  They were, in Mussert’s words, ‘the lancers of the 
Movement’, itself a phrase redolent of myth, of heroic soldiers of war in a tradition going back to 
early modern times.234 The fantastic description seemed appropriate, as they were indeed not only 
the members the public would most commonly encounter, but also those most likely to be 
involved in violent incidents, especially in the Netherlands. Newspapers regularly carried reports 
of fights breaking out between colporteurs and Communists, fights which could occasionally 
escalate into veritable riots.235 Particularly after the ban on political uniforms, it was precisely the 
selling of the party newspaper which identified one as a fascist.  
 
 
Figure 3. Front pages of DSN and VoVa respectively. The front page of DSN changed in 1937, when the fraktur header was 
introduced, and more photographs could be printed as the party acquired its own press. 
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For instance in 1935 a French anarchist attempted to assassinate two NSB members, one 
identifiable as a VoVa colporteur.236 Consequently colporteurs often required protection, which, 
until the ban on paramilitary formations (15 June 1934 in Sweden, in effect 1 August that year; 1936 
in the Netherlands), was provided by the paramilitary SA/A-groups in the NSAP and WA  in the 
NSB, magnifying the fascist presence on the streets. The SA and WA were both described as a 
defence against Marxist violence and terror, but they were also called in by the party to help 
directly with street propaganda.237 
 With the party newspaper in hand, perhaps flanked by a paramilitary guard, the party 
member had to performatively enact the fascist myth which the paper constructed discursively. 
Fascist colporteurs did not just sell a paper, but also their image. In the NSB the emphasis here was, 
in contrast to a soldier myth, on respectability. The guidelines for colportage emphasised that: 
 
Colportage is not allowed on Sundays and Christian holidays, and never in the immediate vicinity 
of churches. Everything which is in conflict with good taste, must be avoided, such as provocative 
behaviour and colportage directly next to rival colporteurs. It must in particular be ensured that 
the public is not needlessly irritated by pushy or cumbersome behaviour.238 
 
House visits in particular required ‘trim’ or ‘decent’ (nette) people, capable of ‘very correct 
behaviour’.239 It appears that it took the NSAP rather longer to develop detailed guidelines for 
colportage, as the first such instructions date from 1938. The ‘Instruction for Front Departments’ 
(IF) (the militant part of the party, successor to the SA and A-groups) states that: 
 
The Front Man does not need to be a saint or ascetic, but he may not be pulled along by the 
indecent swirl of pleasure and entertainment, with which Jewish profiteers want to ruin our 
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people. […] Colporteurs must observe such behaviour that he attracts the interest of the public, 
but without in any way whatsoever being ‘ostentatious’, and provocative even less so.240 
 
Notably both parties permitted female members to participate in colportage, one of the few active 
propaganda duties women were allowed.241 In the NSAP the emphasis was on a different kind of 
respectability, and more on that most ubiquitous and comprehensive of fascist ideals, discipline. 
The militants were ‘political soldiers’ in the great war for the conquest of Sweden, who would 
make a good impression through their ‘un-criminal discipline’, ‘which affects Swedish people 
beneficially, and counteracts the lie that we would be foreign mercenaries of some sort’.242 The 
NSAP ‘strove to have an elite of competent and reliable members, who are not just knowledgeable 
regarding the ideas but also dedicated to their leader’.243  
 
III 
On the foundation of ideologically educated, physically trained, and disciplined cadres, the central 
administration would construct its myths through spectacular political performances that would 
pique the interest of the public, win over new members, and of course, voters. There was a 
veritable ‘National Socialist meeting culture’ as one Swedish police report put it, and even the 
young, understaffed NSAP arranged 546 public meetings in 1933 alone.244 According to Porg, ‘[t]he 
best propaganda for National Socialism is and remains the public meetings and marches, in which 
the population itself can see and hear what the National Socialists want, and through which the 
lies of the Popular Front media will fall to the ground like empty shells’.245 Given the importance 
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and frequency of meetings in the fascist mythopoeic repertoire, the party apparatuses naturally 
developed standardised procedures for their organisation. 
 The first step for any public meeting was hiring a room, building, or public space, of 
appropriate size to house the event. Generally this seems to have gone without too much ado, 
although there were occasions when the responsible organisers failed to arrange a room in time or 
acquire permission, out of ignorance or miscommunication,246 or due to the party’s reputation.247 
In the NSAP the former appears to have been common enough that Porg urged functionaries in 
1937 to ‘answer letters regarding the organisation of meetings immediately, and not wait until the 
last minute, or even just ignore them altogether’.248 Notifying the authorities was of the utmost 
importance, lest opponents exploit any irregularities as an argument to ban fascist meetings.249 In 
Sweden, notification of the meeting had to be sent to the police superintendent [landsfiskal] or 
equivalent authorities, and special permission had to be requested to advertise the meeting, with 
slightly different procedures for city and countryside. The NSAP’s TF helpfully provided letter 
models for the application. Interestingly the TF’s instructions were rather combative compared to 
those of the NSB, emphasising not just the legal responsibilities of the organiser, but also the limits 
on municipal and police power to prevent meetings.250 NSAP meetings were outdoor events far 
more often than in the Netherlands, as their meetings were more often in the countryside than 
urban areas, but TF also found outdoor meetings preferable if weather permitted.251 The NSB 
placed particular emphasis on the hiring of spaces of an appropriate size, ideally slightly too small 
for the expected audience to enhance the impression of strong public interest.252 Notably the 
division of responsibilities for the organisation of meetings was more formalised in the NSB, being 
divided up between the Chief of the Meetings Service, Circle Propagandist, and Circle Leader.253 TF 
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merely noted that meetings should usually be instigated by the Party Leadership or Circle leaders, 
but in practice any member could organise a public meeting for the party.254 
 Once the functionary responsible had made the necessary arrangements for the meeting, 
the cadres were put in charge of advertising for the meeting. Sometimes the help of the 
paramilitaries was called in; in Sweden the youth group Nordisk Ungdom (NU, Nordic Youth) 
could also lend a helping hand. Meetings were advertised to members in VoVa or DSN; sometimes 
advertisements were placed in local newspapers.255 The rank-and-file sold tickets to the meetings 
where necessary, and leafleted the local area, ideally daily, well before the meeting was due.256 The 
leaflets were typically printed on brightly coloured paper – the NSAP invariably favoured bright 
red (one side usually graced with a large black swastika); the NSB orange, cheap white paper for 
workers’ communities, or yellow in Catholic ones.257 Lindholm’s diary records that he often 
participated in leafleting for his own meetings, especially when the local party group had 
neglected to prepare adequately.258 Leaflets were handed out to passers-by, delivered door-to-door, 
or pasted on walls and other more or less appropriate surfaces, sometimes by a team overnight.259 
One circular noted the NSB had received a complaint from the Dutch Railway Service that leaflets 
had been pasted onto trains, and admonished members never to cause offence through the 
distribution of propaganda.260 The Swedish police archives by contrast are littered with complaints 
about and investigations into illegal pasting [klistring]. This was a persistent problem throughout 
the 1930s, but never resolved – invariably the local leaders or the Leader of Propaganda would 
deny ordering such methods, or any knowledge of who might be responsible.261 Party leaders did 
forbid ‘irresponsible pasting’ as harmful to the movement, but there is no evidence any actual 
action was ever taken to put a stop to it.262 In fact, one 1935 letter from Lindholm orders a 
functionary to withhold information from the police, ‘because it’s the police’s job to find out who 
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has been leafleting’.263 Another popular way of distributing leaflets was from cars – one police 
report notes an incident where the NSAP had ‘incurred general vexation’ by driving through 
Stockholm while throwing leaflets from the car at pedestrians, who had to dodge them to avoid 
being hit in the face.264 
 Both parties recognised the necessity of an appropriately decorated space; after all: 
 
…a meeting of NSB-members is something different from a meeting of democrats. Our meetings 
should witness of the new spirit of the Nat. Soc. Movement… the interested or even merely curious 
visitor, as well as the opponent …. should from the moment of entering the building … 
continuously be in contact with that new spirit… To that end each person with a task to fulfil in 
preparation for, during, or after the meeting, should fulfil it with all the militancy, dedication and 
care, which characterise a good NSB-member.265 
 
The mise-en-scène was far more regulated and uniform in the Netherlands compared to Sweden. 
NSB instructions directed the Chief of the Meetings Service to decorate the speaker’s chair and 
table on the podium with a red-black cloth. Banners with appropriate slogans were hung up, with 
a special recommendation for a banner with the Leading Principle at the back of the room. 
Excessive and brightly coloured decorations were to be avoided at all costs: ‘[o]ur gatherings are 
not a carnival. The decorations serve to give expression to a cheerful, but otherwise serious, and 
more or less rigidly steadfast atmosphere’.266  The podium was decorated in a way that was 
simultaneously tasteful, simple, and impressive. In the middle of the background hung a large, 
vertical NSB flag, ensuring the colours were always facing the right way (black on the left, red on 
the right). In front of the flag stood an elevated bust or portrait of the Queen, the elevation 
covered with an orange cloth. On either side of the NSB flag national flags and smaller party flags 
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were placed. The rest of the wings were hidden behind black cloths. Against the lectern, decorated 
with an orange-white-blue or black-red cloth, was a portrait of the Algemeen Leider, unless he was 
the meeting’s speaker. Tables for the press were placed to the side of the podium. Party standards 
with a guard were situated on the sides of the podium foreground. In characteristically sexist 
fashion, female members were required to check whether decorations were in order.267 The NSAP’s 
TF simply noted that ‘[t]he meeting hall should, as well as can be, be decorated with flags, 
National Socialist motivational slogans, and the like’.268 The rest seems to have been left to local 
initiative. Standard bearers, usually members of the SA, were conventional, but otherwise much of 
the staging was ad hoc.269 It was especially during the numerous outdoor meetings that things like 
a podium had to be improvised: in his memoirs, Lindholm mentioned using oil barrels, snow 
heaps, a road side ditch, soap boxes, and memorably ‘a boat in the water off the beach, like 
Jesus’.270 The difference of Inszenierung between the NSB and NSAP can largely be attributed to the 
material availability of props and people for setting up the meetings – NSB meetings were 
typically organised in the vicinity of a party office (kringhuis) in urban areas, whereas the NSAP 
was scattered far and wide across Sweden, and propaganda teams often had to rely on whatever 
could fit in a car, if one was available at all. 
 But the most crucial aspect of any meeting was of course the speaker. The remains of the 
original NSAP/SSS archive contain a particularly large proportion of correspondence about the 
arrangement of speakers for various meetings across the country, which created a considerable 
workload for Headquarters. As the southern District Leader put it to the Party Organiser, then 
Gunnar Svalander, ‘[t]he external work is after all incredibly important, for without new people 
there will be stagnation, and to get new people we require speakers, and we do not exactly have an 
overflow of those’.271 With meetings as one of the foremost mythopoeic tools, speakers were in very 
high demand, but acquiring actually competent ones in specific places at specific times placed a 
great burden on the party apparatus. The relatively few trained and certified speakers had to be 
notified, travel (usually by train) and accommodation arranged, speeches prepared, 
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advertisements placed in the papers,272 and within a limited time frame.273 In the NSAP 
arrangements were made via post and only on urgent occasions by telephone, which could make 
communication slow and inflexible, and prone to mishaps.274 Costs and reimbursement had to be 
negotiated, which could particularly be a problem with some of the poorer branches, especially 
when rooms had to be hired as well.275 The demand for speakers meant some of the most popular 
ones had to attend dozens of meetings across the country over the course of a few months – not 
least the most popular party speaker, Lindholm – something which inevitably led to speakers 
being overworked and falling ill.276 Porg warned that this undermined the training of new speakers, 
who were not given due opportunity to practise at meetings, indicating a remarkable inability of 
the central administration to impose specific speakers on local branches.  
 
It has come to the point where a few of the party’s speakers are going to wear themselves out, 
while new speakers never get the opportunity to properly get started. […] Is it not still the case in 
some places, that if the desired speaker cannot be acquired, you neglect to organise meetings 
altogether? 277 
 
 The provision of party speakers was far better regulated in the NSB, through the Central 
Bureau of Propaganda, which maintained a Speakers’ List: a comprehensive database of all 
certified NSB speakers across the country. The list could be obtained either directly from the 
Bureau, or from the local Circle Propaganda office (Kring-Propaganda-kamer). NSB formations 
could only hire speakers who appeared on the list, and the speaker’s status determined whether 
they were allowed to answer audience questions after the speech. Rather than arranging 
reimbursements between the speaker and local formations, speakers could claim standard 
maximum sums from Department III, by declaring their costs within eight days of the meeting, 
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together with a brief written report. For instance accommodation with breakfast could be 
reimbursed for up to f3.50.278 Money for the reimbursements was levied from the local formations, 
which paid a fixed fee for speakers at all public meetings, depending on their rank, determined by 
their past experience and the size of the meetings they could speak at. Rank IV speakers cost f6, up 
to rank I at f12. Circles could also, with special permission, get trainee speakers for f2, from the 
Regional training schools where available. The hiring costs were paid to the HQ mail account 
together with the application for the speaker by the Circle Propagandist. This arrangement solved 
the problem of evenly distributing costs for party formations, which were generally wealthier in 
the centre and West of the country, where most of the speakers lived, and poorer in the North, 
East, and South, which would otherwise not be able to afford to reimburse the travel costs.279 It 
must also have been an incentive to local formations to hire less experienced speakers to save 
money, circumventing the NSAP’s problem of overworked popular talent, and ensuring the most 
capable speakers remained available for the largest meetings. Another NSB arrangement which 
made the organisation of speakers much easier was the Regional Transport Service (Gewestelijken 
Vervoerdienst), which made cars available to speakers when they otherwise would not be able to 
reach the meeting in time, get a train back home on the same day, or simply be able to save money 
on transport for the party.280 Speakers’ reports were used to gather information about the quality 
of the meetings, interest among the public, and competence of the local organisation. The report 
forms ask whether the speaker was informed in good time of the place and time of the meeting 
and other specifics, whether the meeting went smoothly without interruptions, the mood of the 
audience, how full the room was, and so forth.281 
 The structure of the actual meetings was quite similar in both parties. Meeting 
programmes and reports for both have survived in considerable numbers, allowing for a certain 
degree of generalisation. Meetings were the principal tool for expanding the party membership – 
they spread awareness of the movement, and provided information about the movement and its 
ideology, but they also imposed a mythic image of fascism on the audience. With an audience that 
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ideally consisted of a mixture of both party members and outsiders (ideally 30-40% members in 
NSB meetings), they served simultaneously to mobilise the own cadres, and acquire new 
members.282 Party publications were always sold immediately before and after the meeting, 
frequently by women members.283 The opportunity was also used to collect donations, to support 
the local formation, or to finance an upcoming event or campaign.284 A successful meeting would 
yield new members at the end of it, impressed by the character (myth) of the movement. In areas 
in which the parties did not yet have any formations, public meetings were essential to establish a 
presence. Meetings were a means of ‘conquering new territory’.285 Hence it was crucial that people 
who had been attracted to these meetings were given the correct idea of the movement, i.e. one in 
line with the party’s mythic construction. In accordance with the centralised character of the 
organisation, a general party line was established for how this was meant to be conveyed, so that 
all meetings would have a similar character – again, more so in the NSB than the NSAP. 
 In the NSB, two functionaries were in charge of the meeting – first and foremost the local 
formation leader, and the Chief of the Meetings Service, who divided responsibilities among the 
available staff. When legal, the WA was used to guard the entrance and technical equipment, the 
podium, and as a reserve – especially to keep an eye on suspect elements in the audience, such as 
communists who quite regularly disrupted meetings. At times there was also a police presence. As 
the audience entered the room, guards and standard bearers were already at their stations – the 
carrying of political flags in a public meeting was illegal, but holding them in situ was not. The 
meeting was led by the local leader, who opened the meeting with a brief introduction of a few 
minutes – this was not intended to be a speech in its own right, though that did happen on 
occasion. Then the main speech would commence, lasting approximately one hour, followed by a 
brief break during which audience members had the opportunity to buy propaganda material, and 
apply for membership.286 Afterwards there could also be an opportunity to answer questions from 
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the audience, if the speaker had the authority. The end of the meeting was invariably announced 
with the singing of the Wilhelmus; those who did not wish to sing the national anthem were given 
the opportunity to leave. This ended the meeting without further ado.287 
 NSAP regulations left much more to local initiative. They were held as late in the day as 
possible, ideally the evening, to ensure the largest possible audience. Sundays were avoided for 
this reason, though exceptions were permissible, especially in the countryside where meetings 
were adjusted to the farmers’ work schedules. They were typically organised by the local Chief of 
Propaganda, who like his NSB equivalent divided responsibilities between the staff. Here too the 
paramilitary was used to guard the meeting, and take note of any known communists in the 
audience. After paramilitaries were outlawed, protection of the meeting was left to the police 
authorities. To open the meeting, a procession of standard bearers entered the meeting place to 
marching music, then took up their stations in front of the podium, followed by music – the 
reverse procedure would be used to mark the end of the meeting. Apart from the main speaker, 
someone had to be present to provide an introduction and an afterword. For larger indoor 
meetings it was also desirable to have multiple speakers if possible. Here too, it was cautioned that 
the introduction was not to be a speech in its own right, although it was acceptable to have a 
longer introduction if the speaker was inexperienced. The conclusion was to be limited to purely 
informative announcements, about membership, papers, contributions, the next meeting, and so 
forth. Music was a standard part of NSAP meetings, and songs were often sung on several 
occasions throughout the evening, but only if a positive reception was expected. Members were 
spread out accordingly in the room to be able to lead songs effectively, as well as any exclamations 
of approval for the speaker.288 A typical meeting with one main speaker had three songs scheduled, 
invariably party songs, often written by Lindholm.289 Once the meeting was formally concluded, an 
unscheduled period was left to discuss questions with the audience, sell propaganda material, and 
recruit new members, provided fights did not break out.290 
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The two organisational structures were self-evidently inspired by the same source – the NSDAP, 
but when compared notable practical differences emerge. Broadly speaking the NSAP was a 
weaker organisation relying on autonomous local formations, while the NSB was heavily 
centralised, and tightly regulated. 
 The centralised party organisation of the NSB mapped closely to the urban infrastructure 
of the Dutch Randstad, with its headquarters in the capital of Utrecht province, approximately 50-
60 km away from Amsterdam, Rotterdam, and ‘s-Gravenhage in Holland, which all had strong 
concentrations of NSB members,291 and disproportionate numbers of NSB voters – over 10%.292 
This West-Centre concentration left peripheral NSB Districts isolated, including comparatively 
large ones like Drenthe or Limburg & North-Brabant. But this was also an opportunity for Mussert 
to further concentrate the party’s financial power in Utrecht, turning it into a monetary 
redistribution hub for the chief propaganda activity of meeting organisation, and taking national 
control of speaker access. Through a combination of the dense Dutch railway network and its own 
transport service, NSB propagandists could be sent all across the country from the Randstad, or 
the cadres could be brought together in one place for a rally.293 Nevertheless, travel was expensive; 
for instance in 1936, the Headquarters administration alone incurred costs of f 21 515.04 for travel 
and car maintenance, out of f 124 185.68 total.294 The hierarchical organisation managed to 
effectively coordinate propaganda efforts at Circle level, no doubt facilitated by the NSB’s urban 
concentrations, meaning Mussert could feasibly orchestrate nation-wide efforts through the 
District Leaders, as was evident from the electoral campaigns of 1935, 1937, and 1939. As is evident 
from the surviving rules and regulations for Circle propaganda, the centre closely directed the 
mythopoeic apparatus in the localities, and had the necessary financial and organisational 
leverage to ensure their discipline. The Department of Organisation and Personnel deemed it 
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desirable to centralise NSB power even further, recommending in the wake of the 1935 elections 
that the party should aim to ‘completely annul Circle autonomy’, though this was never achieved 
in practice.295 
 Such control over the minor party branches was unthinkable in the NSAP, which relied 
heavily on the initiative of District Leaders, especially in Gothenburg and Stockholm, from whom 
many of the surviving propaganda directives originate, and where much of the membership was 
concentrated.296 Beyond the cities, those functionaries did not have much insight even at the 
Circle level – far too comprehensive an organisational unit for the Swedish countryside – and 
instead effective organisation devolved to the largely autonomous Local Groups (ortsgrupp) or 
Departments (avdelning). These smaller formations of a few dozen or a hundred members were 
scattered across the country, with little ability to coordinate inter-formational campaigns, and 
with only limited oversight from the Party Leadership which lacked the necessary control agents. 
If the surviving correspondence from NSAP Headquarters is representative of party 
communications, it is glaringly obvious that the party throughout the 1930s did not possess the 
necessary organisation to exert control at a national level, and would not have been able to 
expand without significant restructuring. Lindholm himself, in a 1986 letter to Heléne Lööw, 
described it as a ‘paper tiger’.297 As the organisation of meetings showed, communication was 
frequently directly between the Party Leadership in Gothenburg or Stockholm, and ortsgrupp or 
avdelning leaders. From time to time formations would go altogether silent, stop paying 
membership fees, request propaganda material, or send the monthly reports which were one of 
the few means the centre had to control the periphery.298 To illustrate, one letter from Party 
Secretary Hultberg to a Värmland Circle leader mentioned that the Botilsäter formation  
 
seems to be gone altogether. Since the formation was formed we have not heard anything from 
them. No message, no report: the formation leader does not answer letters. He is a farmer and of 
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course that sort has a lot to do at the moment, but do note that the formation was formed already 
3.2.37, so one feels he should have had the opportunity to let us hear from him at least once.299 
 
The distance from Stockholm to Botilsäter is approximately 370 km, and approximately 70 km 
from Karlstad, home of the Värmland Circle Leader in question. Such distances, never even 
remotely an issue in the Netherlands, made controlling local rogue formations very difficult, and 
checking up on them unfeasibly cumbersome and expensive, even more so in light of the NSAP’s 
poor finances.300 Conversely, matching the exploits of the NSB to mobilise an absolute majority of 
the party membership to attend a party convention was inconceivable. Not only were train travel 
costs for such a large-scale operation excessive, but the Swedish railway network was not nearly as 
extensive as its Dutch equivalent. Nevertheless, the NSAP did successfully manage to coordinate 
travel to the annual party convention (årsting) by means of busses instead, ensuring that rural 
members who had never seen Gothenburg or Stockholm before could attend the great event.301 
Not everyone could afford the bus, but some members simply walked the hundreds of miles if 
necessary. The infrastructural and organisational obstacles the NSAP faced were severe, but not 
insurmountable. 
 Comparing Mussert’s and Lindholm’s respective functions within their parties, it is 
apparent that it was not only geography which explains the NSAP’s deeply flawed centralisation. 
Lindholm and Mussert fulfilled very different functions within their organisations, which goes 
some way towards explaining the organisational strength and centralisation of the NSB vis-à-vis 
the NSAP. The peripatetic Lindholm was frequently occupied with a wide variety of party work, 
ranging from the editing of DSN, writing articles, organising meetings, giving speeches, writing 
poetry, but also the most basic tasks normally left to the cadres: advertising meetings, leafleting 
towns, and recruiting new members. His annual propaganda tours took him away from the 
headquarters for entire seasons, forcing him to rely on the rest of the Party Leadership. Mussert on 
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the other hand was invariably found in Utrecht, behind his desk at the Oude Gracht and later the 
Maliebaan. Rules and regulations, meeting minutes, circulars, and correspondence show Mussert 
to have been directly involved in the construction of the basic party organisation in 1932-33, and 
its expansion for the rest of the decade. Organisation and direction defined Mussert’s day-to-day 
tasks. As noted earlier, Mussert acted as speaker only a handful of times per month at the 
beginning of the NSB’s organisation. At the same time, Lindholm could be speaking at several 
meetings per day. This was also at least partially due to personal aptitude, a contrast between the 
civil engineer Mussert, and the health-obsessed military man Lindholm, who confessed to having 
no real insight or understanding of his party’s finances.302 Nevertheless, Lindholm was always the 
(more or less) undisputed leader of the NSAP/SSS, and of the surviving rules and regulations like 
TF, it is evident they were written by Lindholm, as he wrote in his diary. That this was not left to 
another member of the Leadership, like the Party Organiser, is interesting, and suggests Lindholm 
tried to retain as much control over the basic party apparatus as possible in his absence, even if 
perhaps others were more qualified to take charge of party organisation. It also hints a little at 
Lindholm’s ‘despotic nature’ for which his detractors attacked him.303 Power was not only much 
more centralised in the NSB, but also naturally more focused in Mussert’s own hands. While 
Mussert did see internal opposition during the 1930s, especially after the 1937 elections, he 
retained a far steadier hold on the party leadership, prevented serious break-away movements 
from forming, and managed to secure his leadership even during the turbulent years of the 
German Occupation. 
 Although Mussert had a strong hold over the party administration, and Utrecht could 
regulate the activities of the localities in considerable detail, this was not without its drawbacks. 
The expansive party bureaucracy was perceived by some members as stultifying, not least as the 
still new and inexperienced apparatus did not always work efficiently. In July 1934, van der Goes 
van Naters – a high-ranking functionary who would rebel against Mussert in 1937 – wrote a litany 
(co-signed by three other functionaries) to Van Geelkerken to complain about the departments of 
Organisation (then led by J. Hogewind) and Propaganda (H.J. van Houten). ‘Firstly the Dep. 
Organisation floods the entire N.S.B. with circulars, correcting circulars, additional circulars, 
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circulars which contradict each other on vital points. And through this paper waterfall, local 
authorities are confused and halted in their own work…’304 To his mind the fascist battle was 
supposed to be against officialdom and organisational bungling. If anything the propaganda 
department was even worse: 
 
instead of being a centre of zeal, which pushes and encourages the entire Movement, one notices 
little else from it but bookmarks of different formats and with different imprints: a petite bourgeois 
patchwork shop goings-on [klein burgerlyk lapjes winkel gedoe], which for outsiders is only 
ridiculous, and districts the attention of N.S.B.-members away from the greater goal and task, 
towards rubbish irrelevancies.305 
 
The problem of (incompetent) over-administration was reflected time and time again in 
what was disapprovingly termed the kankergeest, the ‘grumbling spirit’.306 Complaints of 
grumbling among the rank-and-file were common enough to warrant mention in party rules – for 
instance one of the official ‘duties of the Weerman’ (WA paramilitary member) was ‘silence’ – 
‘[n]othing has a more paralysing effect or corrodes the good spirit more than grumbling and 
gossip…’.307 A speech model for the member’s oath suggested by the Department of Education 
compares the NSB to a crusading army, and like such an army ‘[n]either do we ask: “How?” or: 
“Why?”. We, too, act, without asking, without complaint, without grumbling; because we know 
that the Leader leads us in the battle for a mighty ideal!’308 Already in a 1934 report to Mussert, 
John Boddé – inspector of the southern Netherlands – pointed to grumbling as the chief flaw of 
the Brabant circle. Bergen op Zoom was particularly dysfunctional: ‘Bergen op Zoom and 
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grumbling are synonymous.’309 Members were often reluctant to be so closely directed by Utrecht, 
and there was recurring trouble with internal cliques, which could seriously hamper party 
activism.310 A related problem was gossip in the branches, of which there are numerous mentions 
in the archive. As the head of the organisation department wrote in 1935, ‘[i]n our Movement 
there is an enormous gossiping [geweldige roddelarij], which I don’t have to describe for you’.311 
The whole thing undermined the activism of the branches, as the General Council lamented in 
1935, noting a ubiquitous ‘laxness’ in the Circles.312 Already in June 1933, one distressed member 
wrote, in a letter addressed ‘to my Leader’, to complain that over-organisation had dampened 
enthusiasm for the Movement.  
 
In the past I once complained about the considerable disorder at Headquarters, though I then 
added, that I thought it was such a nice place. I enjoyed the enthusiastic stories, about colportage, 
etc. Every time I had been in Utrecht, I also felt a more enthusiastic NSB-member. There was élan, 
zeal, though no work got done. Now, work gets done, but there is no enthusiasm, like there used to 
be. [Now] a visit to Headquarters has the same effect on me as a visit to a tourist bureau. I’ve 
received an answer to the questions I asked. […] Currently we are being ‘administered’ from 
Utrecht, while we wish to be led by Utrecht, and spurred on.313 
 
In 1936 a letter to the leader of the Department of Training raised concerns that ‘the idea – the 
organism [of National Socialism] – DOES NOT PERISH due to organisation’. After all, it was 
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argued, 80-90% of people left the movement ‘on account of organisation and other reasons – 
because everyone, once became a member with and through enthusiasm’.314  
 Nothing seems further from the assessments typically heard of the NSAP’s unpaid cadres.  
As one police report put it: 
 
One will not be able to find greater self-sacrifice from the members in any other political party, 
members who without any compensation whatsoever, dedicate themselves fully to party activity. 
This can to a large extent be explained by that the party’s main cadres are composed of youths, 
who with glowing enthusiasm use most of their spare time to advance the party.315 
 
Indeed Lindholm seems to have been very able to awaken the enthusiasm of Swedish youth. 
Unlike the NSB’s diminutive youth movement, the NSAP’s Nordisk Ungdom (NU, Nordic Youth), 
it’s ‘most important special organisation’, amounted to a significant portion of the fascist cadres, 
and they actively participated in party activities as militants.316 But youthful enthusiasm combined 
with considerable de facto local autonomy meant that the cadres could also be a real headache to 
the Party Leadership. In 1935, one local leader complained to the Party Organiser Svalander that: 
 
It is difficult to get ‘the boys’ to work independently, but they have to if we are going to be able to 
keep the whole thing going. […] Whenever I get home from a [propaganda] tour they have only 
done the things that are absolutely necessary, and they do not understand how to act on their 
own.317 
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As Henrik Dammberg discovered in his research, some local branches consisted exclusively of 
school boys and girls.318 Inexperience and incompetence were not the only trouble with young 
members. Active insubordination was far more common in the NSAP than it was in the Dutch 
party, and there are instances where local branches actively refused orders from Headquarters. For 
instance Branch 225 in Arvika in 1937 simply refused to organise a meeting requested by the Chief 
of Propaganda, Erik Fahl.319 Several letters from the Leadership complain of a lack of discipline.320 
‘There are still some formations which think they can act whichever way they like. If they 
mercifully deign to answer [letters], everything has to be prepared for them like a laid table.’321 
Another common problem was illegal activities such as unlawful leafleting, though NSAP 
members were also prone to more violent forms of law-breaking. One 1937 police memorandum 
noted that NU deliberately provoked fights at meetings, to the chagrin of some of the older 
members present who demanded that the NU be banned from the annual party convention 
[årsting]. Others on the other hand argued the NU should be allowed to participate ‘to make sure 
something happens’, arguing the party would be noticed and discussed more that way.322 NU-
members were also more likely to flagrantly violate the law against political uniforms,323 and the 
NU organ Makt (Might) actively encouraged regular violations to undermine the law.324  
Nevertheless, the NSAP’s at times anarchic militants could be highly effective. This 
appears from a party analysis of the Gothenburg city elections in 1934, in which the administration 
noted approvingly that in terms of street propaganda ‘we have been fully able to rival our 
opponents, and even surpass them’, an impressive feat for such a small and new party. During the 
electoral campaign the entire city was leafleted, meetings for thousands were held, propaganda 
cars drove around with slogans, and a thousand balloons with placards were handed out to 
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children (though of doubtful efficacy, on account of the wind).325 But the unruliness of the cadres 
showed through. During a speech by the Minister of Finance at a Social Democratic meeting, some 
members had dropped a large placard attached to ten balloons, decorated with a large swastika 
and the letters NSAP, from a window in the roof, which slowly descended into the meeting place 
to the astonishment of onlookers. The party leadership noted that ‘we must remember that our 
opponents tend to portray and regard us as childish pranksters. It might be unnecessary to pander 




The two party organisations and their antithetical problems as portrayed here were reinforced by 
the political and social contexts in which they emerged. The bureaucratic, ‘stuffy’, NSB 
organisation, firmly putting the reins in the hands of Mussert and Utrecht, was well-suited to the 
legally restrictive conservatism of the Netherlands. It would have been unthinkable in the Dutch 
organisation to let members get away with breaking the law against political uniforms, which did 
not permit any liberal interpretations of its prohibitions. Throughout the 1930s, Dutch authorities 
increasingly treated the NSB as a revolutionary organisation; the party leadership was constantly 
on its guard against anything that could get the movement banned altogether. Nor were violent 
and independent militants commensurate with the NSB’s attempts to win over parts of the Dutch 
populace with profoundly conservative notions of law and order, particularly liberal conservatives, 
Calvinists, and Roman Catholics, who were among the principal targets of party propaganda. 
These groups were far more likely to be impressed by the myth of an orderly, disciplined, and 
ultimately respectable army, rather than the fiery enthusiasm of revolutionary youth.  
The attitude of the Swedish authorities was far more permissive, perhaps not least because 
the NSAP never was a serious threat to the established political system in the way the NSB was in 
the mid-1930s.  The law against political uniforms could still permit the wearing of uniform-like 
dress, and the various successors to the SA could just about pass as civilian formations. At the 
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same time, Lindholm’s focus on workers and farmers, and his unveiled contempt for 
borgerligheten (middle-class establishment), made it much less urgent for the NSAP to construct 
an image of the party as a respectable force in a bourgeois sense, instead foregrounding the myth 
of a revolutionary army. While violence was rhetorically condemned by the Party Leadership, it 
also alluded to the necessity of illegal means of gaining power, possibly not wishing to dampen the 
useful enthusiasm of its more radical activists.327 Unlike the NSB, the NSAP did not enjoy nearly 
the same amount of press coverage, while during the mid-30s it still had to share the spotlight 
with rival fascist parties, which tended to construct fascism as far more conservative. 
Consequently the violence of the undisciplined cadres should also be seen in the context of the 
NSAP’s urgent need for the attention of the Swedish press. 
 In spite of their great differences in practice, the apparatuses underline one fundamental 
point: adopting the German NSDAP party structure wholesale was inherently problematic and 
complicated, and required considerable modification to the original design over time. This 
analysis has shown directly, in the case of Sweden for the first time, that describing its 
organisation as a German ‘carbon-copy’ is far too simplistic, and does not actually give any sense 
of how the party apparatus operated in reality. It has also brought out a number of problems that 
existed within the NSB apparatus, while in both cases the comparative dimension has 
foregrounded the cause and nature of the problems and development of their organisations. 
Particularly the basic issue of geography and public infrastructure stands out – ostensibly similar 
parties with similar organisations faced completely different situations on account of the very 
large differences between the Dutch and Swedish landscape and population distribution. As seen, 
this was largely to the advantage of the NSB, but it also was a cause for completely different styles 
of administration, which brought its own problems in the Dutch case. The Swedish fascists 
managed to some extent to overcome many of the obstacles they faced, and in spite of their small 
size managed to display impressive zeal and activism, something which has hitherto gone 
unnoticed in the Swedish historiography. As the next chapters will show, while the party 
apparatus was the fundament for party activity, and by extension the fascist mythopoeic project, 
the resources behind it did not stand in a deterministic relation to the results.
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2. The Leader: cult, devotion, respectability 
The centrality of the figure of the leader to fascism was already well-established by the time the 
NSB and NSAP were formed. The Dutch and Swedish public were largely familiar with the 
importance of il Duce in Italy or the Führer of the NSDAP, and a range of smaller native fascist 
leaders had cropped up in the previous decade. By 1933, there was little doubt that a single 
authoritative leader figure was essential to a fascist movement. The ‘Leader principle’ or 
Führerprinzip has since been firmly integrated into academic discussions of fascism as well, 
regularly used as an identifying feature of fascism.328 Particular attention has been paid to the 
notion of the charismatic leader.329 Largely based on the examples of Hitler and Mussolini, ideas 
abound of fascism as a political movement closely connected to a Leader with almost supernatural 
qualities, charisma as understood by Max Weber.330  
Neither Lindholm nor Mussert fit such models of fascism very comfortably, but much the 
same has been said about the reality of Hitler’s personality.331 Ian Kershaw has pointed out that the 
myth of the heroic Hitler was at crass variance with reality, (as has Richard Bosworth regarding 
Mussolini),332 but noted that at the same time the Hitler myth played a crucial integratory function 
in the Third Reich.333 Biographical studies of the Swedish and Dutch leaders have been absent or 
limited. No biography of Lindholm has yet been produced, while the last, and only, full-length 
scholarly biography of Mussert was published in 1984.334 In terms of charisma, Lindholm and 
Mussert have not struck very impressive figures. Scholarship on Swedish fascism has largely 
ignored Lindholm as a personality,335 and even a recent article by Victor Lundberg on Lindholm 
and his ideas makes no real reference to Lindholm as a leader.336 This is particularly curious in the 
presence of substantial archival material on and from Lindholm personally. Mussert on the other 
hand has traditionally been used as a negative example, a tedious technocrat, ‘a spiritual and 
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moral vacuum’,337 thoroughly bourgeois.338 The short, middle-class, civil engineer married to his 
aunt, Maria Witlam, was too easy to mock. While recent work by Tessel Pollmann has sought to 
correct the liberal bourgeois interpretation of Mussert somewhat, there is still little of him as 
anything like a charismatic Leader.339 Attempts to understand the cultural construction of Mussert 
as Leader have also been sparse, including Gerard Groeneveld’s brief discussion of NSB literature 
about Mussert.340 These images of the leaders of the NSAP and NSB are, as will become apparent, 
understandable insofar as they reflected the reality of their personalities. Both Lindholm and 
Mussert were initially reluctant to embrace a leader role in the style of Hitler, and instead focused 
on developing the myth of the party. As authoritative leaders in parties that wholeheartedly 
subscribed to hierarchical leadership, they had a crucial role to play at the heart of the 
organisational apparatus, and consequently in the parties’ mythopoeic endeavours.  
But they could never remain merely technical leaders. There was a demand from the rank-
and-file for something like a charismatic Leader, and if their personalities were not up to scratch, 
the appropriate Leader could be constructed. Perhaps the historiography has been too focused on 
the reality of Mussert and Lindholm, and not enough on their myths, which played a very real and 
effective role in sustaining their respective movements. Charisma then, is not treated as an 
inherent personal quality – a dubious analytical exercise anyway – but as something artificially 
constructed around the person, i.e. a myth.341  The charismatic leaders were created through a 
mythopoeic process – one to a significant extent driven from below.342 This process was not simple 
or flawless, but it was effective. Lindholm and Mussert became the party, and to a greater or lesser 
extent embodied its myth. Mythopoeia could entirely reconstruct them as individuals, at least as 
far as the faithful were concerned. The mythopoeia of the Leader was directly tied up with the 
devotion of the membership, and the desire for a leadership cult, and succeeded in creating a 
lasting charismatic bond. 
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The popular demand for a charismatic fascist Leader conflicted with the respectability 
that both leaders at different times sought to exhibit. If fascist members themselves were inspired 
by external (foreign) sources in their desire for a Leader, non-fascist outsiders too were aware of 
what models inspired the NSB and NSAP. Neither Swedish nor Dutch mainstream democratic 
media had a particularly positive view of fascist dictators, so that the myth of the Leader played 
directly into hostile representations of fascism as tyranny. Alternatively, the impressive 
propaganda imagery that was promulgated from Italy and Germany to the international press 
provided a neat measuring stick with which to beat Lindholm and Mussert as inadequate would-
be Führers. Members’ desires and public opinion were two contradicting driving forces in NSB and 
NSAP mythopoeia, which was always an on-going process, rather than a synchronic achievement. 
From 1933 to 1938, the Leaders were in constant flux, buffeted by opinion and political necessity in 
a dialectical trial and error process of mythopoeic construction. 
 
I 
Sven Olov Lindholm was born on 8 February 1903, in Jönköping, the son of Sigrid Johansson and 
Knut Axel Lindholm. Lindholm grew up in a semi-rural household, and was raised to love his 
hembygd (cf. Heimat), and by extension the fatherland – ‘but it was mostly nature, which was the 
root of that love’.343 His merchant father and his friends who frequently visited were typically 
nationella, bourgeois nationalist and conservative supporters of the Right (Högern), which was 
reflected in how Lindholm was raised.344 This would prove formative, although largely in a 
negative way, as Lindholm rejected the class elements of the Right. After leaving school at the age 
of sixteen, Lindholm joined the Royal Artillery Regiment in 1920, going through NCO-training. He 
remained there until 1927, at which point the regiment was decommissioned, and Lindholm 
moved to the Svea Artillery Regiment in Stockholm.345 During this period he became a leading 
propagandist of the SFKO, founded in 1925. In 1929 he attended the NSDAP Nuremberg rally as a 
guest, and had the opportunity to briefly speak to several of the party leadership, including Hitler. 
More importantly for his ideological development were his December 1932 conversations with 
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Gregor Strasser,346 whom Lindholm admired throughout his life, and mentioned as a key influence 
in his memoirs.347 Overworked, he resigned from military service in 1930 to commit himself fully to 
the party, which at this point was merged with Birger Furugård’s SNSP.348 Throughout the 1930s 
Lindholm would continue doing occasional military service, but mostly earned a living with party 
work. It was also during this period that he met Kersti, whom he married in 1939 after proposing to 
her at the annual party convention. However, Kersti died from leukaemia in 1941, at the age of 
23.349 During the war Lindholm was promoted to sergeant in the artillery, but was forcibly retired 
in 1942 after it became public that he was in charge of military defence against a potential Nazi 
coup. He continued his work as party leader until 1950, when the SSS was disbanded.  
Lindholm lived a long life after that, finding work in a typeface factory, Monotype.350 He re-
married to Vera, a German post-war émigré, whose ideology he then shared. However, over time 
Lindholm’s ideology radically changed, and he came to renounce fascism altogether. Eventually 
Lindholm and Vera divorced in 1960-62 for their political differences.351 Lindholm spent the 
remaining decades of his life engaging in anti-nuclear and anti-war activism, and studying the 
emerging literature on fascism, corresponding with a number of Swedish historians in the 1970s 
and 80s. He also wrote his memoirs, Soldatliv och Politik (Soldier Life and Politics), and edited his 
diary, both dedicated to his daughter. He died in 1994, at his home in Rönninge. 
In his memoirs Lindholm recalled the household literature as being formative for his 
ideas: Johan Runeberg, Viktor Rydberg, Esaias Tegnér, Verner von Heidenstam, Bertel Gripenberg 
– Romantic Swedish classics of the nineteenth century, and reputed contemporary nationalist 
poets.352 Lindholm was an avid if at times eclectic reader throughout his life, but some themes 
stand out: military life, Swedish history, Romanticism, and Nordic culture. Viktor Lundberg has 
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argued that, quite in line with these interests, Lindholm was heavily influenced by Ernst Jünger as 
well.353 However, Lindholm, who otherwise reliably made note of his reading material in his diary 
and other writings, never mentioned reading any of Jünger’s works, so that Lundberg’s claim must 
be regarded with scepticism. Lindholm’s lifestyle was shaped in obvious ways by the military, but 
also by the ideology of Are Waerland, which was reflected in his lifestyle. 
Are Waerland (1876-1955) was a Finno-Swedish popular philosopher and dietician, and 
inventor of the Waerland diet. Throughout the interwar period he wrote on a variety of topics, 
including the Russian Revolution, idealist and materialist philosophy, Swedish national character, 
the virtues of the human colon, the dangers of white sugar, and his hobby horse, kruska 
porridge.354 The degenerate English were described as the most corrupted race due to its 
supposedly advanced civilisation, while Waerland’s hopes were for the Nordic peoples, now under 
attack but who could still be saved from the diseases of modernity.355 His ethos is best summed up 
by his 1938 book, Död åt det vita sockret – Liv åt de vita folken (Death to white sugar – Life for the 
white peoples).356 Lindholm attended at least two of these lectures, and wrote about them in 
DSN.357 His short books were written to make philosophy and medical science accessible to the 
public, and had the grandiose aim of creating a popular movement for a revolution in medicine to 
save it from its current decline into corruption and elitism.358 Lindholm wrote in his diary he had 
become a ‘wærlandist’ in November 1936, but he must have been reading Waerland’s works at 
least as early as 1935 [see chapter 4].359 
 Together with health and military life, Lindholm’s ideology was characterised by a 
corresponding obsession with youth. The idealisation of youth was of course perfectly common 
among fascists at the time, as well as the Swedish health- and sport movement [frisksportrörelsen] 
in labour ideology, which was peaking at this time.360 Next to the Swedish landscape, it was youth 
which most inspired Lindholm to write poetry, and his speeches and articles consistently 
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emphasised Swedish youth as the key to political success. The documents produced by the 
organisation of the annual propaganda tours give the most insight into Lindholm’s day-to-day life. 
His diary shows a pattern of rising early, working hard throughout the day and into the night, 
interspersed with arduous outdoors exercise, and lake-bathing, regularly subjecting the body to 
cold temperatures. His diet typically consisted of rye bread and raw vegetables, and kruska for 
breakfast, what Waerland termed lakto-vegetabilisk råkost. His daily regimen was one he also 
inflicted on his colleagues during the summer, with a preference for lakeside camping. In his own 
words: ‘Save us, old soldiers, from all desire for comfort, and for all extravagances. In all things we 
only desire order.’361 His somewhat ascetic lifestyle became almost proverbial within the party. If 
that was a point of admiration for the cadres, his ‘Waerlandism’ was not. His rejection of alcohol 
was not well-received,362 and one can only imagine how his kruska cooking classes were received 




Much less is known about the early life of Anton Mussert, but he could hardly have been more 
different from Lindholm. He was born 11 May 1894 in Werkendam, in North-Brabant. His father, 
Joannes Leonardus, was Catholic, but converted to Protestantism when he married Frederika 
Witlam. Joannes Leonardus was a liberal conservative school teacher who seems to have had a 
lasting influence on Anton,364 in spite of his premature death.365 The historian Jan Meyers argued 
that this was a fiercely patriotic Orangist household, something which marked Mussert as a 
conservative bourgeois liberal for life.366 As such he fell largely outside the confessional pillars of 
Dutch society, and his Christianity seemed largely negative in character. But as will be shown later, 
he would come to develop his religion to be more in tune with the serious Christian political 
culture of the Netherlands.  Unlike Lindholm, Mussert had no taste for literature, or music for that 
matter, and seemed largely culturally illiterate. His main interests were in history, with a similar 
                                                             
361
 „Bevare oss, gamla soldater, för all längtan efter bekvämlighet och för alla kinkigheter. Men det är bara 
ordning vi vill ha i allt.‟, Note from Lindholm,  1935 (Spring), Marieberg: NSAP/SSS Archive, Vol. 1. 
362
 Police memorandum, S. Fransson regarding splits in the NSAP, 27 February 1937, p. 1, Arninge: XII 64: 1. 
363
 Lindholm diary, 1 November 1936; 9-13 November 1936. 
364
 Pollmann, p. 28. 
365
 Due to a lung infection, acquired after bathing in a frozen lake mid-winter. Anton‟s father was, though severe 
and stately, also prone to occasional recklessness. 
366
 Meyers, pp. 15–18. 
76 
 
kind of nineteenth-century national-romantic education as Lindholm, and engineering. His 
interests in engineering and organisation defined his character for life, and even in prison after the 
Second World War he would write and propose new ideas on the subject. Generally he appears to 
have been unsociable; not unpleasant, but humourless and pedantic, and with few friends. He 
attempted to join the navy, but was rejected as constitutionally inadequate, on account of his 
diminutive stature. Instead he went to a Technical College to acquire a Master’s degree as civil 
engineer, and he would brandish the title it earned him [ingenieur, ir.] for years to come. During 
the First World War Mussert got some taste of military life, when he managed to join the reserve 
army.367 However, he had to go home again for a prolonged illness, during which time he was 
taken care of by his aunt, Maria Witlam, a 38-year old nurse. In 1917 they married, with royal 
dispensation for the incestuous union, and much to the dismay of his family, especially Anton’s 
mother who fiercely opposed the marriage to her sister.368  
After the war he made a career as civil engineer in water management in Utrecht, 
attaining the prestigious office of Head Engineer at the impressive age of 31 through a mixture of 
talent and careerist cunning.369 He spent his spare time reading about history, engineering, and 
politics, with weekly visits to the Jewish Jitta family to play bridge.370 A member of the liberal 
conservative Freedom Union like his father, his work brought him into nationalist politics when 
the 1925 Belgian Treaty unexpectedly united water management with nationalist controversy. The 
treaty concerned Belgian access to the Moerdijk canal via Antwerp, and under the treaty, 
supported by France, the right to pass through the canals with war ships if necessary.371 Mussert 
became a leading figure in the national protest against the treaty, which was successfully 
abandoned under the pressure. Inspired by his political success, Mussert became increasingly 
interested in politics, leading him to eventually found his own party in 1931, together with his 
colleague in the treaty protest, Cornelis Van Geelkerken (1901-1976). 
In 1934, the law against civil servants in revolutionary organisations forced Mussert into a 
career of full-time politics, his fame or notoriety growing with the NSB. May 1940 became a turning 
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point as the German Occupation and the establishment of a Reichskommissariat offered the 
prospect of real political power. But with collaboration –albeit of a very difficult and conflicted 
sort, with open hostility between the NSB and the SS – Mussert quickly became one of the most 
hated figures of the Netherlands. After the war he was arrested and put on trial; his time in prison 
was spent writing letters, proposing new engineering projects, and a justification of his political 
actions.372 He was executed on 7 May 1946.373 
Beyond a short war-time diary and his prison notes, little has been written by Mussert to 
elucidate his thinking, or the development of his personal ideology. Like Lindholm, Mussert never 
read Mein Kampf, and it seems his conversion to fascism came with reports and propaganda from 
the rising NSDAP in Germany, and an admiration for Mussolini that was common in the 
Netherlands of the late twenties and early thirties, as it was elsewhere in Europe.374 Historians like 
Ronald Havenaar have denied Mussert had any kind of ideology at all, pointing to the theoretical 
poverty of his thought, instead seeing him as an organiser above all.375 There was doubtlessly no 
originality in Mussert’s programmatic statements, and a great deal was copied directly from 
Germany and Italy, but this must be qualified. Beyond clearly stated ideological positions, 
Mussert’s thoughts were strongly grounded in patriotic histories of the Netherlands and the Dutch 
Republic. His liberal-romantic patriotism was in many ways conventionally bourgeois, but also 
made for a consistent and unique fascist ideology.376 Together with his passion for engineering, it 




Lindholm and Mussert were not just the human face of the leadership vis-à-vis the rank-and-file, 
but the face of the party to the public. As public-facing figures the personalities of the leaders were 
most immediately on display, rather than by virtue of their office, reflexively bestowing their 
particular traits on the party. The NSAP’s myth of a revolutionary socialist arbetareparti owed a lot 
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to Lindholm himself. The simplicity of his speech, his common habits, as well as his personal 
background as a low-ranking army officer in the Swedish artillery helped promote the party 
image.377 By contrast it was Mussert’s background as a leader in the 1925-27 protest against the 
Belgian Treaty which established his patriotic credentials (his ideas about the treaty and for 
diplomacy with Belgium were published in the liberal Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant, and later as 
a book),378 while it was his prestigious job as Head Engineer that gave the NSB such respectable 
appeal.379 Lindholm’s and Mussert’s functions in the party leadership were not entirely separable 
from themselves as persons. Thus, while the party leaders were themselves situated at various 
points within the apparatus’s mythopoeia of the party, there was also an implicit equivalence 
between them and the party myth as such.  
 
II 
But it was not enough for Lindholm and Mussert to simply function as public leaders in their 
respective organisations. The formal roles which the parties bestowed on them, and the ultimately 
rather un-exciting reality of their personalities, were insufficient for fascist Leaders. In other words, 
the party membership, rank-and-file, functionaries, and the leadership, had a pre-established idea 
of what a leader was meant to be like in such an organisation. Neither of the leaders had read Mein 
Kampf, at least in full,380 and did not necessarily share the notion of a ‘genius’ Leader,381 but they 
were doubtlessly influenced by the propaganda material and reports coming out of Germany, and 
to a lesser extent Italy. In the third ever issue of DSN, Per Dahlberg wrote, in a statement of the 
principles of National Socialism, that ‘a leader cannot be conjured forth through advertisement or 
empty declamations, [rather] he works through the power of his personality’.382 There was an 
understanding that fascist leaders had to be more than just competent, as implied by the 
extraordinary authority the party leaders enjoyed. There were other important figures in the NSB 
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and NSAP which could make claims to leadership on the basis of competence, or who were 
equally good at commanding a crowd as their superiors. Mussert was a decent speaker, but the 
Deputy Leader and General Secretary Cornelis Van Geelkerken was generally held to be more 
engaging, handsome, and taller.383 Regional leaders could command their own loyalties: southern 
District Leader d’Ansembourg for instance received requests for signed portraits of him from 
devoted members.384 In Sweden, Lindholm had acquired a great deal of experience as speaker – 
(sadly no recordings of Lindholm’s speeches exist)385 – and propaganda organiser in SFKO and 
SNSP, but Per Dahlberg rivalled those qualities, while youth leader Arne Clementsson (1915-?) 
seems to have been an excellent speaker, and even something like a charismatic leader in his own 
right.386 Consequently, since neither Lindholm nor Mussert occupied the position as Leader 
naturally, at least not very securely, it was necessary to construct them as Leaders, and enhance 
their actual qualities with the aura of fascist Leadership (contrary to Dahlberg’s performative 
claim). 
 One of the first and most direct ways of doing this was through dress and demeanour, 
which relied on handy signs to mark the leader as the Leader. They took on the roles of military 
commanders in speeches and articles, which was complemented through the wearing of uniforms, 
which underlined the hierarchical and unquestionable nature of the relationship of the leader to 
his followers. Mussert favoured a simple, tailored, but bespoke black or grey military jacket with a 
white shirt and black tie, which, while denoting him as an officer over his troops, set him above 
the dress regulations of the party, denoting his special rank [see figure 3]. Lindholm by contrast 
favoured the brown shirt SA-uniform of his party. His image of the Leader was that of the primus 
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In the guise of military commanders, the party leaders led marching columns through cities during 
rallies,387 or subjected party branches to solemn reviews as if army regiments, letting the members 
march past as they theatrically saluted the columns from a platform.388 Both leaders used 
standards as explicit symbols of their authority. From 1936 onwards Lindholm’s presence was 
marked by a yellow-blue flag with a red Thyr rune (↑), symbolising the self-sacrificing Nordic god 
of soldiers.389 Mussert used a black standard, initially with the fasces, which was replaced (being 
‘too Italian’) after August 1936, with a lion’s claw grasping eleven arrows to mark his authority.390 It 
was a simple, but evocative visual language which easily marked the men not as conventional 
party leaders or administrators, but something special, which allowed them to more effectively 
perform the role of natural Leader, and was seamlessly integrated with the militaristic myth of the 
party army [chapter 3]. In parties where part of the attraction was to be a missionary fascist soldier, 
military imagery could convincingly make a Leader for the cadres. 
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 In practice most members did not often see their party leaders in the flesh however, 
especially not in countryside NSAP branches, which did not get a visit from Lindholm more than 
once every few years, so to maintain the idea of the natural and unquestionable Leader, repetition 
was required in some form. This was managed particularly through print media, and the regular 
replication of images and text. Both DSN and VoVa produced standardised portraits of the Leader, 
which were featured on the front page of the papers whenever relevant, usually to emphasise the 
leaders addressing the members directly, their names printed in large capital letters. Generally 
depictions of the Leader were more common in VoVa than DSN – sufficiently often that Catholic 
daily De Tijd wrote Mussert should solicit for a job as advertising doll391 – perhaps because of 
greater modesty on Lindholm’s part, or simply because the paper’s often shaky finances could not 
afford the printing costs. When the paper’s budged increased somewhat in the latter half of the 
decade there was a corresponding increase in photographs of the leader. To celebrate Mussert’s 
return from the Dutch East Indies in 1935, NSB artist Meuldijk produced an idealised portrait of 
the Leader, emphasising his most celebrated facial features – ‘the Napoleonic figure with that 
imposing head, in which the mouth accentuates the force of will like a deep trench’392 – which was 
regularly reprinted in VoVa [figure 2]. Party programmes and meeting brochures invariably 
featured an image of the stern but benevolent face of the Leader, perhaps with a quotation of his 
wise words, or a caption such as ‘[t]he Leader of the freedom movement, foremost in the battle 
against the enemies of the people’,393 while the NSB often included a capsule biography of 
Mussert.394 It is of note that it tended to be the same portrait that was used over and over again, 
familiarising members with a single image of their Leader [see figure 1], which over the years 
acquired an iconic status. In the NSB this effect was enhanced further by the obligatory presence 
of the latest approved portrait of Mussert as part of the decoration of any party meeting,395 
(alongside a larger portrait of the Queen).396 By contrast other important functionaries of the 
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parties were typically only depicted on special occasions, particularly in VoVa, while DSN more 
regularly produced at least smaller portraits of the Leadership. These portraits of the Leader had a 
special status unlike others, and had to be treated with due reverence – for instance NSAP 
members were not allowed to in any way commercialise Lindholm’s image,397 nor use his picture 
or name in propaganda without special permission.398 Beyond portraiture, party publications also 
used techniques of design and placement to give special prominence or significance to the words 
of the leader, emphasising his special relationship to the party. Any editorial by Mussert was 
placed on the front page of VoVa, usually taking up the entire page, and with his name 
prominently displayed in capital letters. From time to time quotations from the Leader were 
printed in a banner at the bottom of the page of the paper, where it would also place quotations 
from patriotic historical figures like William the Silent.399 In 1938 VoVa took to printing a regular 
little column simply entitled ‘Sayings by Mussert’.400 DSN seemed to have eschewed quite such 
blatant methods of highlighting Lindholm’s significance, but did give enormous prominence to his 
speeches, especially after the annual party convention [årsting]. Simply summarising his speeches 
was not acceptable. In 1934, being only a six-to-eight page paper, DSN printed every word of 
Lindholm’s årsting speech, spreading it through several issues over more than a month, taking up 
almost a quarter of the paper.401 Party publications, being the one piece of media to which party 
members (and the public for that matter) were exposed on a regular basis, were not simply a 
mouthpiece of the Leader, but were specifically designed to construct him as a Leader, as a figure 
of unparalleled and unquestionable authority. 
 The myth of the fascist Leader required Lindholm and Mussert to not just be authoritative, 
but popular. Leaving aside whether or not they indeed were, efforts were certainly made to 
portray them as such. The propaganda apparatuses were highly observant of high attendance 
figures at meetings featuring the party leader, quick to point out applause and cries of agreement, 
and generally emphasise the loyalty of members to their Leader. The NSAP employed claques to 
express support for Lindholm, though it is unclear to what extent.402 At the first party convention, 
DSN pointed out the ‘especially strong tributes’ that were made to Lindholm, and printed in the 
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front page header that Lindholm had been ‘acclaimed with ovations’ at the rally.403 The following 
year the paper again pointed out the ‘ovations for Lindholm’ at the party congress,404 and DSN 
never failed to point out the ‘crashing applause’ reserved for the leader at meetings in the 
capital.405 Whenever Lindholm appeared on stage, he was immediately met with ‘endless 
jubilation’, and cries of hell Lindholm.406 If the reader who had never met Lindholm was in any 
doubt as to the enthusiasm that Lindholm could generate in his audience, DSN could paint a vivid 
and exclamatory picture of the supposedly electrifying character of his speeches:  
 
Like threatening thunder the rumbling of the applause filled the enormous circus tent! The Leader 
had spoken and the followers had been forged together into one single unit, ready for battle! While 
Lindholm had been speaking, all doubts had disappeared; problems, which one had been 
pondering for weeks, were solved; the lines were now clear; the goals for the fight stood out plain 
and firm before one’s eyes and the will to continued struggle had become even more hard as iron 
than ever before!407 
 
Whether there was a word of truth to these descriptions of Lindholm’s effect on his audience is 
uncertain, but there is no doubt the mantric insistence on the enthusiasm of the crowds in every 
meeting report helped construct Lindholm as a charismatic leader.408 Some of the formulaic 
expressions employed by DSN even found their way into branch reports of meetings with 
Lindholm.409 The rhetoric of VoVa was a little less fervent in its assessment of Mussert’s speeches, 
opting instead to simply describe a meeting as ‘an evening of fervent zeal’,410 or letting the headline 
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speak for itself: ‘Mussert in Amsterdam: Thousands inspired with new courage and zeal’.411 At the 
march to the RAI meeting hall for the April 1935 party congress, Mussert marched at the head of 
the party troops, while people pushed and shoved on the pavements and hung from their house 
windows, ‘to see Mussert’.412 Appearing in the hall to speak, the audience burst out in ovations, as 
the Leader benevolently regarded his audience. ‘Then Mussert made the well-known gesture’, 
VoVa wrote, ‘as if cutting the ripe wheat with a single stroke – the loud ovations ceased’.413 When 
the Algemeen Leider spoke at a meeting for the first time after a prolonged illness, his appearance 
was immediately met with ‘thundering shouts of hou-zee’, as he made his way up to the podium.414 
While commentators have been seriously sceptical about the rhetorical talent of the Swedish and 
Dutch fascist leaders, and Dutch historians have been keen to deny any charismatic qualities to 
Mussert in particular, VoVa and DSN present a very different image of the leaders.415 In party 
media, the leader came across as a natural leader, one who led not just through his competence, 
but due to his innate commanding stature, his inexplicable but unquestioned authority, and the 
charismatic bond with his followers which was expressed in their wild and tremendous 
enthusiasm.416 There was no particular need for this discursive construction to directly correspond 
to the reality of Lindholm’s and Mussert’s persons, because these repeated statements of Leader 
qualities were fundamentally performative in nature, i.e. they created what they ostensibly 
described. No doubt imperfectly, but certainly not ineffectively. Thus, the creation of the Leader 
was largely a top-down mythopoeic process pursued through the party apparatus. But as will be 
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While the parties’ propaganda apparatuses constructed the leaders as charismatic fascist Leaders, 
neither Mussert nor Lindholm were very comfortable performing these roles, at least initially. 
Both seemed aware enough of their own lack of any superhuman talents, and little of the 
propaganda work had yet been done to render their leading positions in the organisation 
indisputable. Around 1932-33, the two leaders seem to have mostly been preoccupied with 
securing the organisational foundations of the party and attracting a membership, with little 
notion of any extraordinary demands of themselves. But in a short time, they found that while 
they may not have required any particular adulation from their members, many of the members 
that came to the new movements desired a Leader to venerate.  
A June 1933 letter from one member to Mussert linked the nature of the NSB as a fascist 
movement to Mussert’s role as leader – if Mussert was not prepared to take on the role of a true 
Leader of his followers, ‘can we be sure that the N.S.B. intends to be a fascist organisation’.417 It was 
rumoured that Mussert opposed a cult of personality [persoonsvereering], and had prohibited the 
‘heil Mussert’ salute – the expression heil den Leider appears precisely once, in the second issue of 
VoVa, and never again after that418 – instead opting for the idiosyncratic maritime greeting hou zee 
(hold sea). As Mussert’s rather technical title of Algemeen Leider (General Leader) suggests, the ‘AL’ 
saw himself as not a predestined Leader, but as a leader elected for his competence. At the first 
party congress in Utrecht, January 1933, he acknowledged that ‘[t]he fascist worldview places the 
life-affirming force of the personality against the dead weight of majorities. It desires strong 
authority; it desires personal leadership. In our own organisation we will of course have to set an 
example.’419 But the nature of that leadership was immediately underlined as elective; Mussert 
promised that if a better, more competent leader emerged, he would withdraw immediately.420 
VoVa reported that the congress subsequently declared him General Leader with great enthusiasm. 
His anxious devotee pointed out: 
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But the masses want a cult of personality, the masses want a symbol: can ‘begeisterung’ really 
emerge from the daily administration of for instance 3 people, a triumvirate? […] And so you too 
must be a symbol for our Movement, and the people must not know you, they must not know you 
as an ordinary mortal, they must only see and hear you on the stage, or at the head of the troops.421 
 
Mussert’s response to the letter has not survived, but it is evident that in spite of any discomfort he 
may have felt, the leadership did acknowledge the existence of a grassroots demand for Mussert to 
be a charismatic Leader. That fascist loyalty to the Algemeen Leider was quickly taking on forms 
beyond the merely conventional is suggested by one letter to Mussert from a party functionary in 
December 1933. He and his wife had decided to name their new-born child Anton Adriaan, since 
‘we see in you the example of a good Patriot and an upright fascist, and also hope that this will be 
a guide to him for the rest of his life’.422  
Lindholm only seemed to demand from his members something like the loyalty of soldiers 
to their officer, but the socialist myth of the party emphasised the fundamental equality of the 
leader with his followers, and made ‘voluntary discipline’ the basis of party hierarchy. In his 1980-
81 interview, Lindholm noted his own discomfort with anything like a cult of personality in 1935: ‘I 
wasn’t particularly fond of that, but unfortunately I had to accept it. Because the fact is that it 
made a strong impression, on both followers and spectators – they wanted things like that.’423 
While the evidence outside of party publications is relatively sparse here, Lindholm’s assessment 
decades later does seem to correspond to the strong desire some branches expressed to have the 
partiledare speak to them.424  In fact party correspondence shows the leadership explicitly used 
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Lindholm’s visits as a reward mechanism.425 There was also the dreadful poetry members sent in to 
DSN: ‘They had no ideals to acclaim, / they had no Lindholm, them, - like us. / At his portrait there 
will always be flowers!’, as one adoring member wrote in celebration of the 1934 årsting.426 
Adulation apparently came automatically from the members, much in the same way as in the 
Netherlands, in a way that suggests prior expectations of the fascist leader – even before the 
propaganda apparatus had the chance to establish a strong and abiding myth of the leader. 
Whatever the extent of the rank-and-file’s demand for a leader cult, it was an opportunity the 
party leadership did not leave aside. The fascist leader had a crucial mobilising function in the 
party organisation. To encourage and sustain devotion to the leader could only enhance that 
function, but this required more than just the discursive construction of popularity. 
One of the means of satisfying grassroots demand for a leader cult was through idolising 
imagery, poetry, songs, and the like, and making these directly available to the membership. It has 
been noted how portraits of the Leader were frequently put on the front page of party publications, 
newspapers, brochures, and the like, which could quickly give them an iconic quality. Odes in the 
form of poetry were another form which attempted to develop a cultic appreciation of the Leader 
in the NSB. In July 1935 VoVa featured the first poem in dedication to Mussert on the front page, in 
acclaim of his flight to and from the Dutch Indies427 - De Tijd commented sarcastically on the VoVa 
poem celebrating ‘the immaterial fact, that someone who visits India, also returns’428 - after which 
they featured in the paper a couple of times per year for the rest of the decade. ‘The drums of 
Mussert’ glorified the Leader’s call to arms, while ‘The word of the leader’ envisioned Mussert as ‘a 
hero’.429 The Swedish DSN by contrast was remarkably void of such poetic celebrations of the 
partiledare, but then the NSAP never developed a particularly intensive or elaborate leader cult. 
The paper did however feature Lindholm’s own poetry, which was another way in which members 
could engage with him, the party organ becoming a platform for his image as a sensitive Swede, 
                                                             
425
 Letter, Dpch to Apch Agnér (branch 69), 27 April 1935, Kristianstad, Marieberg: NSAP/SSS, vol. 4, 
Kristiandstad (1935-38). 
426
 „De hade inga ideal att hylla, / de hade ingen Lindholm, de, - som vi. / Vid hans porträtt skall ständigt 
blommor finnas!‟, „En visa om Tinget‟, DSN, 1934, transcript in Arninge: 2A: 1. 
427
 Durandal, „Mussert naar Indië‟, VoVa, no 29, 20 July 1935, p. 1. 
428
 „...het onbelangrijke feit, dat iemand, die Indië bezoekt, ook weer terugkomt...‟, „Mussert kwam aan: Partij-
poezie‟, De Tijd, no 28370, 10 September 1935, p. 5. 
429
 Paulus, „De trommels van Mussert‟, VoVa, no 33, 17 August 1935, p. 6; Gabriel Geelmuijden, „Het woord 
van den leider‟, VoVa, no 8, 22 February 1936, p. 6. 
88 
 
baring his soul, communicating the mysteries of nature and struggle.430 To permit members to 
engage even closer with Lindholm’s poetic products, a gramophone recording was made of his 
party anthem Friheten leve! (Freedom lives), a popular song frequently sung at party meetings.431 
Written by Lindholm at the end of 1934 or January 1935,432 with a melody reminiscent of the 
Internationale, a performance of the song by the Stockholm SA ortsgrupp was recorded probably 
in the summer or autumn that year. Originally a speech by the leader was suggested for the reverse 
of the record, but in the end the cheerfully militaristic ‘March of the Leader’ was used instead.433 
Members could purchase one of the thousand records, produced by Tors Förlag, for 2.50 kronor, 
directly from the party supply service or certain stores.434 Beyond this potentially lucrative 
endeavour, there appear to have been surprisingly few attempts in the NSAP to further members’ 
interactions with the Leader through merchandise. Postcards with a portrait of Lindholm in SA 
uniform and one of his poems were sold, allowing members to possess a representation of the 
Leader, but not much more.435 In the Netherlands, commercialisation of the Leader’s image was 
much more common.436 After all, the NSB did not have the same socialistic ethos as the NSAP, 
while Mussert clearly had a more refined instinct for business.437 Many of the commercial activities 
of the NSB required deals with companies and businesses of all sorts across the country, 
something the NSAP seemed loth to do except for essential propaganda production. Portraits of 
Mussert in various sizes were advertised to the members, so they could display their loyalty to the 
Leader in their own homes.438 In 1934 a ‘film booklet’ was made. ‘By quickly passing the pages 
through one’s fingers, a living picture is formed of the General Leader.’ This was ‘of great 
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propagandistic value’, according to the propaganda department.439 When Mussert returned from 
his successful trip to the East Indies by airplane, a commemorative plate was gifted to him, of 
which subsequently 600 copies were made available to the more devoted members.440 Moreover, 
every party convention was used as an opportunity to sell high quality, illustrated commemorative 
books, which prominently displayed numerous pictures of the Leader, as advertised in circulars 
and VoVa, for prices as low as f 0.75.441 The illustrated Gedenkboek (Commemorative Book) of the 
1936 Hagespraak rally, produced by the graphic art institute Hobera in black and red, featured not 
only Mussert’s speech in full, but over a dozen pictures of the Leader, delivering his speech, talking 
to functionaries, and of course greeting his adoring followers [figure 3].442 
 
Figure 3. Mussert enters the Goudsberg. From De Hagespraak (1936), p. 20. 
For most of these examples of merchandise it is unfortunately impossible to know what kind of 
investment they entailed for the party, how much it profited from the sales, or indeed how 
popular they were – though the continued annual production of the commemorative books 
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suggests they must have been well-received. Regardless, they demonstrate a willingness of the 
party leadership to commercialise Mussert’s image, and disseminate his image in various forms 
into the households of thousands of members, simultaneously satisfying and encouraging the 
cadres’ devotional desires. It also highlights a contrast in financial capacity between the NSB and 
the NSAP, the latter lacking much of the resources and competence that would have made this 
particular method of developing the leader cult possible. 
Owing to this lack of resources, the mythopoeia of the charismatic Leader was less refined 
in Sweden, and relied more on the aforementioned presence of Lindholm as a reward to party 
branches, which suited his itinerant leadership style.443 In the mythopoeic development of the 
NSAP cult, personal presence was used to emphasise the special, unbreakable bond between the 
Leader and his ‘never failing troops of swastika-warriors, unwaveringly devoted to their leader’, 
rather than on Lindholm as a person.444 Members had to not just be loyal to the ideas, but 
absolutely dedicated to their leader as a condition for party membership.445 It was the årsting, held 
every year except 1936, which formed the centrepiece of the NSAP’s ceremonial devotion to 
Lindholm. ‘Out in the countryside, the fighters look towards Stockholm filled with expectations 
this Pentecost. After another year of struggle, loyalty, and sacrifice, they will now get the 
opportunity to come together with comrades from the entire country and meet their Leader…’446 
During the event which went on for two days, members would attend multiple speeches from the 
leadership, and attend outdoor rallies complete with marches through the city. While ostensibly 
an occasion for collective decision-making and an opportunity for the rank-and-file to enter into 
dialogue with the leadership, in practice the event was an opportunity for mobilising the 
membership and rubber-stamping the leadership’s decisions. For Lindholm personally it was a 
moment to be in contact with his followers, and accept their adulations, the moment when the 
‘fighting battalions march in the capital and gather around their young chieftain’.447 On the first 
day of the convention, the ‘leader day’, the Party Leadership conferred with party functionaries 
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from branches across the country, but on the second day the Party Leader would speak to the 
rank-and-file (usually around 2000 members). In 1934 ‘Lindholm had tried to avoid personal 
acclamation from the members, but it was the only thing at the convention that failed – 
completely spontaneously the bubbling shouts of hail came to him, from the depths of a thousand 
hearts.’448 By 1935 a ritual was developed for the congress. Once all members were gathered, the 
band played a song such as Friheten Leve, and the Leader ascended the podium to ovations and 
shouts of hell Lindholm. ‘An outsider cannot understand the heartfelt contact that exists in a 
moment such as this between Leader and followers, but we know that this natural, voluntary 
solidarity, founded on the kinship of souls, only exists among us’, DSN insisted.449 After a lengthy 
speech assessing the continued party struggle, Lindholm made an appeal for onward struggle. 
With the close of the speech, Lindholm shouted out to his followers: ‘One for all!’, to which the 
audience responded with a resounding: ‘All for one!’ [En för alla – Alla för en, figure 4].450 
 
Figure 4. 'One for all – All for one'. The party salutes Lindholm. DSN, no 35, 1938. 
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The choreography was simplistic, even trivial, but the event amounted to a covenant between the 
Leader and his followers. As J.P. Stern argued in regard to Nazi rituals, it was a great perlocutionary 
[performative] act, using extremely low information content, and instead affirming the mutual 
identity of the Leader and his followers, performatively enacting their unity.451 Annually renewed, 
it was a mythopoeic ritual sanctifying the charismatic bond between Lindholm and the NSAP with 
a solemn vow to mutual devotion, one that filled a genuine need amongst the cadres. However, it 
is important to note that the årsting never managed to gather more than perhaps one-fifth of the 
total party membership. Thus, in the end the actual mythopoeic potential of ritual relying on the 
personal presence of Lindholm was directly limited, even if the mythopoeic potential was 
magnified through reproduction and dissemination in print. 
 The Dutch landdagen had a similar character to those of the NSAP, but appear from 
VoVa’s reports to have been more varied from year to year, as were the Hagespraken in Lunteren 
held every year from 1936 to 1940. At the start of the 1934 regional party congress, Mussert 
suddenly entered unannounced, strode up to the podium to the sound of snare drums, 
accompanied by a uniformed guard, and mounted the elevated platform to ovations and shouts of 
hou-zee; a conventional choreography that doubtlessly constructed Mussert as a fascist Leader, but 
did not do anything out of the ordinary, and maintained the hierarchical separation of Leader and 
followers, seeking to impress the audience more than anything else.452 With minor variations, it 
was a ritual uniformly repeated through the thirties, its components echoing those of not just the 
NSAP, but fascist groups all over Europe. 
Rather more intriguing is the evidence that various NSB departments were by the mid-30s 
working on ceremonies to develop the emergent cult of the leader with religious overtones, 
specifically designed to move the audience, and give the Leader mythical status. Two documents 
survive, one (1935) from the Council for Ecclesiastical Matters by the Catholic John Boddé, and 
another (1936) from the shadowy Council for Volksche Culture, by the Reformed E.J. Roskam (also 
a member of the ecclesiastical council). It is unclear whether the suggestions were ever fully 
implemented, but as will be made clear further on, at least elements were incorporated into 
mythopoeic ritual. Council Secretary Boddé suggested that for a one hour meeting, after a short 
speech, the present members would sing the 1626 hymn Wilt heden nu treden (‘We gather 
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together’), and subsequently proceed to gather around the Leader (presumably in a semi-circle). 
Boddé insisted that the ceremony ‘does not become a veneration of the Leader, no deification. 
Rather, we gather around our Leader, we swear loyalty, and the Leader accepts that, and places 
himself precisely because of that with us before the face of our Creator.’453 The initial two lines of 
the first verse would emphasise ‘the beautiful symbolism’: ‘We gather together before God the 
Lord, / Him above all we praise with our hearts’.454 Metaphorically facing God, Mussert would have 
stood before his loyal devotees, guiding them onwards in subservience to the Lord. ‘Then we will 
experience a moment with which one can go on [fighting] for a year, and which one will never 
forget. Surely we must try to touch people in the deepest parts of their being.’455 In his letter to 
Mussert, Roskam suggested a prayer ceremony to follow the main speech. In Mussert’s speech to 
the audience (congregation) he would emphasise the charismatic bond with his followers: ‘Our 
Movement is too large for us to maintain personal contact, even though we would like to. But even 
though that is not possible, that does not mean that there is no mystic bond which links us 
together and binds us.’456 The speech continued to affirm it was a bond forged by God Himself in 
the struggle for an honest cause. In silence the audience then listened to a trumpet playing Nader 
mijn God tot U (‘Closer to you, my God’), before Mussert commenced a prayer to the ‘God of the 
Netherlands’, (‘Forgive us that we cannot see your light. Forgive us that we so often do not wish to 
see your light. We would not dare approach you if not You Yourself had called us, etc.),457 after 
which he announced the singing of Wilt heden nu treden, optionally replacing the final verse with 
an appeal to the Trinity. In this ceremony, the construction of the Leader as a priestly figure was 
taken even further, interceding with God for the Movement. It is uncertain whether these specific 
forms on paper were ever fully implemented, but they are a clear indication of the direction in 
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which party institutions were taking the Leader myth by the mid-30s, using ritual means to 
progress mythopoeia, and were doing so in cooperation with the party leader. 
Regardless of the personal qualities of Mussert and Lindholm, the mythopoeia of the 
Leader through these more or less ‘cultish’ methods met a deeply felt need among some members, 
and successfully created a thoroughly loyal core of militant devotees, if not necessarily a large one. 
There are a number of key moments through which this can be assessed, if in a limited way. When 
Lindholm spent time in prison from 17 March to 17 May, he received numerous letters of support 
from his followers, and the first buttercups of the season from some female members. Throughout 
April, Lindholm was literally inundated with flowers, which he had to eventually move out of his 
cell because of the overwhelming scent.458 He wrote happily to his mother of the floral 
contributions from his devotees.459 Branch 103 from Fridlevstad donated 10 kronor to the party, 
exclusively for flowers ‘to our Leader Sven Olof Lindholm, when freedom’s hour strikes’.460 For his 
release in May, hundreds of party members had travelled to the prison to greet him – one NU-boy 
handing over yet another bouquet – and welcome him back to the struggle.461 Many NSAP 
members clearly felt a strong sense of loyalty to Lindholm personally, and a need to demonstrate 
their commitment in some material way. Such opportunities did not often present themselves, but 
were used when they did. A cultic devotion to Lindholm as Leader persisted among a small core of 
members, who even through great setbacks, the difficult war years, and perhaps even harder post-
war years until 1950, remained loyal to him. 
The greater survival of the NSB party archive makes an assessment of devotion to Mussert 
a little easier, as some of the correspondence gives an insight into the rank-and-file’s personal 
feelings about their Leader. On the occasion of the third party convention [landdag] in 
Amsterdam, 1935, some felt the need to ‘personally express [their] feelings of honest veneration’ 
for Mussert.462 One member wrote the day after the landdag to thank her Leader for ‘the glowing 
words which you spoke to us’, which spurred her on to place her ‘entire being in the service of the 
NSB, and as a woman to help you as much as possible with the great work for the good of our 
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Fatherland’.463 Another family wrote enthusiastically of their experience of the entire event, 
‘[h]owever, the climax for us all was seeing the figure of the General Leader, far in the distance, 
heavily lit and standing tall above his thousands of loyal followers, as if on the forecastle of his 
admiral’s ship!’.464 The most important sign of loyalty to Mussert came after the electoral failure of 
May 1937, which was followed by an attempt to oust Mussert in the autumn by Goes van der 
Naters, and other leading functionaries in Department X (Education, Vorming). Summoning his 
followers to the Goudsberg in Lunteren on 9 October for an impromptu meeting, (‘MUSSERT calls 
for his faithful’, as the summons put it),465 35-40 000 turned up at their own expense to profess 
loyalty to their Leider.466 The crowd burst out into ovations as Mussert appeared on the podium, 
meeting him with the party song Wij zijn de zwarte soldaten (‘We are the black soldiers’). The 
meeting was finished with Voor Anton Mussert zijn wij in het gevecht (‘We are in this fight for 
Anton Mussert’),467 and a recording of Luther’s Ein feste Burg ist unser Gott (Een vaste burg).468 
Hundreds more sent in professions of loyalty before and after;469 one party branch (Circle 23, 
group 1) sent in the signatures of all the members who could not make it to Lunteren but wished 
to ‘hereby profess their unshakeable loyalty to the Leider’ – ‘Loyal until death!’, one handwritten 
note added dramatically.470 Devotion to Mussert personally had clearly been generated over the 
years, and when put to the test it turned out to be a useful tool, and was in and of itself sufficient 
to mobilise the NSB on a large scale. In spite of numerous challenges to his leadership, especially 
during the German Occupation, even as the membership was decimated, Mussert always 
managed to maintain his position, being able to reliably fall back on his mythic status as 
predestined Leader of the Movement.471 
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While the various mythopoeic methods constructed Lindholm and Mussert as ‘generic’ fascist 
Leaders in some sense, there were important differences, with significant implications for the 
quality and nature of their leadership and the greater fascist myth. But crucially the development 
of the myth of the Leader was a process: it was never in any sense complete, was in no sense all-
encompassing, and changed substantially over time. The devotion of party loyalists and the need 
for mobilisation was not the only factor driving mythopoeia, as the party organisations also had to 
contend with respectable opinion, and a vindictive press’s attitudes to fascist leader cults. These 
prohibited any kind of straightforward apotheosis of the Leader, not least because political 
opponents interrupted mythopoeia with their own, less flattering narratives. 
 The myth of Lindholm was perhaps the least fantastical, and largely static compared to 
Mussert’s, but multi-faceted and subtle. It derived more from Lindholm’s actual person – a young, 
tall, blond soldier with a love for the Swedish landscape – and relied on a more egalitarian notion 
of leadership. Lindholm may have been as wary of a cult of personality as he claimed in the 1980s, 
but his supposed modesty as a fascist Leader was exploited all the more for that. As shown above, 
NSAP mythopoeia focused particularly on his relationship to his followers rather than his own 
charismatic qualities. While Lindholm’s leadership was hardly democratic in the conventional 
sense of the word, he held his position with the approval of the loyal membership. As a 1938 
circular put it: ‘Our opponents’ propaganda often has an animus against the Nordic leader 
principle. They confuse our leader with oriental idols and small-German gauführer. Our leader is a 
Swedish people’s leader [folkledare] and nothing more. The first among comrades.’472 The humble 
leader was primus inter pares, in accordance with the Nordic chieftain tradition: ‘the leader of a 
youthful troop … Behind him stand men and women, boys and girls, who all wear the sign of the 
Nordic peoples, the swastika – the cross of light – “We National Socialists want to continue the 
history of Sweden!”’, as one propaganda leaflet put it.473 The young chieftain deserved his position 
as a leader who was always at the front of his troops, leading them into battle, doing the brunt of 
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the work, taking responsibility for the party. Carrying over his habits and activities from his time 
as an SNSP propaganda functionary, Lindholm was immediately established as the Leader ‘on the 
frontline’.474 DSN portrayed a vivid picture of him: constantly at meetings, touring the entire 
country to evangelise in the remotest villages, from Scania to Haparanda, doing his duty like all 
the other activists, with a small unwaged team, sleeping in tents, living hand to mouth through the 
sale of newspapers, propaganda, and donations. Every year, during the summer months in 
particular, but also in the depths of winter, the paper kept the readers up to date on Lindholm’s 
latest meetings, successes, and sacrifices, setting an example to the cadres, an apostle spreading 
the gospel. Illustrated with Lindholm’s own photographs, it showed members how their leader 
lived out in the field, rising early to bathe in the lakes, going to bed late at night after a hard day of 
often dangerous activism, or braving arctic weather conditions to spread his message to Finnish 
lumberjack communities in the far north.475 Lindholm was the perfect fascist activist, above all an 
example to his followers, while the apostolic undertones remained just that, undertones. In the 
words of one District functionary, ‘in the last instance our struggle is a matter of will, and it is the 
will to life which pushes us to sacrifices of almost any magnitude, and in this, as in all other cases,  
Lindholm is our example.’476 The principle of the leader as an example to his followers was 
institutionalised in the party directives for activists (1938), which emphasised that members were 
loyal to their leader because they were first and foremost loyal to the ideas, which the leader 
embodied.477 
 It was in this that Lindholm’s myth culminated: he was the NSAP incarnate; he embodied 
fascism. The semantic slip from example to personification was made deliberately by Lindholm 
himself with the inception of the party. In his article ‘to the National Socialists of Sweden’ in the 
first issue of DSN, he justified the break away from SNSP with the notions of example and 
personification: 
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One must demand from the leadership of this nat. soc. party that they are not just men who are 
honest, competent, and thoroughly familiar with their political task, but also that they through 
their personal example represent the ideas. Of a leader himself, finally, one demands that he 
personifies the ideas also in his life and in his actions…478 
 
When the fascist sympathiser Carl-Enfrid Carlberg, owner of far-right publishing house Svea Rike, 
and later financial supporter of SSS was asked why the young acclaimed Lindholm, he answered 
‘[b]ecause Lindholm personally embodies the … ideal of Swedish masculinity’, utterly lacking 
amongst other leaders.479 It was not without significance that in 1936 the NSAP sought to register 
its official electoral name as ‘Lindholm’s freedom movement’.480 In the wake of the 1937 party 
congress, DSN proclaimed in its headline: ‘NSAP and Lindholm are one’.481 Closely tied up with the 
construction of Lindholm as the ideal fascist embodiment of the party, was the narrative of the 
party’s origins as a moral and idealistic break with corruption and compromise represented by the 
SNSP. This myth was annually reified with the 15 January celebration of the founding of the NSAP, 
an opportunity to develop a narrative with Lindholm as the moral hero purging Swedish fascism 
of its ‘bourgeois corruption’, destined to lead his followers to victory through the struggle and 
sacrifice he embodied.482  
 
The man who had led them [Furugård], had failed them – it now depended on those who felt their 
responsibility before the people, whether everything was going to collapse, whether the sacrifices 
made up to this point would be in vain. They knew, that they needed to act, and on that dark 
January day the revolution came. Lindholm raised his hand to strike. Lindholm raised his hand for 
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renewed struggle. Around Lindholm they gathered, the oldest and most honest fighters of Swedish 
National Socialism.483 
 
As the idealistic and moral manifestation of fascism, Lindholm was increasingly associated with 
an above all uncompromising fascism, a reputation that by 1936 appears to have made it across the 
border to Denmark. ‘Lindholm’s name is a guarantee that the struggle in Sweden is waged without 
compromise’, Fritz Clausen’s DSNAP reported.484 The ‘spirit of Lindholm’ would ultimately save 
Sweden through a ‘moral revolution’.485 In the latter half of the thirties the party apparatus 
increasingly emphasised Lindholm’s ethos as the salvation of Sweden. A police informant noted in 
March 1937 that Party Organiser Bertil Brisman ‘depicted Lindholm as the man “who will save 
[frälsa] the Swedish people from their oppressors”’.486 In one surviving 1935 letter a former 
member of Lindholm’s propaganda team wrote that life felt meaningless without active 
participation in the struggle, and fighting alongside Lindholm, who made life worth living; 
‘Lindholm the leader will lead the people out of hardship and sorrow’.487 Over the years a myth of 
Lindholm was constructed, that of a humble fascist Leader, pure and saintly in life, capable of 
saving the nation through his example, followed by a willing army with which he had a special, 
personal bond. Within a short span of time, this appears to have convinced at least some, and 
underpinned the devotion of the cadres, and mobilised them to unusually self-sacrificing forms of 
activism. As will be shown later, the corresponding mythopoeic efforts were sharply reduced in 
intensity around 1938, and came under fire from various directions, but for most of the 1930s it was 
an important factor in the cohesion and mobilisation of the NSAP. 
 During the first years in the Netherlands, the NSB mainly tried to shape Mussert’s image in 
line with his social status, his past as a nationalist campaigner, and as civil engineer. Rather than 
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mythicising his capacities, emphasis was on his technical competence derived from a highly 
successful career, and hard organisational work, which made him above all a responsible leader. 
The General Leader was ir. Mussert [ingenieur],488 a respectable politician who abhorred 
violence,489 who engaged in performative acts of loyalty to the House of Orange – most notably the 
public sending of telegrams to the Queen at party rallies.490 That Mussert’s image and reputation 
provided a solid foundation for mythopoeia is evident from some of the initial press reports. In 
reaction to the first party convention, one paper wrote: 
 
Nothing but good is known about his past as engineer of water management. His love for his 
country and people is above suspicion. Indeed he has not started with bombast in a theoretical 
void, rather he has prepared the first appearance to the outside world methodically like a 
conscientious civil servant. Everything must really have been completely and neatly in order.491 
 
The paper also favourably compared the NSB’s engineered organisation to the preposterous 
indiscipline of previous fascist parties; the liberal conservative paper Algemeen Handelsblad 
agreed.492 In the first years the party made the most of this: quite uniquely in European fascism, 
this became a myth of the Leader as civil engineer. Mussert was portrayed as a responsible civil 
servant with a dedication to both state water management and the party, who fulfilled his duty in 
both capacities until forced to resign from his office by the 1934 law against civil servants in 
revolutionary organisations (Mussert argued the law itself was right in principle, but that the NSB 
was not a revolutionary organisation).493 That moment marked the decline of this particular 
construction of Mussert’s myth, but it never went away entirely. While the myth would undergo 
radical alterations in the following years, as late as 1944 it was still brought up, with the 
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publication of the Nenasu biography Mussert als ingenieur (Mussert as engineer).494 But the 
heyday of this myth was the first few years of the NSB, when it could count on sympathy from the 
conservative press. In February 1933 VoVa proudly quoted the local Utrecht newspaper in its 
description of the leader, this ‘young chief engineer of water management [Rijkswaterstaat], who 
builds roads in the day and spends his free time building up a movement, for which he has great 
expectations, is a born leader and organiser’.495 ‘It is no accident’, VoVa exclaimed, ‘that an 
engineer is at the head of our movement’: engineers were amongst all the intellectuals the only 
ones who had the privilege of working with all parts and classes of the people.496 In the NSB fascist 
myth, engineers were ideally suited to be fascists: born organisers, and leaders of the people. And 
Mussert was the perfect engineer, demonstrated through his every action. At a rally in Amsterdam: 
‘The arrival of the leader is announced; with thundering calls of houzee Mussert goes to the 
podium in the middle of the hall. In everything Mussert shows himself the engineer: the straight 
line is the shortest path between two points…’497 
In line with the respectability and supposed leader qualities that came with the skills of a 
civil engineer, Mussert was also constructed as a strongman to rival the Prime Minister, and a 
moral guardian of society. In the years 1932-34 Mussert was presented as an alternative to the Anti-
Revolutionary Hendricus Colijn, who Mussert argued only weakened state authority through his 
compromises with the SDAP.498 Through his editorials the Algemeen Leider consistently came out 
in defence of state authority and the, if necessary, violent suppression of unrest and disorder, as 
well as Christian morality in the face of cultural decadence.499 In 1935 Mussert was vocal in his 
disapproval of the Swedish modernist novella and play Bödeln (The Executioner, De Beul in Dutch) 
by Pär Lagerkvist, which in unsubtle ways portrayed fascists as murderous racist brutes.500 Mussert 
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and VoVa took the opportunity to denounce the performance of the play in Amsterdam as a 
scandal, and argued that ‘the decent part of the Dutch people should be thankful’ for the NSB 
members who disrupted the performance, before focusing on the blasphemous and allegedly anti-
Christian parts of the work.501 In his October 1933 Utrecht convention speech, Mussert shunned 
terror, rejected racism, and stated that Dutch National Socialism considered the Queen to be the 
personification of power in the country, and ‘fully recognises the Christian character of the 
nation’.502 The bourgeois undertones of Mussert’s respectability were palpable, to the point where 
it became a source of complaint in the party: many members were prone to use ‘un-fascist’ modes 
of address for the Leader, referring to him as ‘Mr Mussert’ and the like, much to the chagrin of 
other members.503 Mussert’s respectability was banal, but was a crucial part of the mythopoeia of 
the Leader, and retrospectively turned out to be a stepping stone towards a less mundane myth. 
As the NSB entered a damaging political contest with the Catholics and Calvinists in 1934-
35, suffering the opprobrium of ecclesiastical censure, the party organisation and Mussert 
increasingly emphasised the positive Christian dimensions of their ideology. In Mussert’s own 
rhetoric, faith in God, while always an aspect of the ‘leading principle’, was pushed to the fore as 
the decade progressed (contrary to the claims of Tessel Pollmann who argues the reverse).504 As 
seen previously, it was precisely after 1934 that the party leadership developed mythopoeic 
ceremonies with heavy-handed Christian overtones, presenting Mussert as an ecumenical 
alternative to Colijn, RKSP leader Piet Aalberse, or CHU leader Dirk Jan de Geer. At the 1937 
Hagespraak, Mussert castigated the three main confessional parties for their perverted sense of 
decency and respectability [fatsoen], as the political press confused the historical term for a 
spontaneous citizens’ council, hagespraken, dating back to the Middle Ages, with the early 
modern Calvinist hagepreken, accusing the NSB of a divisive Protestant bias.505 In 1939 Mussert, in 
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a speech about the decline of agriculture, invoked God to attack the government as sanctimonious, 
founded on the atheistic principles of the French Revolution. ‘Whoever considers all this, for him 
it is no wonder that there is a rumbling over our fatherland. This is a miracle: that the Almighty 
endures it any longer, this state order which tramples and despises the laws of its Creator.’506 From 
1935 onwards there was a noticeable increase in Mussert’s references to God, and his rhetoric 
became generally more and more biblical.507 He portrayed the fascist mission as being about the 
conscientious salvation of the people in duty to God, portraying the NSB as a martyrs’ organisation 
in God’s service: ‘At the end of every human life it does not matter one bit if the farewell happens 
in a prison or a stately bed … it only matters, if you have done your duty, in accordance with your 
honour and conscience, to God and man.’508 The mythopoeic qualities of his airborne journey to 
and from the East Indies in the summer of 1935 were exploited to depict the leader not as a daring, 
heroic man,509 – although this was discussed by the General Council510 – but as one protected by 
Providence.511  
The image of bourgeois respectability was pushed to the background, if not eliminated, to 
instead turn Mussert into a Leader with a holy mission, a priestly figure. In January 1937, an article 
by the Head of Department X described his experience of meeting Mussert in 1927: a charismatic 
man had emerged in defence of his people, ‘touched by the hand of destiny’.512 Where Lindholm 
always emphasised the long-term struggle and need for sacrifice in the face of constant (electoral 
and financial) adversity, Mussert, buoyed by the meteoric success of the NSB in its first three years, 
relied on themes of destiny and imminent salvation. A new age was dawning in Europe, and 
Mussert was the first in the Netherlands to realise it. As he put it at the second Hagespraak in 1937, 
also in the Dutch people a divine spark had taken hold, which spoke of resurrection, and the 
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victory of good over evil.513 ‘We stand in the middle of the period in which history is made’.514 The 
NSB followed a path, on which it had found the love of God, and it wished to keep pursuing the 
way in which God would stay with them. In the current darkness there was a burning fire, ‘that a 
Movement has emerged in our people … which has shown its indestructability, and gradually 
makes itself ready to fulfil its calling that history has ordained’.515  No longer just a thoroughly 
respectable Christian gentleman, Mussert was constructed as a Biblical prophet, echoing the voice 
of the Lord, calling to the people to heed the coming of a divinely ordained era. ‘A new era is 
coming: that era is Mussert. Irresistible. He is the voice of the coming Netherlands’.516 At the 
December 1936 commemoration of the founding of the NSB, Mussert declared that ‘God’s 
judgement is being executed over all that has shown itself sinful, both in the individual and in the 
people’ – a new era is coming in the history of nations.517 Commanding the flags to be lowered, and 
his audience to rise and stand still in silence, Mussert recited a prayer: 
 
We do not ask, that we will be spared suffering, sorrows, and ardour in the coming years; 
We do not ask, that it may go well for us; 
We do not ask, that our wishes and our desires are fulfilled, 
because not our will be done. 
But we ask on this evening, at the beginning of a new battle period this one thing: 
that God give us the insight, the courage, the determination, the honesty, the good faith, which are 
necessary to be a good tool in His hand, serving for the resurrection of this people, which we love, 
so that the Fatherland, so that the Imperium will not be lost, but will be maintained and the way 
up will be steadfastly walked according to His will. 
We now sing together: Wilt heden nu treden.518 
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Christian credentials were indispensable for a respectable politician in the interwar Netherlands, 
and a religious outlook had been, albeit in the background, part of Mussert’s image since 1933. But 
as the years went on, initial success, as well as hostility from the authorities, drove a mythopoeia 
which transformed the respectable bourgeois leader, the down to earth civil servant, into a 
charismatic prophet-priest figure. Additionally, people in the Ecclesiastical Council argued that 
‘the increasingly calling on God’s aid at our meetings has found resonance and finds this more and 
more amongst the best and most serious of our Volksgenooten’, even as Germanic-pagan ideas 
were also gaining ground in the party.519 In some respects respectability had been jettisoned in the 
mythopoeic process, but in this myth the NSB had found a handy marriage between the demands 




The mythopoeia around the leaders of the NSB and NSAP was managed with mainly the party 
membership in mind, building on the grassroots demand for a devotional object. The uninitiated 
tended to be much less impressed by the fantastic representations of the Leader. A 1937 report by 
the Anti-Revolutionary De Rotterdammer, on a Senate speech by a CHU speaker, is illustrative of 
how opponents perceived and portrayed Mussert’s Christian myth: 
 
[Mussert’s National Socialism] does try to hide its true nature with pretty words. Sometimes they 
are also virtuous words, which however immediately betray that they are merely the words and 
concepts, handled by those, who do not know their Christian meaning … It is an horrendous abuse, 
an abhorrent method for misleading the simple. Nevertheless [sic] … Mussert’s National Socialism 
is equally pagan and objectionable in its principle foundations as the German [equivalent], which 
he imitates. Unchristian, unhistorical, and revolutionary, concluded Prof. Anema. And rightly so.520 
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One ARP preacher, Ds Bik, took things a bit further: ‘the brainless Mussert – that great St Nicholas 
figure … every show of friendship from him I regard as a kiss from Satan – the N.S.B. is Satanism in 
disguise’.521  Mussert’s ever more virtuous Christian image and the increasingly liturgical rituals did 
not necessarily impress an antagonistic press, which was keen to highlight the pseudo-pagan 
elements in a party that was already tarnished with the Nazi German brush. In 1936 Mussert was 
the butt of a satirical poem by the popular Anti-Revolutionary poet Leo Lens, decrying the 
indecency of his sanctimonious and hypocritical performance – ‘Such a man must and surely does 
know, / That outside of his wonderful N.S.B. / Not an honest, decent man can be found / In this 
hopeless place by the sea’.522 Mythopoeia did not take place in a vacuum, and opponents exploited 
fractures in the party’s performance of (Christian) respectability to undermine Mussert’s myth. 
Although it was naturally impossible to make the Mussert myth flawlessly convincing, the party 
apparatus did counter the hostile feedback and wholeheartedly engaged in a public struggle to 
define Mussert as a symbol of fascism. The above quotation from De Rotterdammer was found in a 
press summary compiled by the NSB’s Central Documentation Bureau, which monitored press 
reports from all over the country, with the aim of informing party propagandists such as speakers, 
and providing them with the tools to offer a rebuttal, and interject the NSB’s own narrative in a 
struggle to reify party myths in public discourse. VoVa was constantly engaged in a battle with 
hostile media,523 recounting and denying unfavourable reports from the ‘lie-press’.524 The NSAP 
was engaged in a virtually identical battle with the ‘deceitful Jewish systempressen’ (‘the System 
Press’),525 but by contrast made few overt efforts to construct Lindholm as a respectable figure – 
certainly not in any Christian sense as Lindholm and the party showed limited sympathy for the 
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Lutheran Church and Christianity in general.526 But, like Mussert, Lindholm’s myth was still 
vulnerable to comparison with foreign dictators, opening it up to accusations of an unrespectable, 
un-Swedish lack of patriotism, or dangerous dictatorial tendencies. It has already been noted that 
Lindholm was compared to ‘small-German gauführer’ and the like, or just mockingly ‘the 
Führer’,527 while the socialist Prague-based paper Neuer Vorwärts described Lindholm as ‘a man, 
who gathers the lumpenproletariat under [the NSAP’s] flags. His style is truly Goebbelesque’.528  
Both party leaders were the target of damaging comparisons to the leaders of Nazi 
Germany, which were made not just to make them look dangerous, but also ridiculous. Positing 
Hitler as an undisputed, charismatic, and impressive original,529 the Swedish and Dutch leaders 
were juxtaposed to present a pathetic picture. In 1933 the liberal Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant 
described the NSB leader as ‘’Mr Mussert playing as Hitler’;530 the same year the Socialist paper Het 
Volk printed photographs comparing Mussert and Hitler saluting their followers from their cars, 
captioned ‘Like the master, so the servant!’,531 and De Maasbode described Mussert as a caricature 
of Hitler.532 In 1937, before the general election, NRC noted sardonically that if the Netherlands was 
to be a dictatorship it would need a dictator ‘of great stature’: ‘many NSB-members are already 
coming to their senses…’.533 A 1934 biography of Mussert stated that ‘[h]e remained the leader of 
an assignment; what he was not: a prophet who was going to make the crowd ecstatic’.534 Similarly, 
the Swedish priest Per Gyberg described Lindholm as a man devoid of rhetorical talent, 
monotonous, lacking in imagination, and clumsy in his performance – an anti-demagogue, one 
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couldn’t but help compare unfavourably to his German counterparts.535 Göteborgs-Posten 
compared Lindholm favourably to Birger Furugård (‘a buffoon’), but also depicted the row with 
other Swedish fascist leaders as childish; in Sweden the sheer plurality of competing ‘little Führers’ 
was a common way to denigrate their stature.536  
Beyond the respectable press, some commentators were also happy to point out just how 
short Lindholm and Mussert fell from the mythic constructions produced by the party, opting for 
ad hominem approaches that portrayed them as grotesque simpletons. ‘How is it possible’, wrote 
one columnist, ‘that thousands of Netherlanders “work themselves up into the hysterical worship 
of a completely ordinary bourgeois”’.537 De Tijd wrote that ‘mister Mussert is a completely ordinary, 
well-off gentleman’, with an unfortunate predilection for black trousers ‘which are not the most 
flattering on his small figure’.538 ‘Mister Mussert was evidently a comfortable and valued civil 
servant in Utrecht. That is certainly praiseworthy, it is just a pity that he was a civil servant, and no 
longer is.’539 An exaggerated emphasis on the charismatic qualities of the Leader tended to backfire 
with a close examination of their actual personal qualities. While it appears the Dutch press was 
generally very reluctant to pry into Mussert’s private life during the interwar years, one 
propaganda leaflet of unknown origin, most likely from 1937, took the opportunity to point out 
that ‘[o]n 19 September 1917, at the city hall at de Steeg, ANTON ADRIAAN MUSSERT, 23 years old, 
unemployed, married Maria Witlam, the sister of his mother, a nurse, twice as old as him. … 
Mothers of sons, imagine something like that. Your son with your sister!!’540 Lindholm’s private life 
did not offer quite the same opportunities for portraying him as a perverted hypocrite of any kind, 
and it must be noted that his leader myth was more convincing and internally directed than 
Mussert’s. Nevertheless the left-wing press was keen to undermine his image as the natural, tall, fit, 
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healthy and handsome sergeant, caricaturing him as strange and ungainly, an unkempt ‘nazi 
wastrel’ and gangster boss cravenly vying for German approval [figure 5]. 
 
 
Figure 5. 'Gangsterledarna slåss om subsidierna', N! S! K!, 17 January 1939. 
 The inherently flawed nature of mythopoeia, particularly when focused on actual, 
physically present human beings, did not only cause problems with outsiders; in the interstices of 
the mythopoeic process scepticism grew among the members, especially higher functionaries. 
This was quite possibly aggravated by the hostile press representations of their leaders, which 
provided a sobering antidote to the fervent myth-making and overt adulation that dominated the 
internal party cultures. By 1940 the Swedish police had picked up on signs that some of the 
members were unhappy with some of Lindholm’s decisions in the SSS, showing that he was far 
from unquestionable.541 In 1937 there were already some rumblings that Lindholm was ‘running 
out’ as leader, was becoming arrogant and pompous.542 One functionary, in a treasonous letter to 
Hermann Göring, described Lindholm as an undiplomatic and unsuitable leader ‘in most people’s 
opinion’, even suggesting perhaps Birger Furugård should be made leader again.543 Mussert also 
had his sceptics in the NSB, something that is particularly evident from some of the party’s 
disciplinary dossiers; for instance his pro-Italian stance on the invasion of Abyssinia attracted 
criticism from some of the members, though others considered it wrong to say so.544 In spite of the 
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mythopoeic attempts to construct Lindholm and Mussert as undisputed and natural leaders, they 
had to contend with potential alternatives to their leadership. In both cases this was made 
painfully evident to them in the wake of electoral failure, which provided a natural opportunity to 
question myths, and consider alternatives. The 1937 autumn rebellion of Department X and former 
WA-commander J. Hogewind highlights how those who stood closest to the Leader were also the 
most liable to exploit mythopoeic flaws, and revolt. The NSB rebellion may have failed, but 
nevertheless thousands of members left the party after the electoral disaster in May that year, an 
important reminder that Mussert’s myth as prophetic and predestined Leader was founded and to 
some extent contingent on success, and by no means subscribed to by the entire membership.  
Lindholm’s myth was far more stable. Rather than a prophet predicting imminent and 
total victory, the ascetic frontline soldier-chieftain promised a long and hard struggle demanding 
the utmost discipline as per his own example. Consequently, the opening for scepticism and 
outright rebellion did not immediately come from the lack of electoral success – never as dramatic 
as the NSB’s loss of half its vote in 1937 – but from his and the Party Leadership’s decision to alter 
and even reverse the mythopoeia the party apparatus had worked on for years. After years of 
constructing Lindholm as the moral and uncompromising revolutionary Leader of Swedish 
fascism, the New Direction [nyorientering] created a new, respectable Lindholm, a suited 
nationalist politician open for compromise with other parties. 
 
 
Figure 6. Front page picture of Lindholm, DSN, no 35, 1938. 
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This was a gradual process. Although the official announcement of the nyorientering came at the 
end of October 1938, for the past year and half at least, members could spot that change was afoot. 
Not only was some of the anti-Semitic rhetoric toned down, but the pictures of Lindholm were 
increasingly not of the Leader in uniform, but neat and kempt in a suit and tie [see figure 6]. When 
he announced the changes at a meeting in Stockholm, attendees noted he was behaving very 
oddly: 
 
Lindholm finished his speech by letting out a fourfold ‘long live’ the N.S.A.P.!? Now there were 
some members who cheered, and others who ‘hailed’, and some who kept silent. Was Lindholm 
drunk or had he become bourgeois? It had never happened before in the history of the N.S.A.P., 
that an ordinary member had ‘long-lived’ [the party], and now the leader himself did it. What was 
the meaning of this? […] The meeting was finished with a very strange – not to mention oppressive 
– atmosphere.545 
 
The change in image and behaviour was striking, and members immediately picked up on the 
shift towards respectability, something which could only be profoundly damaging of the 
charismatic bond that was integral to the Lindholm myth. In January 1939 the party organ even 
published a remarkable deconstruction and denial of Lindholm’s myth. A transcript of a speech by 
the leader himself stated that ‘already in the beginning of our community of struggle I warned that 
you should not regard me as some kind of super human or wizard, but I have promised to fight 
honourably and place myself foremost in line for our sacred cause’.546   Lindholm, previously a 
living symbol of fascism, now found that there were other symbols to rival him, symbols which 
retained their mythic charge. When part of the NSAP/SSS broke away to form Solkorset (The Sun 
Cross), under the leadership of the SA branch leaders Nils Björkman and John E. Runefelt, they 
portrayed it as an act of loyalty to the swastika, and the ideas it represented. In abandoning the old 
myth of the radical and uncompromising Leader under the swastika banner, and compromising 
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with Jewish capital (it was rumoured), Lindholm had betrayed the cadres and the NSAP’s ethos 
intrinsic to the Leader myth: a frontline fighter, one of and equal to his own. ‘We National 




In 1932-33, neither Lindholm nor Mussert fit the then established mould of the charismatic fascist 
Leader. Both had years of political experience of one kind or another, and were used to more 
conventional relations to their colleagues and followers. With the establishment of their own 
fascist parties, they quickly found themselves under pressure from the party’s lower echelons to 
perform the part of the fascist leader. With the active support of their colleagues at the top, the 
party apparatus started the mythopoeic process straight away. While this initial period was 
mutatis mutandis the same in both movements, the following stages diverged significantly. The 
NSAP quickly established Lindholm as a young Nordic chieftain, fighting for his followers as the 
first among equals, and the living embodiment of the fascist idea. This remarkably insular myth 
saw little change or variation from 1933 to circa 1937, nor did it need to. Relatively unconcerned 
with any external notions of respectability and not expecting major electoral success or growth in 
the near-future, it could afford to strengthen Lindholm’s bonds with his followers and, at least at 
first, ceaselessly mobilise the cadres on a path of continuous sacrifice. It must however be added 
that the scarce resources of the NSAP limited the efficacy of this strategy: establishing loyalty 
through personal contact was difficult with Sweden’s geography, even as financial necessity 
dictated such a cost-free method.  
In the NSB on the other hand, 1932-34 saw an attempt to establish ir. Mussert as a 
respectable nationalist politician, a responsible and even technocratic alternative to the corrupt 
and failing parliamentary government, but firstly found that this failed to satisfy the devotional 
demands from the cadres, and secondly that the pointed measures taken by the authorities, 
secular and spiritual, undermined that narrative.  In the second half of the decade, spurred on by 
the electoral success of 1935, the party organisation set to work to recreate Mussert as a priestly 
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figure who had foreseen the future, and heeding God’s call, was leading his people to national 
resurrection. It was a fantastic myth, and seemed to put an end to internal complaints about the 
banal and bourgeois leader, while simultaneously offsetting concerns about the growth of pseudo-
pagan discourse and symbolism in the party around the same time. The NSB and the NSAP show 
that mythopoeia was by no means linear. While different stages can be discerned, the phases were 
intertwined, and various myths co-existed at the same time, with different intensities and 
trajectories – especially in Mussert’s case. Neither leader hit upon any kind of ‘winning formula’ 
that would stabilise or focus mythopoeia. 
 The Dutch general elections of 1937 demonstrated the inherent problems. The party 
leadership’s response to the more fanatic parts of the membership may have had great mobilising 
potential, but to many outsiders it was evidently perceived as sanctimonious at best, and 
dangerous cultic behaviour at worst – Satanic worship. However, internally the Mussert myth was 
of considerable value in maintaining party cohesion at this difficult time. The 1937 challenge to 
Mussert’s authority was seen off quickly and without endangering the party organisation, as the 
Leader exploited the cult of the leader to mobilise his loyalists to counter the rebellion. In the 
period of 1937-40 mythopoeia remained in the same register, with no real changes made until the 
hectic days of the Occupation. Even in the latter period Mussert managed to maintain a loyal 
following, which desperately placed its trust in him as their saviour until the final collapse in May 
1945.548 
 Lindholm may never have faced a rebellion of any sort had the NSAP leadership not 
radically altered the mythopoeic course in 1937-38. Doubtless there were already some murmurs of 
dissatisfaction before then. The cadres could not be permanently mobilised, and the lack of 
notable progress in the elections reflected badly on the party’s first and foremost activist, leading 
to dangerous levels of frustration. Where Mussert saw off a revolt by exploiting the charismatic 
bonds that his myth had forged, the NSAP leadership wilfully cut them by reversing much of the 
mythopoeia in a turn to political respectability, hoping to catch more votes and members. The 
subsequent Solkors break-away put the spotlight on alternatives objects of devotion to the mythic 
Lindholm. The rebellion the following year of the young and radical Arne Clementsson and the 
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NU underlined the willingness of others to perform the myth of charismatic Leader.549 While 
Lindholm survived the internal turmoil, some level of scepticism and unrest persisted for years to 
come, while the SSS continued to haemorrhage followers even as it sought to establish an alliance 
with other far-right organisations. 
 Respectability did not seem to be of any real concern to the NSAP for most of the 1930s, 
but as the years went on the Leader himself, active as a fascist politician since 1926, started to feel 
the frustration of being perpetually on the fringe. Contrary to Mussert, who after little more than a 
year experienced spectacular political success, and subsequently settled into a, more or less, 
comfortable if limiting niche between fantastic myth and respectability, the NSAP had effectively 
painted Lindholm into a corner. The radical and uncompromising embodiment of the idea was 
going nowhere fast, but turning away from this myth could not be anything but profoundly 
damaging to Lindholm’s authority, and the prestige of the party, so painstakingly acquired over 
the decade as it had outperformed and outlasted other fascist contenders. The tendency of the 
Leader myth to supplant the party itself that has been observed in Germany and Italy, was not 
present in the NSAP or NSB.550 In different ways, and with varying if ultimately similar results, both 
Lindholm and Mussert were caught up in a myth-making dialectic that could neither fully satisfy 
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3. The Uniform: fantasy, violence, discipline 
The fascist uniform was a cultural nexus of peculiar importance in the struggle to assert the 
meaning and nature of fascism. No other prop in the political performances of the NSB and NSAP 
carried the same weight of signification, was so heavily inscribed with symbolism. The association 
between uniforms and fascism was not inevitable, but well-established by the early thirties. Both 
parties drew on this, in self-conscious homage to the precedents of Mussolini’s Blackshirts and the 
brown-shirted SA of the NSDAP. The shirt of the appropriate colour was the most recognisable 
part these uniforms, but not the only one. Various other articles of clothing, accessories, and 
insignia completed the uniform, each part echoing the whole. At their full potential, the uniforms 
were worn collectively in larger groups, a full ensemble worn with insignia, in a march or similar 
ritual occasion with flags, music, and other symbols, which underlined a militaristic discipline that 
the NSAP and NSB were keen to exhibit. Therefore, while the uniform is the focus of this chapter, 
it must also deal with the wider culture of symbols and behaviour of the rank-and-file that was 
directly linked to the garments. 
 While the ubiquity of uniforms in fascist political culture has been widely acknowledged 
and discussed, especially in the German historiography, analysis has rarely been in great depth. 
Many historians have dismissed uniforms and the associated signs, symbols, and paraphernalia as 
too superficial to be worth discussing.551 For instance Gerhard Paul’s otherwise insightful study of 
visual Nazi propaganda before 1933, Aufstand der Bilder (1990), only has little over one page on the 
ubiquitous uniform specifically.552 A more detailed and holistic analysis of fascist uniforms has 
been made by Sven Reichardt in Faschistischer Kampfbünde (2009), looking into the German SA 
and Italian squadristi, and through a cultural-pragmatic lens. Reichardt’s research reveals some of 
the practical issues behind the images of uniformed troops that Gerhard Paul studied, and 
connects this to the emotional effect they sought to produce. Rather than just using a propaganda 
angle on uniforms, Reichardt also comments on the social cohesion and political identity that 
uniforms facilitated.553  But mostly uniforms have been studied as one small part of a larger 
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spectacle, rather than as a nexus of fascist culture and myth, to which other symbols and 
behaviours can be viewed as secondary.554  
Scholars have also placed the uniform in a wider political and social context, noting the 
tactical uses of uniforms in fascist paramilitaries, the impact of uniformed men on the street,555 or 
analysing it as a symptom of the mass politics of the modern era.556 Somewhat surprisingly, for 
such an obviously cultural phenomenon, it has rarely been studied in terms of cultural production. 
Historians with a specifically cultural approach to fascism, such as George L. Mosse, Emilio Gentile, 
or Roger Griffin have tended to overlook the uniform. But there are exceptions, of sorts, one of 
which is Klaus Theweleit’s (now somewhat dated) psychoanalytical study of Freikorps literature, 
Männerphantasien (1983), which explores the fascist relationship to the body and sexuality. Again 
it is not the uniform specifically which is highlighted here, but the interface of military culture and 
pseudo-sexual fantasy relevant. Theweleit’s analysis, while rather ahistorical, does understand the 
militaristic objects and behaviour of the soldiers as producing reality, and the manifestation of a 
fantasy, which makes it highly applicable to the mythopoeic project discussed here. Theweleit, 
then, attempted to reconstruct the mythical content of the fascist imagination.557 
 
Here even the most improbable actions were redolent with significance. The simplest salute 
became a symbol of submission to an authority that bound both parties in mutually fruitful 
association. The slow march, tempo one hundred fourteen, became the physical and spiritual 
expression of discipline to the brink of death. [...] In the first instance, what the troop-machine 
produces is itself – itself as a totality that places the individual soldier in a new set of relations to 
other bodies; itself as a combination of innumerable identically polished components.558 
 
Theweleit brought out the significative richness of the actions and signs associated with military 
life. But, while the psychological dimension of fascist uniforms is unavoidable, this chapter frames 
the fantastic and performative dimensions of the uniform in cultural terms: their primary 
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significance is their role in asserting the meaning of fascism in a national context. Secondly, unlike 
any previous analyses, this chapter puts the uniform in focus, with everything understood only in 
relation to the uniform, as a means of foregrounding the importance of this mythopoeic prop in 
the cultural understanding of fascism. 
The Swedish and Dutch governments were well aware of the power political uniforms 
could possess, and in 1933, with an eye on developments in central and southern Europe, passed 
legislation prohibiting the wearing of political uniforms in public.559 Compared to their Dutch 
equivalent, the Swedish regulations were vague and not very comprehensive, prohibiting ‘[t]he 
wearing of a uniform or similar dress, which serves to highlight the wearer’s political 
orientation’.560 The legislation was technically a warrant for local authorities (made into law in 
1947),561 leaving it up to them to wrestle with questions as to what and how many garments 
constituted a uniform, and whether or not they indeed indicated a specific political orientation.562 
In the Netherlands, Article 435a – partially inspired by Sweden563 – stated that: ‘He who publicly 
wears, or carries, garments, or conspicuous marks of distinction, which are expression of a 
particular political orientation, will be punished with incarceration of a maximum of twelve days 
or a pecuniary fine of at most one hundred and fifty guilders.’564 This law had been proposed 
already in 1932, initiated by conservative concerns about communism,565 but was only 
implemented when the rapid growth of the NSB could no longer be ignored.566 The Dutch law too 
had its ambiguities, particularly whether certain marks or insignia were indeed conspicuous 
[opzichtig], and whether certain uniforms, garments or similar could really be regarded as being 
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the expression of a political orientation.567 Thus the bans on uniforms, while they were in many 
ways effective, could not fully seal off this particular mythopoeic wellspring. Apart from outright 
flouting the law, fascists found subtle ways of circumventing it, leading to repeated public debate 
about the efficacy of the law and the threat of fascism, keeping the issue alive throughout the 
decade. The laws only applied to uniforms worn in public, making the legal distinction between 
private and public crucial to party meetings, and retaining a well-defined place for the uniform in 
the party.  
Evocative in the extreme, and indelibly tied to the performativity of its wearer, the 
uniform was an unstable signifier. The evocations of the fascist uniform were equivocal, and prey 
to infelicitous associations. The inherent militarism, paradoxically at once denied and encouraged 
by the party apparatus, imbued the clothing with the threat, or promise, of violence. The unity it 
symbolised strengthened the feeling of comradeship, while marking fascists as outsiders.568 The 
allusion to the German brownshirts and Italian blackshirts made native fascists part of something 
much bigger than a national movement, even when their own organisation remained small, but 
undermined their patriotic credentials.569 Fascist political uniforms proved to be powerful 
mythopoeic objects, and were strong amplifiers of fascist performances and spectacles, but 
dangerously double-edged. As a lynchpin in much of the public discourse about fascism in its most 
militaristic guise, the uniform functioned as a defining battle site in the cultural shaping of the 
national understanding about fascism and its role in national political life. This made it an obvious 
target for unsympathetic interpretations, but as party commitment to this symbol showed, the key 
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In its most basic form, the uniform of the NSAP and the NSB consisted of a shirt – a brown one in 
the former, a black one in the latter. In the NSAP standard models were available from the party 
supply service, though they could be purchased elsewhere as long as they followed the required 
model. The Swedish police has left precise notes on the NSAP shirts from the 1935 raid of the 
Gothenburg headquarters, which describe a military style shirt, highly reminiscent of German SA-
shirts: ‘made of a brown khaki fabric, provided with epaulettes, double-folded collar, two breast 
pockets … one row of buttons at the front, consisting of five brown buttons, a waistband at the 
bottom, with five belt loops. All the buttons in two of the shirts had grooves, resembling 
swastikas…’570 No such descriptions for the black shirts of the NSB seem to exist, perhaps lost when 
NIOD destroyed large batches of correspondence regarding uniforms to save archival space.571 
None of the NSB regulations prescribe a certain model or even style of shirt, so that in practice 
members ironically tended not to wear particularly uniform shirts. Apart from the famous shirt, 
the only other part of the fascist uniform that was considered absolutely essential was the party 
insignia: in the NSAP a swastika, worn on the left lapel when in civilian dress,572 for NSB-members 
a triangular emblem featuring a rampant gold lion, against a black and red background. ‘Wear 
your insignia!’ VoVa reminded readers in every issue.573 A small enamel pin was a cheap and easy 
way of readily identifying oneself and others as fascists. Shirt and insignia were only the minimum 
requirement however, and a full body uniform was desirable. 
In Sweden the brown shirt was ideally worn with shoulder boards indicating district and 
branch, a blue armband, featuring a yellow swastika, as well as a brown tie, brown visor cap, and a 
claw belt on the waist with a shoulder strap [koppel]. Trousers were ideally breeches in brown, 
grey, or a similar colour, with leather boots, but not shoes.574 Dutch uniform regulations were not 
as extensive. If a 1935 proposal by WA-leader J. Hogewind was actually implemented, as seems 
likely, the rank-and-file simply needed a black shirt with a black tie, decorated with a thin red-
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white-blue stripe; the insignia; and dark trousers, with a black belt. A suit jacket over the shirt was 
permitted. For functionaries of the rank of Circle Leader or higher, uniforms were more elaborate, 
and included breeches, boots, and a visor cap.575 For instance, members of the Disciplinary Council, 
when possible, wore a grey uniform jacket with trousers, a waist belt and shoulder strap, and an 
armband indicating the department and rank of the wearer.576 Higher functionaries were a fairly 
rare sight however, so the most striking impression was made by the party paramilitaries. The 
Swedish Stormavdelning uniform closely resembled that of the ordinary members; a black tie 
instead of a brown tie on the shirt, collar tabs, special insignia, and a brown coat for winter.577 
Members of the Weerafdeeling on the other hand stood out strongly from their NSB counterparts, 
wearing the black shirt with an all-black uniform consisting of jacket, breeches, riding boots or 
shoes with leather gaiters, waist belt and shoulder strap, visor cap, and assorted insignia indicating 
rank.578 It is notable that the NSAP in Sweden eschewed jackets, and made a far less formal 
impression than the NSB with its black and grey uniforms, which evoked a mixture of militarism 
and cleanliness, instead of the egalitarian simplicity of the plain brown shirts. 
 To create something of an actually uniform impression, the thousands of party members 
had to be actually supplied with their uniforms and associated paraphernalia. After an initial stage 
when the NSAP Leadership itself supplied materials via Party Treasurer Karl Kristern,579 Lennart 
Fornander was in charge of the supply service (partiintendentur, Pi.), which stocked all garments 
and insignia required, where they could be bought by members individually or via branch 
leaders.580 Uniforms could be acquired from independent suppliers,581 but members had to request 
the correct dimensions and other details from the supply service; the NSAP was keen to ensure 
members’ uniforms were identical.582 Shirts cost 6 kr, party insignia 1.50, and a waist belt no less 
than 4.25 kr. A full uniform for a SA member, boots not included, cost in total as much as 17.75 kr, 
and doubtless had to be acquired piece by piece by many members, who were often unemployed, 
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or underage.583 The uniform of a regular member did not cost much less. The desirable leather 
boots were not supplied by the party’s supply service, and were a considerable expense for 
members – one letter to a Karlskrona member looking for leather boots at a reasonable price 
received the reply that boots regionally cost about 33 kronor ready-made, and 45 kronor custom-
made.584 It is not surprising that hiking boots with leg wraps or similar were an acceptable 
alternative. It might also offer a clue as to why the proud owners of actual leather riding boots [see 
also fig. 1, ch. 1] tended to wear them even after the law against political uniforms got them in 
trouble with the authorities. 585 
Dutch party members were looking at similar prices, but the NSB supply service 
(Department VII, Dienst Materiaal) headed by A.J. Hartman, did not supply full uniforms, only 
insignia and minor accessories.586 Instead shirts had to be bought from independent suppliers, 
who happily advertised their black shirts in VoVa, for prices of f 2-3, roughly equivalent to the cost 
of the NSAP’s shirts.587 This made any major party occasion that called for uniforms an excellent 
advertisement opportunity.588 However, a full uniform for a member of the WA cost far more than 
that of his SA equivalent. At a Headquarters meeting in 1935, concerns were raised that while 80% 
of members were workers, the uniform cost f 17 or f 18, which most could not afford.589 WA-
members had to pay for their own uniform, which they could pay off piece by piece via their WA 
company (Vendel) administrator.590 It must have been an egregious expense, given that the 
uniform could not be worn in public after 1933. The grey uniform of higher functionaries was even 
more expensive. The Utrecht-based suppliers which Headquarters recommended to functionaries 
of the disciplinary councils cost as much as f 62.50.591  
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In the 1935 police interrogation of Lindholm, he noted a strong decline in the members’ 
demand for uniforms after the 1933 ban – understandably, given the costs. 592 One can imagine a 
similar trend in the NSB, though of course the party administration did not have any direct insight 
into actual purchases outside of the WA. The laws against political uniforms had created a sharp 
division between the appearance of the party internally, and the party in public. Generally, 
instructions give the impression that the leadership responded to the ban by an even greater 
insistence that members should wear the uniform any time when legally possible, and one can 
imagine members were more than happy to if they had already bought one. ‘[T]he uniform ought 
to always be worn as often as possible in all closed meetings and all services for the NSB, in which 
one does not come in conflict with the uniform ban.’593 ‘Every member, who has the slightest 
opportunity to do so, should acquire one. Both at members’ meetings and other internal meetings 
there are opportunities to wear the new socialism’s exhorting symbol. Wear the brown shirt!’ 594 
The NSAP’s internal organisational paper Porg reminded functionaries that the order to wear the 
uniform ‘is still valid and now even more so, when wearing it in public is forbidden’.595 For the 1935 
NSB party convention in The Hague [see chapter 4], only uniformed WA-members could 
participate in the ceremonial march,596 while a directive for the 1934 NSAP party convention 
ordered all participants to immediately acquire a uniform if they did not have one already.597 For 
most of this period then, the black or brown shirt was worn only at members’ meetings, at internal 
party events, but not at public rallies and the like, or even individually on the street. Legally, the 
only way an outsider in the Netherlands would encounter a fascist in uniform was if they were 
invited, as a sympathiser or otherwise, to a closed party meeting. In the Netherlands the legal 
journal Recht published an article in 1936 about fascist meetings which were found to have been 
public in character, and therefore uniformed members in breach of Article 435a. The article was 
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recommended reading for members.598 When members had to travel to a meeting or function 
which required the uniform, public spaces were traversed fully covered up. For the 1935 
convention in Amsterdam, WA-members were ordered to travel to the venue in full uniform, but 
with no visible parts exposed. ‘An (old) long pair of trousers will be worn over the boots and 
uniform breeches. The cap will be taken with you wrapped up in paper or fabric.’599 For other 
occasions the NSB supply service had made ‘blackshirt protectors’ available for 40 cents: a kind of 
collar, buttoned around the neck, with an attached scarf of some sort, which could be unfolded to 
cover up the black shirt with one of six colours (purple, yellow, dark blue, orange, green, and light 
blue). ‘Especially the effect of the upcoming Landdag march through the streets of Amsterdam 
will be elevated, if these colourful protectors are worn a lot, and the procession will be given a gay 
appearance’, a circular explained optimistically.600 
In spite of prohibitions and exhortations, there were still disagreements between the 
leadership and the rank-and-file membership as to when uniforms should be worn. It is evident 
from Swedish police observations that many members did not wear a uniform even to internal 
meetings.601 The fact that NSB and NSAP circulars and other directives several years after the ban 
still urged members to wear their uniform or shirt at all possible times is indicative of a 
disciplinary problem in this regard. This problem came to the fore in the case of party insignia, 
where the scope for wearing them was more extensive, yet many members still neglected to wear 
it. Porg complained at the end of 1935 that there were still too many members who ‘could not 
stretch out their hand [in salute], [and] don’t wear the party insignia’.602 In a 1936 NSB disciplinary 
case in Hilversum, one member outright stated that: ‘I personally do not attach the slightest value 
to the pin and the black shirt’.603 The value of the uniform and attendant insignia was by no means 
valued equally by all members, and the acquisition and even wearing of uniforms whole, or in part, 
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had its obstacles. Yet for all those troubles, and more, the uniform remained a staple of fascist 
performances until the end. 
 
II 
Not just aesthetic clothing or practical outfits, the fascists’ uniforms were rich in associations and 
symbolism, already before they arrived on the national stage. The fascist political uniform was not 
left to speak for itself, but was consciously imbued with a party-particular ideological symbolism, 
most overtly through its discursive construction in party publications. ‘Symbols’, in Jeffrey 
Schnapp’s words, ‘were a privileged site of self-definition for fascism’.604 The NSAP’s leading 
ideologue and Lindholm’s friend, Per Dahlberg, argued in the wake of the ban that ‘National 
Socialism concerns a state of mind, National Socialism does not reside in the brown shirt, which is 
merely a symbol and service garment [tjänstedräkt] in the struggle for the fatherland of the 
future’.605 In the words of the party directives, TF: ‘[t]he National Socialists’ service clothes are a 
symbolic expression of the struggle we wage. For us it is not some kind of military uniform, but a 
working shirt which makes us all equal in our duties for the same goal.’606 In 1938, an order from 
Mussert regarding symbols in the NSB explained: 
 
The Movement has started its struggle for the resurrection of our People with as external signs: the 
black shirt and the fascist salute, the black-red flag, and the insignia. The black shirt is our official 
dress, adopted in honour of Mussolini and his blackshirts, who have given the signal for the 
resurrection of Europe, accepted as an expression of our comradely cohesion in the struggle for 
People and Fatherland. […] None of us would ever think of taking away these external signs of our 
struggle.607 
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Community and equality in struggle were themes both the NSB and the NSAP emphasised, and 
both consciously referenced foreign fascist movements in their choice of colour. A united 
community of militants, in which all class differences were obliterated in the service of a common 
cause: the Fatherland; part of a new political age that was sweeping across Europe.  
 But, in spite of Mussert’s protestations to the contrary, the external signs were not static in 
either party, not least on account of the awkward dynamic between militarism and respectability. 
The uniform constantly evoked militarism, but the parties, especially the NSB, were keen to 
temper this inevitable association with respectability. Sven Reichardt noted the effect of the 
uniform as a metaphor for militaristic violence, but the NSAP and NSB were careful to keep such 
symbolism in the background.608 One illustrative example is NU-leader Arne Clementsson’s 1937 
article on the meaning of soldiers. ‘When someone in Sweden in these days of decline mentions 
the word soldier, everyone recoils and see in their mind’s eye the militarised dictatorships on the 
march, threateningly prepared to crush the last outpost of culture – the democratic North.’609 
Clementsson shows the NSAP was self-conscious about the problematic associations of a uniform. 
He argued for a distinction between the military and the soldierly, fascism embodying the latter. In 
an analogous case, VoVa wrote that ‘National Socialist self-control’ [tucht] was ‘disciplinary, not 
military’.610 The often precarious legal situation of the party organisations shaped discourse in this 
regard, moderating the military connotations lest they became a legal stick for political enemies.611 
We may regard Lindholm’s decision in 1937-38 to change the uniform to a dark blue shirt with a 
grey tie in the same vein. The idea to change the shirt was first discussed in 1937. A letter from the 
eastern District Leader to Lindholm approved of the idea to ‘change the uniform to give it a more 
marked Swedish character’: ‘a clear difference in uniform [from Germany] should more strongly 
mark our will to independent national life’.612 The dark blue colour of the shirt, with the splash of 
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grey, was reminiscent of the Carolingian army under the Swedish ‘soldier-king’ Charles XII, much 
admired by the NSAP and the Swedish far-right ever since. Here the uniform was given 
recognisably patriotic connotations, something helped along by the decision to swap out the 
swastika for vasakärven, the coat of arms of the royal Vasa dynasty. Thus symbols, signs, and 
colours, and the surrounding fascist discourse guided the outside spectator towards a more 
respectable reading of fascist appearances. 
 In symbolically enacting the party in particular, and fascism in general, it was crucial that 
the uniform-wearer adequately perform the myth of a respectable, patriotic fascist. Hence the 
NSAP and NSB were keen to inscribe certain behaviours onto the uniform. The wearer was not to 
merely carry the symbolic uniform around like a metaphorical sandwich board, but symbiotically 
bring out its fantastic qualities, just as the uniform constructed the individual as a fascist. Already 
the first blueprint document for NSB membership noted the importance of combining the wearing 
of the uniform with suitable behaviour.613 The party leaderships and the propaganda departments 
instinctively understood, in Judith Butler’s words, that ‘[t]he body is not a self-identical or merely 
factic materiality; it is a materiality that bears meaning, if nothing else, and the manner of this 
bearing is fundamentally dramatic’.614 Wearing the uniform, the insignia, and using the NSB salute 
was compulsory, and in doing so the member should always ‘carry himself with pride and 
dignity’.615 As Hogewind put it: ‘Each NSB-member will consider, that when dressed in uniform, he 
(she) bears witness to the NSB, and that he (she) then, even more than otherwise would be the 
case, must be an example of decency, punctuality, politeness, and comradeship’.616 The NSAP’s 
1937 TF instructed that ‘[e]ach member should wear his brownshirt with pride and when wearing 
it strive more than ever towards good comportment’.617 The 1933 NSAP convention was portrayed 
as a litmus test for members’ behaviour in uniform, when for three days two-hundred uniformed 
members were housed in the same building as a communist group. Uniformed SA and 
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communists guarded each other at the gates throughout the nights, ‘without any trouble 
whatsoever. Not even a slap! Instead the one to get slapped was the uniform ban’.618  
Lindholm placed high demands on the morality and behaviour of party members, and in 
1986 confessed that perhaps the party was a little too harsh in regularly ousting members that fell 
short.619 Both parties regularly purged the membership to get rid of inadequate and corrupt 
members. In the NSAP, applicants were refused membership if they were known for a poor 
lifestyle, such as drunkenness.620 Porg stated there was to be no corruption, no dubious members – 
‘Keep the N.S.A.P. pure’.621 The issue became more acute in 1936, when the dissolution of the SNSP 
led to an influx of new members. Applications were now accompanied by a private interview as 
well, to check the suitability of the candidate.622 But this kind of purism was present from the 
beginning, as a startlingly Matthean speech by Oscar Landahl in Stockholm’s Auditorium shows. 
‘By being intolerant we keep the ranks pure. […] In our movement we must dispose of elements, 
that turn out not to measure up – many are called, but few are chosen.’623 From the first concept 
versions of the NSB membership requirements members had to sign up for ‘complete submission 
to the rules of discipline’.624 Members had to hold Dutch citizenship or colonial subject status [!], 
be at least 18 years of age, and practise a profession. Intriguingly, in the original rules new 
members could not have a criminal record or be known for ‘poor moral behaviour’ [kennelijk slecht 
zedelijk gedrag], but these requirements are struck out with pencil in the original document. 
Aspiring members were provisionally allowed for a trial period of at least three months, after 
which the Circle leader could recommend them to Headquarters as a full party member.625 But in 
practice the NSB was never quite so discriminating, and welcomed new members freely, instead 
opting to dispose of the useless, corrupt, and fraudulent afterwards. The massive influx of 
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members in the first years would have made Swedish-style screening impractical; instead, within a 
year of opening to new members, the NSB ousted them by the thousands.626 
To make sure members lived up to the fascist myth in public, physical and ideological 
training was required. The active member was ‘obliged in all cases, when commanded, to wear the 
black shirt, the uniform, the insignia, and to use the N.S.B. salute. He will always know to carry 
himself with pride and dignity’.627 While NSAP discourse was less focused on respectability, in 
practice the Swedish party had no less stringent moral standards for the cadres. The minimum age 
was seventeen, and members were required to be Swedish citizens, and not be ‘descendant from 
Jews or “coloured” racial elements’, while they also, with a markedly different emphasis from the 
NSB, ‘had to be known for decency and not have behaved in an un-solidary fashion towards 
colleagues during legitimate social wage conflicts’.628 The NSAP’s origins in the split from the SNSP 
fed into its myth of fascism, and the devotion it required: 
 
The National Socialist Workers Party was founded precisely through a moral revolution, which 
purged careerism and corruption from the ranks. And now it is up to us, to not just get as many 
followers as possible, but the most important thing is for us to get decent comrades, such as can 
work for the victory of the mission, for the good of their national brothers [folkbröder] and not for 
their own.629 
 
It was recognised that not every new member could be a consummate fascist, but they 
were theoretically expected to dedicate themselves wholeheartedly to becoming the 
uncompromisingly disciplined political soldiers of fascist myth.630 To instil the necessary discipline, 
members were trained by means of special schools, study circles, quasi-military training camps, 
and subjected to intellectual, technical, and physical training. In the NSAP, members were 
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encouraged to join the militant part of the organisation (SA and its successors), and participate in 
activities such as sports, gymnastics, orienteering, and musical practice.631 A police informant 
reported that the SA organisation ‘regularly organises orienteering exercises outside Stockholm … 
they seem in and of themselves rather childish, but should not be ignored’. They also included 
what he termed military exercises, with snow balls in lieu of firearms.632 Physical training was 
encouraged, and Lindholm trained NSAP and NU groups personally, frequently with gymnastics 
and hours-long marches in the woods.633 Quite unlike Mussert, Lindholm – a self-described ‘field 
and forest person’634 – was himself an example of the sort of physical fitness which the party 
demanded of its members.  
After the uniform bans, the individual member in public was still required to enact a myth 
of fascism through their behaviour – a myriad of individuals performatively constituting fascism 
through their endlessly repeated acts as fascists, a collective corporeal repertoire.635 ‘Those who 
cannot abandon pleasures for work in the service of the party are not worthy of the name National 
Socialist. Through his idealistic will to sacrifice and fearless energy, good bearing, and faultless 
behaviour the A-group man [activist] will instil respect for the ideas and the NSAP.’636 
 
National Socialism is not just a political opinion but a world view, which first and foremost aims to 
change people and give them new goals. This view must also impress its character on its carrier, 
not just in matters of judgment, but also in the way of life and bearing. It conflicts with our world 
view to engage in the habits of bourgeois society. National Socialists should not participate in the 
degenerate pleasures of modern society, or be known as restaurant visitors and the like.637 
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The importance of good behaviour was underlined even further when members were in uniform. 
The shirt naturally enhanced the association of the individual member with the party, so that the 
party’s reputation was at stake, but the garment did more than that. As the eye-catching uniform 
minimised or even erased the individual, the members no longer merely constituted themselves as 
fascists, as NSB or NSAP members – rather they came to embody the party itself, fascism, 
externalising the fantasy. The powerful symbolic quality of the uniform transformed the 
performative, from a set of repeated acts constituting individual political identity, into a 
mythopoeic performance. Uniformed members became living parts of the myth, constituting it in 
their presence and actions. 
 Thus it was through trained and disciplined bodies in space - on the street, in the meeting 
room – that the uniform made the myth. Evocative and inscribed with symbolism, when worn the 
uniform bestowed its qualities on the body, which through repeated performative acts constituted 
the fascist myth, i.e. constructed a Swedish or Dutch fascism.638 The uniform, as a performative aid 
to corporeal signification, more effectively than any other prop inscribed the fantasy of the fascist 
onto the body.639 The black- or brown shirt uniform was of course not the only signifier to be laden 
with significance from the outset of the 1930s: the stretched arm salute and the swastika (avoided 
like the plague by the NSB) were similarly powerful signifiers of fascism.640 Together they 
amounted to a corporeal repertoire, a set of signs and acts by which members produced 
themselves as fascists: salutes, slogans, marching steps, even a firm gaze and a straight back could 
be part of this. This was made quite explicit in Swedish fascist discourse in particular, which spoke 
of a new ‘style’ which the NSAP brought to Swedish life. As in the aforementioned Clementsson 
article: ‘Soldier is composure, style.’ The NU-member was to be the personification of a straight-
backed attitude.641 By contrast to be a bourgeois was characterised as less a matter of class or 
ideology, but style: ‘one is bourgeois if one is cowardly, superficial, and lazy’.642 Similarly, the NSB 
emphasised the contrast between its disciplined troops, and the disorganised and rowdy left-wing 
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opponents they faced on the street, a difference that foregrounded the connection between the 
meaning of fascism, and the corporeal signification of fascists, produced in acts and composure.643 
 
III 
Having established the workings of the mythopoeic uniform, it becomes evident that the function 
it fulfilled in its mythopoeic capacity differed depending on whether it was directed inward or 
outward, particularly after the law established a radical distinction between private and public 
wear. In public, the mythopoeic effect was enhanced by acting in concert. In 1933, the symbolism 
of classless unity and struggle was strengthened by a plurality of uniformed actors – ‘here there is 
no difference of social class, the ideas unite and the brownshirt unites them’644 – while utilising 
common social techniques of demonstrating strength and numbers.645 The uniform itself, by 
definition, possessed that peculiar quality of being empowered through multiplicity, so that it 
really came into its own on occasions of mass meeting.  
To this end, other props were also available. The uniform proper was not the only object 
with a strong mythopoeic charge, even if it was the most powerful one. Rather, as Article 435a 
recognised, there were certain props which could be interpreted as an extension of the uniform, 
and in the Netherlands were legally treated the same way.  
 
To the outside, uniform dress on its own, chosen as a sign of a particular political orientation, also 
when further organisation is disregarded, has an impressive effect on the public. This effect is then 
also intended foremost by those who introduce the uniform [into public life]. One wants one’s 
followers to be clearly recognisable and make an impression through their numbers. Meanwhile it 
is usually not left at this alone, and one starts also acting in concert, in organised formations…646 
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These mythopoeic props as extensions of or supplements to the uniform were one of the 
differences between the two countries, as they were mostly legal in Sweden during the 1930s.647 For 
instance, armbands and insignia also served to identify party members, or highlight group 
hierarchy. In Sweden torches were another popular feature, which quickly became an 
unmistakable characteristic of a fascist procession. But it was typically flags which added the 
greatest symbolic charge to a meeting or procession. With their large size and bright colours, party 
or national flags served to tie a group together visually, emphasising the unity of idealism as well 
as sheer numbers. NSAP meetings were invariably decorated with the party’s bright yellow 
swastika flag, even more so after 1936 when the leadership directed formations to only use 
swastika flags in meetings.648 Group numbers, props, performative acts like the salute, collective 
behaviour and so forth, came together to complete enhance and dramatise a mythopoeia first and 
foremost instigated by the uniform, but which could also function without it, ‘by marching 
through the street with firm and disciplined force, with a fearless gaze and song, with style. These 
youths come with music and radiant swastika flags, in their hands they hold flaming torches, and 
they march with composure and determined will’.649 
 Thus props could also be used to further public mythopoeic demonstrations after the 
uniform bans, and exercised a similar function in the fascist symbolic universe. The NSAP 
managed to stand out during the party convention marches of May 1934, marching through 
Stockholm in long columns of 1700 participants. The procession carried sixty flags (blue-yellow-
red swastika flags and Swedish national flags), marked the march through song and hail-chants, 
and hoped to impress the audience with an exhibition of discipline. ‘The swearing, spitting, and 
fists of the reds, the blatant communist attempts at provocation, nothing worked; they marched 
calmly in their ranks, sang battle songs, and raised resounding shouts of hail.’650 The Dutch NSB on 
such occasions made heavy use of the national flag in its dynastic orange-white-blue version, de-
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emphasising party identity in favour of patriotic symbolism and respectable loyalty to the House 
of Orange. In some cases the red-black party flag was even prohibited, and the black shirt replaced 
with merely dark clothes.651 The impressive appearance of flags in a procession, and the 
intrinsically respectable nature of the national flag, made it an appealing mythopoeic prop for the 
NSB. Correspondence shows that before major marches through cities Mussert requested 
permission to carry exclusively Dutch flags in the procession.652  This happened sufficiently often 
that the national flag became a recognisably fascist feature, not just at political demonstrations 
but also festivities such as the Queen’s birthday or Princess Juliana’s wedding in 1936.653 This was 
much to the dismay of the conservative Right. Already in 1934, a Christian Historical speaker 
complained at a meeting that ‘the NSB uses our National Flag for its politics … but without the 
Flag one can still see the armies marching up to the RAI-building [Amsterdam conference 
venue]’.654 When in 1937 the government settled on the red-white-blue tricolour as the official 
Dutch flag, the NSB protested that the oranje-blanje-bleu version represented the historical unity 
of the people and the confessions, and loyalty to the House of Orange. This further underlined its 
associations with Orangist patriotism,655 again to the irritation of the Calvinist Right in 
particular.656  
This has foregrounded the legal ways in which the NSAP and the NSB tried to deal with the 
uniform ban, and other mythopoeic props and acts that were still publicly available. It was an 
organised attempt to propagandise the mythopoeic faculties which existed in the uniformed 
internal meetings, and transfer them to the public. It is evident that the NSB always paid particular 
attention to respectability as a core part of its myth, while by contrast the NSAP at the same time 
insisted on its use of party flags, even to the exclusion of national flags. Of course this practice 
came to an abrupt end towards the end of 1938 when Lindholm’s nyorientering abolished the 
swastika, and self-consciously turned to more traditional Swedish symbols (vasakärven), i.e. more 
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in line with NSB practice up to that point, while the latter shifted towards the use of less 
traditional and patriotic symbolism, introducing symbols like the wolf’s hook.657 The wolf’s hook or 
wolfsangel was a symbol of particular interest in the NSB, as it was originally intended to phase out 
the awkward triangular party symbol. The first sign of a discussion to change the symbol is from 
1936, when a party artist complained that the NSB had not tried to introduce a simple and 
appealing symbol instead, like the swastika or the hammer and sickle.658 Eventually the pseudo-
runic hook was introduced, a far simpler and distinct design. 
 
IV 
If public demonstrations served to proselytise, internal party meetings and rallies above all aimed 
to mobilise. Here the uniform served a different function. Shorn of both legal restrictions and 
immediate public scrutiny, the mythopoeic dynamic was altered. In the first instance closed 
meetings permitted uniforms to be used as a tool of discipline. In a 1935 NSB meeting of the 
General Council, it was discussed whether the black shirt was to be compulsory at closed meetings, 
as a means of raising discipline – Mussert confirming that this was going to at least be the case for 
functionaries.659 The 1935 TF for the NSAP similarly tied the uniform to discipline, encouraging 
local leaders to ensure members closely followed uniform regulations.660 Uniforms made the 
identification of members’ rank, formation, and branch significantly easier, and allowed for a 
more effective organisation of larger meetings in particular. The Swedish uniform denoted with 
insignia the Circle and Local Group [ortsgrupp] a member belonged to, simplifying management 
at rallies and the like. As DSN put it admiringly in its description of the 1933 årsting: ‘One imagines 
the accommodation of two hundred men, older as well as younger, with the same order as at a 
military camp, except that the discipline was self-assumed, and all were comrades.’661 The 
following years NSAP conventions counted around 2000 members from over a hundred Circles.662 
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At later ting uniformed guards were given red and yellow armbands to denote their authority, 
urging members to show ‘comradely discipline’ and follow orders without question.663 With a 
similar function at its far larger meetings, the NSB used an elaborate system of insignia to denote 
ranks and functions among members, distinguishing between Headquarters, Districts, City 
services, Circles, and Groups, as well as particular HQ functionaries, the WA, propagandists, local 
leaders, and local functionaries. As the surviving descriptions and drawings of the distinctions 
shows, different coloured armbands were used to denote placement (e.g. black for HQ, red for the 
cities), and an elaborate system of lines and chevrons to denote function and rank.664 
 Internally, the uniform served to reify the myth of the party as a fantastic army, ‘the 
militant, spiritual army’, as Mussert put it,665 ‘a political army, which believes in the calling of the 
NSB. You are the soldiers of that army’.666 In the NSB the army myth became only stronger with 
time, as the oath written in 1936 highlights. As new members swore to wear the shirt and insignia 
with honour and dignity, the Circle Leader emphasised that: 
 
We too are an army, and such an army, as can be compared to that of the various Crusades … we 
too act, without asking, without complaint […] because we know, that the Leader goes in the 
vanguard of the battle for a mighty ideal! –We too are zealous. Animated by the example of our 
Leader, by seeing our Standard.667  
 
Conversely, in Sweden NSAP members were trained to ‘become a soldier in the future army of the 
socialist people’s community’,668 ‘a youth army with fanatic faith and a will as hard as iron’.669 In 
wearing a uniform at the meeting, the member became a soldier of a mighty, transcendent force, 
tied together by bonds of comradeship. ‘Your place is in the freedom army, / you have soon forged 
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yourself a sword’, declaimed one DSN poem – ‘Your Sweden calls you: / Your place is in the 
freedom army, / join, become a fighter, a man’.670 The NSAP was particularly sensitive to the ‘spirit 
of struggle’ [kampanda] and comradeship that permeated large uniformed meetings. As Porg 
explained, ‘[w]ith the uniform a renewed kampanda always follows, which elevates the 
impression of the meeting and has a good effect on new comrades.’671 There was nothing quite like 
a uniformed gathering of party comrades to strengthen the bonds of ‘comradeship and the will to 
victory’.672 This myth was discursively relentlessly reified through military metaphors, which in 
publications as well as internal documents imagined the parties as armies which ‘conquered’ and 
‘attacked’, waged ‘a struggle for freedom’, ‘bloody battles’, and ‘war’.673 ‘Our struggle is 
revolutionary and fought honourably. You are needed at the front.’674 Visual depictions of the party 
often relied on military references, constructing the party as a fantastical military army [figure 1].  
 
 
Figure 4. 'The NSB wants war!!!', VoVa, no 23, 1935. 
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The uniformed member embodied a contempt of bourgeois attitudes,675 materialising ‘not 
just a new spirit but also a new style’, rejecting ‘petty bourgeois entertainments and all forms of 
“kitsch”’.676 This was most powerfully embodied by the NU: 
 
We despise bourgeois cowardice, conscious of the ruthless struggle that is the road to true freedom. 
Struggle is the privilege of youth, without which no regeneration of the people or upheaval of 
society is possible. But we are not men of violence, but intend to execute the revolution in the 
people’s way of thinking, through our example of courage, faith, and will to sacrifice.677 
 
In the NU this often went together with illicit acts of daring and provocative behaviour, 
culminating in the break-in at a communist party office in Gothenburg, at the instigation of the 
young leader Arne Clementsson.678 The socialist newspaper Ny Dag dismissed the act as ‘ridiculous, 
the way in which our puberty-nazis realise their fantasies about the desirability to “live a life of 
danger”’.679 Lindholm used the occasion as an excuse to fire Clementsson. The NSB did not possess 
this youthful drive to revolution, and its mythopoeia clearly stayed clear of rhetoric that would 
make the party sound like a red workers’ army of any kind. As highlighted earlier, the NSB was 
nothing if not a respectable army, emphasising cooperation with the authorities, and always full of 
praise for the police which it claimed to support wherever possible, particularly by letting the WA 
lend a hand in law enforcement.680 But to some members this smacked of ‘liberal decency’, arguing 
the party should not avoid conflict with the law, fearing the party army was being filled up with 
 
decent, well-meaning Fatherlanders, but who are scared to death that someone will smash their 
windows, who would find it terrible if a shoemaker addressed them as ‘comrade’, people who 
might sometimes put on a black shirt, [but only] after first having confirmed over telephone that 
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their friends and acquaintances are also doing it. […] Soldiers of faith [heilsoldaten] an Ĳmuider 
church paper called us, and that is what we need to be, soldiers of faith, who fight for the salvation 
of our People and Fatherland… 681 
 
In the first years of the party the NSB seemed more prone to permit deliberate acts of daring that 
fit in with the myth of a heroic army. For instance Hogewind permitted a colportage march into 
the red neighbourhoods of Amsterdam, with a group of fully uniformed WA-men, simply to 
disprove the notion that this would be impossible without being assaulted by the reds.682 The same 
month the NSB sent a 150 strong band of colporteurs and WA-men, with reinforcements from 
Hilversum, to the overwhelmingly socialist community of Bussum in North-Holland. The trip 
provoked a riot, requiring a large police force to restore order. VoVa proudly reported the 
discipline and dignity of the heroic soldiers on the front page.683 One year later, by contrast, these 
sorts of expeditions to red neighbourhoods were absolutely prohibited as damaging to the NSB, as 
public discussion had turned to the threat of private organised violence.684 
 
V 
This potent symbolic construction of the fascist army went hand in hand with the fetishisation of 
the uniform, and was often indistinguishable from it. While outwardly the NSB and NSAP 
repeatedly emphasised the non-violent nature of this uniformed army, the latent quality of the 
uniform as a metaphor of violence was implicitly encouraged.685 ‘They conveyed the sensual image 
of a uniformed nationalism, of dynamic youthfulness, male dominance and uncompromising 
violence’, happily encouraging members to surrender themselves to the militaristic power 
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fantasies that were overtly and covertly propagated.686 While Mussert claimed the uniforms were 
merely handsome and practical, both parties turned the uniform into a fetish.687  
 Party discourse and imagery invariably constructed the uniformed member as an, above 
all, powerful and masculine figure, disciplined, martial, and implicitly violent. It was a 
construction which systematically excluded women from the myth, for whom the fascist symbolic 
universe seemed to have no place. On one of the extremely rare occasions that VoVa printed a 
photograph of uniformed women, the emphasis was on their neatness and orderliness, by contrast 
with the dissolute women of the SDAP. In this regard the fascist movements were both predictably 
conservative, denying the connotations of power and violence in the depiction of uniformed 
women, if they were depicted at all.688   
The NSAP’s depictions of the party member were perfectly uniformed, over-emphasising 
the masculinity of the fascist, but did not appear to have access to any artists of the same (still not 
very impressive) calibre as the NSB, instead using somewhat more abstract depictions most of the 
time. The result was eerie, but highly appropriate: an idealised figure unrecognisable as an 
individual – the perfect fascist, nothing but a uniform. These smaller images were recycled over 
and over again as column headings and the like, repeatedly imprinting on the young membership 
the importance of the uniform [see figure 2].  
 
 
Figure 5. 'Where we fight', DSN no 26, 1933. 
VoVa never missed a chance to describe a fully uniformed WA company, ‘dashing file after file, the 
faces taut with the storm strap around the chin. There they go, martial in the black uniform with 
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the wide waist belt and shoulder strap: masculine youth…’.689 The DSN was similarly delighted 
with the SA: ‘They wear blue tabs on the collar, it is Stockholm’s SA under its leader [Sten] 
Hermann – firmly paced boys, used to “liberate the streets” for themselves. […] [then] it is 
Gothenburg’s brisk SA with its group leader Linder at the front. They are recognised by their 
yellow collar tabs, and their bold countenance – people that are scared of no one.’690 Visual 
representations of the WA had to unfailingly show them as a completely uniformed troop; when 
the NSB prepared a film about the WA, Hogewind required thirty of only ‘the most decorative 
weermannen’ in full uniform.691 With no exceptions, artistic depictions of the idealised fascist 
figure were of male figures, tall and often visibly muscular, with strong jawlines and steely eyes; 
the uniform tightly fitted, shoulder strap straining across the chest, lace-up or riding boots 
impossibly tight on the calves. This imagery cultivated a power fantasy that was intrinsic to the 
fascist myth created by the uniform; the association of the uniform with power was a strong one. 
In 1936, the head of Department I wrote to Mussert, to urge a simplification of the uniforms’ ‘±102 
distinctions’, adding somewhat concerned, ‘that there exists in our Movement a certain urge for 
distinctions; with this [I am] expressing the hope, that this is not in order to, through the 
distinction, indulge a certain lust for power’.692 
While depictions of the complete uniform were favoured, specific parts of the uniform had 
a particular attraction to some members. There was evidently a desire to wear these as part of a 
uniform more complete than regulations strictly dictated, even somewhat contrary to regulations. 
District Leader d’Ansembourg wrote to General Secretary Van Geelkerken to tell him that ‘I have 
been asked whether non-members of the WA are permitted to wear waist belts with a shoulder 
strap, and if this is e.g. prescribed for certain functionaries. The wearing of a black shirt with black 
or dark grey trousers requires at least a black belt, and that is why many instead wear a WA belt 
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with shoulder strap. […] Is there any objection to this?’693 (There was not.)694 It is notable that 
members bothered to inquire about and purchase such accessories, given the cost of leatherwear 
such as the wide waist-cinching belt. Under Sweden’s less strict uniform regulations, the secret 
police observed that members took the opportunity to at least wear certain parts of the uniform, 
(while compulsively detailing all the individual shirt colours that were worn), especially breeches 
and riding boots, an even more extravagant expense.695 The boots were sufficiently iconic by the 
mid-thirties in Sweden that the liberal independent Dagens Nyheter described NSAP members as 
simply ‘some gentlemen in boots’.696 Though not uncommon in VoVa, DSN was particularly 
obsessed with the description of the ‘compulsory nazi-boots’, as local newspaper Göteborgs-Posten 
called them,697 rarely failing to take the opportunity to describe the rhythmic beat of marching 
heels on the pavement, an aural and visual signifier of violent force and numbers, sometimes 
mused over in painstaking detail. Boots were invariably marching, always resounding, always 
rhythmic, firmly paced, forceful, redolent of order and discipline.698 Even in part, the 
paraphernalia of the mythopoeic uniform proved intensely evocative, ‘the sensual embodiment of 
the political idea’ in the most literal sense.699 To underline the physical dimension of the uniform, 
party discourse went to great lengths to evoke the sensory impressions, the sounds, sights, and 
feelings of uniforms, rather than just symbolism. 
Notably, when a new uniform was made for NU in conjunction with the 1938 New 
Direction, the new model was if anything more militaristic: ‘army coat and breeches entirely like 
the army’s latest model and in the same colour’, including the indispensable riding boots and 
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shoulder strap.700 The appeal of the shoulder strap in particular, a glossy strap of leather across the 
chest which catches the eye in so many photographs of uniformed fascists, lay perhaps in an 
implicit promise of violence. For the 1934 årsting, SA-guards were instructed that the military 
accessory, ‘[the] shoulder strap attached at the waist belt with karabiners was ‘also useful’ for self-
defence [emphasis in original].701 The instructions did not specify how, though it does not require 
much imagination. Notably these instructions were only issued orally according to Party Organiser 
Svalander, while no hint at such use has been found in the NSB archives at all. The shoulder strap 
was also one of the parts of the uniform Lindholm felt had to be disposed of with the New 
Direction, as a means of reconstructing the party myth in a more respectable, and perhaps less 
fetishistic direction. ‘The only conceivable [way forward] … would be to get rid of both name and 
symbol, not to mention boots, cross strap and “Hitler salute”.’702 The response of many members 
was extremely negative, and some refused to compromise on this matter. 
In both movements the uniform was imbued with a special aura, and became an object of 
reverence in its own right, regarded with pride and adoration. The myriad close descriptions of the 
uniform in fascist discourse delineated it as a sacred object in the fascist symbolic order. While 
uniform bans succeeded in keeping them of the street, they can only have served to reinforce the 
mythopoeic power of the uniform within the parties, distancing it from the secular world, 
associating it even stronger with the close-knit militarised community, a powerful elite group with 
a holy mission. In an informal ceremony on the night before Article 435a came into effect, 
uniformed NSB-members gathered on an Utrecht square, in the rain with Mussert, ‘commander of 
the growing army’. After a short speech, and singing of the Wilhelmus anthem, the dozens of 
assorted members ritually removed their black shirts at the stroke of midnight, raising them in the 
air in a show of defiance to onlookers, and the promise to one day wear them again on that same 
street.703 (The NSAP did not turn the uniform ban into such a ceremony, instead opting to push the 
limits of the law for as long as possible.)704 In another rather remarkable illustration of the peculiar 
position of the shirt in the NSAP’s culture, the fifth årsting in Stockholm featured a little exhibition, 
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curated by then-NU leader Gösta Hallberg-Cuula. (Hallberg-Cuula himself was something of a 
legendary figure in the party – Lindholm described him as taken straight from Runeberg’s Tales of 
Ensign Stål (1848-60), a romantic fascist soldier with an eye patch, who fell in battle as a volunteer 
in the Finno-Soviet war of 1940-41.705 His grave became a pilgrimage site for Swedish neo-nazis.)706 
The exhibition put the black, brown, and blue shirts of the SFKO and NSAP and other uniform 
paraphernalia on display, while Hallberg-Cuula himself was dressed in the SFKO black shirt.707 
Under the guidance of Sven Hedengren and various party members in the police and military, 
foreign guests from Scandinavia as well as a Völkischer Beobachter representative were shown the 
enshrined items.708  
The Movement uniform possessed a powerful and sacred symbolic charge, which elevated 
the party member from their individuality, and made them into a privileged part of the holy 
mission, imbued with the righteous strength this fetish bestowed. The mythopoeic force of the 
uniform harmonised with its fetishistic attractions, an aesthetic armour that promised violent 
power to the wearer, while turning them into a living embodiment of an army – the party, led by a 
divinely ordained Leader, part of an irresistible force of destiny: fascism. Bertil Brisman invoked 
this myth by quoting the nationalist Finno-Swedish poet Örnulf Tigerstedt, his description of 
Caesar’s armies evoking the Swedish SA, a new type of man, a new world view, a new era: ‘A heavy 
tread / and the rattling of the steel dice / resounds in my ears. / Mutely destiny walks / across the 
river Rubicon / and the great closing of the accounts approaches.’709 As a concrete symbol in which 
the individual could literally immerse themselves, there was no possible connection to the myth 
more immediate than the uniform.710 In uniform, in a symbiotic process of ‘performing fascism’, 
the individual was annihilated, sensuously dissolved in the fantasy of political myth. The poem 
‘Like one man’, published in VoVa before the fifth NSB landdag is worth citing here by way of 
illustration. 
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At the Congress I will be 
As thousands who with me came 
In that foaming current of the wave: small, 
Without ranks and without names;  
One single voice in the “hold sea!” 
Which will be shouted across the streets, 
Just One man in Mussert’s army, 
One of the unknown soldiers. 
 
In my black shirt amidst the black 
Of the others entirely lost, 
Yet I will hear the beating of my heart 
Even in the heartbeat of the masses. 
And in might I will be One, 
In endurance, in desire, 
Be One in courage and in power, 
And With these I will conquer! 711 
 
VI 
For all the mobilising force the uniform possessed internally, and crucial as it was in the 
mythopoeic process, it was a double-edged sword. The fascist symbolic order which defined the 
uniform was not invulnerable to contradiction, and while its actors could follow a script, they 
were not liberated from arbitrary divergence.712 Uniquely marking the wearer as a fascist, the 
uniform amplified the consequences of infelicitous performances, shattering the authenticity of 
the performance, disenchanting the audience.713 The uniform could be said to have been over-
inscribed with symbolism, over-burdened with signification, in a way that was easily exploited by 
political opponents.  
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 Most immediately and of greatest public concern was the threat of violence and disorder 
that seemed to be caused by the uniforms. Both parties were under suspicion of trying to instigate 
a civil war, particularly in areas where communists were also strong. Mindful of the political 
unrest that had led up to the establishment of the Italian Fascist and German Nazi regimes, state 
authorities including the secret police (both the Dutch Centrale Inlichtingendienst, CI, and 
Sweden’s unofficial secret police) kept a watchful eye for any disturbing activities such as military 
training and weaponisation. When uniforms were banned in 1933, DSN portrayed the legislation as 
a slanderous accusation that the NSAP was hostile to the state [statsfientlig].714 But the fascist 
uniform was also a simple concern of law and order, and in 1933 rival parties were keen to point to 
the provocative effect uniforms had on those of differing political opinions, i.e. the Left.715 Rows 
about the provocative effect of uniformed fascists continued throughout the 1930s. The NJS youth 
organisation was legally apolitical, until a Dutch court decided otherwise:716  
 
With great fury the Nationale Dagblad makes note of the fact that marching permission was 
refused to the so called “National Youth Storm”. This fascist organisation, which in a defiant 
manner evades the uniform ban, planned to … demonstrate throughout town. Of course with no 
other purpose other than fascist advertising. However, the police commissioner and the [AR] 
mayor have given no permission for such a provocative, uniformed procession.717 
 
A Swedish police report of 1933 monitoring the National Socialist organisations tells of the 
frequent disorders wherever the NSAP had meetings, especially at the Stockholm Auditorium 
concert hall. While these rarely got out of hand, keeping them under control required a 
considerable police presence.718 In the Swedish countryside matters were worse. Communists 
would regularly disturb fascist meetings, which often ended with physical fights and rock 
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throwing.719 Lindholm himself recounted numerous incidents of serious physical violence, peaking 
at a meeting in Sandviken in 1935: the square was filled with an angry crowd of circa 3000 – ‘I 
could not speak over the roaring [of the crowd] and had to duck to avoid the rocks being thrown. 
Have never before experienced such madness, could speak for at most 5 minutes.’ Police aborted 
the meeting, the crowd tried to turn over the party car, and the windows were smashed. 
(Laconically Lindholm ended the entry with: ‘Slept well after a real day of struggle’.)720 The fears of 
some sort of civil war, which in retrospect was highly unfeasible in Sweden, felt like a real risk to 
some, given the crowds the NSAP could attract, as well as local support for the party in the cities 
especially. 
Uniforms were by no means the sole cause of unrest, which was after all usually due to 
profound ideological differences, and banning uniforms did not put an end to such disorders. 
However they were a central part of arguments about the inherently disorderly nature of fascism. 
While some groups appreciated the anti-communist stance, and saw socialists as the primary 
offenders during any unrest, conservatives were suspicious of fascist claims to be protecting law 
and order.721 Uniformed and sometimes armed resistance to even communism was an intolerable 
usurpation of state authority, especially in the eyes of the Dutch confessional Right. Apart from 
citing concerns about public disorder and the provocative character of uniforms, RKSP minister 
Josef Van Schaik warned ‘that such a, more or less military, power-development of political 
orientations alongside legal authority – even if it is, initially perhaps bona fide,  dressed in the form 
of assistance to the authorities – cannot be tolerated in an ordered state’.722 In the Netherlands, 
where for the period 1933-37 the NSB seemed like a genuine threat to the established political 
system, Mussert did surprisingly little to alleviate fears of civil unrest and violence, opting for a 
rhetorical carrot and stick approach. In response to the various laws passed against the NSB and 
similar organisations, particularly the law against political uniforms, he stated that ‘[e]very 
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attempt to block the legal path of a new spiritual current within a people, for which the historical 
time has come, is in essence an attempt at civil war’, words quoted in large font by VoVa, 
something which cannot have put the parliamentary Right at ease.723 
 In conjunction with the use of trained paramilitary formations, the uniformed party 
armies – even if banned in public – were under constant scrutiny for organised criminal 
intentions, particularly a coup d’état. The considerable number of files that are stored in the 
Swedish secret police archive are themselves evidence of the scrutiny under which the NSAP was 
placed, as are the surviving CI documents showing even small NSB meetings were monitored by 
state agents. The Swedish secret police specifically kept a file on ‘illegal activities’, investigating 
rumours of a coup d’état.724 Sweden had already had a controversy about paramilitary formations 
in 1931 when the right-wing Munck Corps [Munckska kåren] was discovered to have illegally 
imported firearms from Germany, a small group erroneously associated with SFKO.725 The corps 
was the invention of a number of right-wing military figures, including Freikorps officer Horst von 
Pflugk-Harttung, which ostensibly existed to help out the Swedish police in case of a Bolshevik 
revolution.726 Sven Hedengren (himself under scrutiny from the secret police) was interrogated 
about the Munck Corps and its arms supply.727 Lindholm himself viewed the corps sympathetically, 
although he considered it too bourgeois in character.728 The corps was disbanded and Parliament 
passed a law against private armies.729 Thus the connection between extreme anti-communism, 
fascism, and armed paramilitaries had already been made in the public mind, and the NSAP was 
regularly accused of, and inspected for, keeping illegal weapons. Authorities cited concerns for law 
and order, while Dagens Nyheter pointed to the danger of paramilitaries that regularly armed 
themselves in street fights.730 In fact, when Dagens Nyheter reported on fascists in Sweden, it was 
almost exclusively in the context of violence and disorder. The left-wing press regularly portrayed 
the NSAP as a criminal organisation, plotting to overthrow the state with armed violence, while 
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the police turned a blind eye – the inconclusive 1935 investigation into the supposed continued 
existence of the SA particularly enraged socialists, especially when prosecutors failed to act on a 
number of illegal weapons that had been found.731 ‘In Sweden, as before in Germany, democracy 
protects itself with fascist judges and by general prosecutors, who sit on the indictments against 
the fascist bandit organisations until they can no longer be implemented.’732 Public suspicions 
persisted, and in 1939 the Social-Demokraten editor Schenk was informed by one anonymous 
individual that the SSS student organisation kept a large secret weapon depot, which was followed 
up by a state police investigation, though again inconclusive.733 The police itself was particularly 
concerned with the high proportion of military men in the party, even more so when in the latter 
half of the decade the NSAP organised them internally as the Brown (later Blue) Army and Navy. 
Sometimes these would march alongside the standard bearers to help out in case of fights, at other 
times they just lent a splash of military colour to the picture.734 ‘During the latest march … Thorén 
[Brown Army leader] went next to the procession to “maintain order”. He was followed by five 
sailors … in uniform, who would assist him if necessary. … Throughout the entire march they sang 
along with the songs’, a concerned police memorandum reported. ‘It did not look very 
democratic.’735  
In the Netherlands, while Mussert dissolved the WA at the beginning of 1936 in 
anticipation of a law against paramilitary formations, suspicions that the party kept training 
members in secret persisted.736 De Tribune reported that ‘the WA is dissolved in appearance only. 
The uniform had been put away, [but] “with a ball of camphor”’, quoting Hogewind (now head of 
Indian Affairs) at a party convention in Batavia (Jakarta).737 This turned out to be correct with the 
1940 Occupation, but before then, though unknown to the public or authorities until the end of 
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1939,738 a small elite youth corps of circa 400 members – the Mussertgarde – was apparently 
trained for a potential violent takeover, and would be the basis of the future Dutch SS.739 VoVa was 
particularly dismayed at a report by De Telegraaf of ‘military-style exercises in political uniform’,740 
in the wake of a police raid. Conservative newspapers remained concerned about the displays of 
military-style discipline in NSB marches, the association of fascism with the paramilitary uniform 
strongly impressed on their minds.741 Already in 1934 De Tijd reported rumours that the NSB was 
secretly introducing cells into the state civil militias.742 The natural association of the uniform with 
paramilitaries, a link heavily encouraged by fascist discourse, cast a permanent shadow of 
suspicion on the NSB and NSAP, and was welcome ammunition for the Left, which readily used it 
to portray fascism as a form of organised crime. Already in 1933, the liberal progressive Nieuwe 
Rotterdamsche Courant, NRC, warned that even unarmed uniformed formations could in the 
future quickly develop into something more sinister – ‘weapons are easy to acquire’.743 Accurate or 
not, in public discourse political uniforms became a sign of disorder, and the laws against 
uniforms and paramilitaries tainted it doubly with the association of illegality, an association that 
stuck even when worn legally at party meetings. One article from De Tijd, based on a report by the 
Anti-Revolutionary Rotterdammer, speaks volumes with its title: ‘The forbidden N.S.B.: 
Impermissible defence squads after foreign model’, recounting rumours that the NSB was 
preparing an illegal paramilitary group like the squadristi or SA.744 Even as the parties themselves 
emphasised their anti-communist credentials, and portrayed their uniformed formations as a 
bulwark of law and order, the symbolic uniform was easy prey to hostile perspectives which 
reinterpreted it as a threat to the peace or the state.  
 One of the concerns behind both the Swedish and Dutch legislation was recent 
developments in Central Europe, particularly Germany of course. While the main fear was for a 
brownshirt or communist takeover of the streets, the argument hinted at a more insidious 
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accusation, that of foreign associations. This was the greatest obstacle to the NSAP, which already 
in so many regards resembled the German NSDAP, and whose brown shirts were suspiciously 
similar to those of the German SA. In 1938 this was even criticised by the German Ministry for 
Propaganda, which stated in a report to Heinrich Himmler that Lindholm had committed the 
error of copying NSDAP paraphernalia too closely.745 (Nevertheless, Lindholm would later 
maintain that anti-Semitism was the only German import in the party, as a scribble in the margins 
of his personal copy of the 1948 party programme implies.)746 
The NSB’s black shirts did not expose it to quite the same kind of criticism, particularly as 
Fascist Italy was regarded as much less threatening than the Netherlands’ eastern neighbour, but 
the wearing of political uniforms on the street was still regarded as something distinctly un-Dutch, 
‘a more or less ridiculous urge to imitate foreign methods’.747 Both SDAP newspaper Het Volk and 
the liberal conservative Algemeen Handelsblad thought the 1933 landdag constituted an awful lot 
of ‘visual militaristic messing about’, which seemed ‘“awfully un-Dutch” for such a patriotic-acting 
group’.748 Thus the wearing of uniforms, while partially a reminder that the fascists were part of 
something much greater than merely the national movement – ‘the great current of the new age’ –
749 that part of something greater was to many outsiders threatening. Black- or brown shirted 
fascists looked like potential foreign infiltration, a constant reminder of their ideological cousins 
dangerously close to home.750 Accusations of treasonous activity such as sabotage or spying 
doggedly haunted both parties until the end of the war, and beyond, though unproven in the 
Swedish case, and the Dutch before the Second World War.751 
 
 
                                                             
745
 Report for Reichsführer-SS, 24 February 1938, in: Preliminary investigation protocol, Lindholm, 18 
February 1948, p. 19, Arninge. 
746
 Lindholm‟s private copy of SSS: Den Nationella Folksocialismens Program, (Stockholm: Grundläggaren, 
1948), p. 17, in: Marieberg: SO Lindholm, vol. 8. 
747
 „...een, min of meer belachelijke, zucht tot nabootsing van buitenlandsche methoden...‟, Van Schaik, 
Memorandum no 3, Session 1933-231, („Aanvulling van het Wetboek van Strafrecht met het oog op 
kleedingstukken en onderscheidingsteekenen, welke uitdrukking zijn van een bepaald staatkundig streven‟), p. 1, 
NSB newspaper clippings collection , NIOD: Amsterdam, KA II: 1701. 
748
 „het uiterlijk militaristisch gedoe “wel erg on-Nederlandsch” noemt voor een zoo patriottisch doende groep.‟, 
Het Volk, no 11 895, 11 January 1933, evening edition, p. 5; the charge of un-Dutch NSB behaviour recurred 
regularly, see for instance: „De Landdag van de N.S.B.‟, De Standaard, no 19 475, 14 October 1935, p. 3. 
749
 „En het fascisme is de groote strooming van den nieuwen tijd.‟, „Interview met Mussert‟, VoVa, no 30, 27 
July 1935, p. 4. 
750
 Kunkeler, „The Evolution of Swedish Fascism‟, pp. 387–95. 
751





The hostile press happily integrated the predilection for uniforms into their narratives of a 
criminal, dangerous, and foreign threat. They were helped with this by actual fascist law-breaking. 
This was particularly common in Sweden, where NSAP members were often ready to push the 
limits of local authorities’ willingness to use their warranty, and the party hierarchy often lacked 
the means of enforcing discipline. As usual newspapers jumped on any occasion to point out 
fascists flouting the law –the communist paper Ny Dag reported the case of a colporteur selling 
DSN in uniform, defending himself in court with the claim that he had no choice, as these were 
the only clothes he owned.752 Dagens Nyheter reported several times on Lindholmsnazister being 
arrested for flouting the law, usually with a sense of humour about the proceedings.753 The party 
propaganda teams, Lindholm told during his 1980-81 interview, were frequently taken to the police 
station immediately after meetings, to be photographed and judged as to whether they had worn 
political uniforms.754 Frequently these encounters did not end with any charges, as local police 
found it difficult to prove that visor caps, or boots and the like could constitute a uniform, when 
individual garments were commonly worn by local inhabitants. Only once, in August 1933, were 
Lindholm and his team actually fined for wearing political uniforms in Skene, Västergötland.755 So 
throughout the decade the police would be constantly frustrated by NSAP members making a very 
particular impression with their garments, without being able to charge them. One police 
memorandum reported in late 1937: 
 
It would however certainly not do any harm if the nazis left their boots at home when they held 
their outdoors meetings, since it is probably the uniform-like clothes which really gall the 
southerners in particular. If the nazis were dressed ‘like normal’ people, then the troublemakers 
wouldn’t know which ones were nazis or not when they left the meetings, and would have no one 
to harass as is always the case at the moment.756 
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The most blatant acts of legal disobedience in this regard came from the NU, particularly until 
1939 under the leadership of the radical Arne Clementsson. While the youth group already had a 
reputation in its own right for provocative tactics in the political struggle, this was not without the 
connivance of the main party. For instance at the 1937 regional convention [landsting] in Uppsala, 
while the main party and SA followed police directives in marching through town in smaller 
groups in civilian clothes, the state police reported virtually all NU-members turned up in full 
uniform, the procession decorated with their striking ‘Odin flags’.757 At the 1939 SSS årsting in 
Malmö the party also permitted NU to turn up in their light blue shirt uniforms, although this time 
the police intervened during the march, ordering the participants to remove the shirts. When the 
hundreds of boys and girls duly obeyed and started marching topless the police ordered them to 
put the shirts back on again, and the march continued. (Lindholm took great delight in this 
episode, and recounted it whenever possible.)758 But, as Dagens Nyheter did not fail to observe, the 
blue-shirted youths were fined for their transgression afterwards.759 Flouting of the law in this 
fashion was much less common in the NSB, not least because of the far less permissive Article 435a, 
and stronger party discipline. Nor did the NJS constitute as large and independent-minded an 
organisation as the NU was, instead being closely controlled by Van Geelkerken, and disbanded 
the moment it was legally deemed a covert NSB organisation. 
 Uniformed indiscipline, an incongruence antithetical to fascist myth, occurred in to both 
parties, and made easy targets for hostile constructions of fascism. In spite of the exhortations of 
rules, directives, and functionaries, no member fully conformed to the fantasy of the perfect, 
uniformed, disciplined fascist. Fascists had a script to follow, but sometimes forgot, sometimes 
wilfully ignored its injunctions. Not every member was a dedicated fanatic, not all lost themselves 
in the fantastical mythopoeic process when performing in uniform. Nor was every organised 
collective performance a success: the uniformed fascist spectacle came with a pre-established 
reputation in Sweden and the Netherlands, one that required significant numbers and resources 
to live up to. Not only were opponents – Socialist, Catholic, Calvinist, Liberal – unwilling to accept 
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the fascist myth at face value, if at all, but they were ready to interject their own constructions of 
fascism in the interstices of mythopoeia, interstices opened up by infelicitous performances. 
The NSB’s first public performance, the first landdag in Utrecht, 7 January 1933, had a 
dubious impact. While surviving HQ correspondence shows that the event was an important 
factor in the initial upsurge in members to the young movement, much of the media observed the 
diminutive uniformed rally with scorn.760 One fascist wrote in March to express his admiration for 
the bravery of men performing in uniform with hostile crowds, but also noted that the uniforms 
might be perceived to be ridiculous and theatrical, literally ‘monkey suits’ [apepakkies].761 
Algemeen Handelsblad’s stern assessment of the event’s militarism had already been noted. Social 
Democratic Het Volk sardonically described it as ‘decent fascism’, ‘but in essence no less crude’. 
The event was unremarkable, and what ‘appeared on the theatre stage was of little interest and 
badly disappointing’. But it was the parade which attracted most of the paper’s derision. ‘[T]here 
were, carefully counted, thirty small uniformed men, and the circumstance, that they were being 
inspected by “leader” Mussert with the necessary preparations, did not take away the fact that the 
entire fascist “army” consisted of thirty men.’762 Noting that they wore black shirts like the Italian 
Fascists, Het Volk concluded that ‘this group too is inspired by hideous murder-fascism, with its 
crude, bombastic performances and its deplorably low intellectual standards’.763 The NSB, Het Volk 
concluded, had failed to make fascism into a ‘respectable force’ as the liberal press had hoped. 
Orthodox Calvinist De Standaard was less concerned about the militarism of the event, noting, a 
little dismissively, that ‘[t]he mise-en-scène was entirely in order’, and instead mostly complained 
about the lack of any ‘positive Christian’ content, but was also scornful of the WA-men’s discipline 
in the face of Communist harassment.764 Numbers definitely mattered in a uniformed 
demonstration, and their lack could seriously undermine the mythopoeic effect of such 
performances. The group being measured against the standard of foreign ‘fascist armies’, their 
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‘heroic’ discipline placed in a more mundane national context, the impression made through a 
different hermeneutic lens was primarily ridiculous, not fantastic. As SDAP commentator Henri 
Polak wrote, ‘I really did not know whether to laugh or cry, when I saw the photos … of the 
exhibition in Utrecht on that historical Saturday 7 January 1933.’765 
The NSAP that same year probably experienced much the same thing, at their first 
convention of a few hundred attendees, but rather than the written scorn of the newspapers they 
were mostly met with silence, as DSN complained.766 After the 1934 party congress, the local 
Göteborgs-Posten was one of the few papers that reported extensively on the event, drily noting 
the haphazard adherence to the law against political uniforms, with the presence of boots, barely 
concealed brown shirts, and brown visor caps. While the militaristic discipline of the NSAP march 
was noted, the overall impression was chaotic, mostly due to the shouting and taunts of counter-
demonstrators, and the sometimes violent police intervention.767 Typically at these larger party 
manifestations, it was precisely a display of order and discipline that the NSAP aimed for, and 
these were often hindered by the participants’ disobedience. DSN’s instructions for the 1935 
årsting implored members to remove uniforms in public, reminding them in large font that ‘[t]he 
carrying of nat.-soc. uniform paraphernalia is absolutely forbidden’, underlining that breaking the 
law would harm the party as a whole.768  Similarly the Strängnäs landsting programme brochure 
put directly on its front page: ‘The reputation of the party demands of you as a party member: 
Respect the uniform law’.769 As noted earlier, this injunction was only partially successful, so that 
members’ performances in uniforms were often inherently un-disciplinary, feeding directly into 
counter-narratives of fascists as brutes and thugs [figure 3]. 
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Figure 3. Storebackegatan at Masthugget, as our artist saw it on Sunday evening.' 
Arbetar-Tidningen, 1934, newspaper clipping, National Archives of Sweden, Arninge. 
 
The NSB’s Disciplinary Council, partially set up to resolve internal disputes, functioned 
chiefly to protect the party’s image and settle cases for the benefit of the party in case of 
disciplinary infractions.770 While many of the surviving carbon copies of the case files deal with 
various forms of internal insubordination, there are also numerous instances of members flouting 
behavioural prescriptions, while wearing insignia. One Rotterdam member, a notorious alcoholic, 
got drunk in a café while wearing the triangular party insignia on his coat. Trying to start a fight in 
the café, one of the first priorities of his comrades was to remove the insignia from his clothes, 
commenting that ‘that was no propaganda for the NSB’.771 Such cases of fascist drunkenness are 
some of the most common in the council files.772 Naturally this contributed to the image of fascists 
as undisciplined and immoral boors, and did not just undermine mythopoeic efforts, but straight 
up reinforced negative stereotypes. One member was found to be carrying a German Parabellum 
pistol during the work camp mutiny at the 1935 Hague convention work camp mutiny, while 
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another tried to illegally sell a revolver to other members.773 One case concerned an alcoholic WA-
member, with a possible habit of adultery, who was rumoured to have shot off the lock of his 
liquor cabinet with a revolver.774 
The thug was one of the most common and harmful, constructions of fascism that the 
NSAP and the NSB faced,775 and it relied strongly on the portrayal of fascism as simultaneously a 
form of organised and undisciplined violence, threatening and chaotic. The habit of some 
members to arm themselves for fights, at meetings and in public, was most conducive to breaking 
up the myth of fascism as a respectable and disciplined force. One 1934 letter, from the NSAP 
southern District Leader Nils Wenchert to a local functionary, even implied that while weapons 
were not considered part of  the uniform, the leadership did not object to them.  ‘You’ll have to get 
truncheons yourself individually, because they don’t belong to the equipment.’776 Lindholm also 
recounts that members of the propaganda teams regularly brought truncheons to meetings, and 
recounts several instances in his diary of groups attacking communists with truncheons, though 
this seems to have more or less stopped after the law against paramilitaries was passed.777  
Armed members do seem to have been more of a problem for the NSB, in spite, or perhaps 
because of, stricter laws against carrying arms of any sort.778 NSB-members were in 1933 numerous 
times found to illegally carry truncheons, knuckledusters, blackjacks, and even guns, leading to 
several trials which particularly Het Volk reported, denouncing them as ‘armed Mussert-fascists’.779 
By far the most embarrassing incident involved Mussert himself in May 1937, when, during a visit 
to the communist-dominated neighbourhood Blauwe Zand in Amsterdam, he and his chauffeur 
fended off a hostile crowd with a whip, and his chauffeur with a gun (a Mausser revolver or semi-
automatic). The heavily publicised incident went to trial, and while Mussert was never convicted, 
the case allowed the gleeful reconstruction of the quasi-uniformed Mussert carrying a less-than-
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respectable whip in the street, flanked by a thuggish gun-toting chauffeur, picking fights in 
communist neighbourhoods. The investigation allowed newspapers to repeat and elaborate the 
story for several days, shortly before the general elections. VoVa tried to depict the incident as an 
assassination attempt on Mussert, but papers like De Tijd chose to focus on the less heroic aspects 
of the confrontation. ‘[O]ne thing is for sure, and that is that Mussert carried a whip, when he was 
visiting party members by car in the known communist neighbourhood, while his chauffeur 
carried a revolver’, the paper wrote in an article entitled ‘The Hero of the “Blue Sand”’ [Blauwe 
Zand].780 The whip in particular would come to haunt Mussert’s image, as a preposterous imitation 
of Hitler.781 While VoVa claimed that fascists needed to be armed to protect themselves from Red 
terror, it was all too aware of how armed members made cracks in the myth of an army of law and 
order. NSB discourse was in constant debate with rival interpretations of fascist behaviour, 
arguing that papers like Algemeen Handelsblad presented a false picture of the respectable party 
members, merely resorting to legitimate means of self-defence, as became dignified and 
courageous men.782 
The mythopoeic potential of the uniform was powerful, but a significative minefield. 
Moments of indiscipline, collective or individual, and even just bad luck, made for infelicitous 
performances that were easily integrated into alternative constructions of the fascist movements. 
The uniform made fascist movements into militaristic armies, a myth that members carried with 
them even when the uniform was left at home or covered up. The deliberately cultivated 
connotations of discipline, organisation, power, and militarism leaked easily beyond the 
boundaries of respectability, within which party discourse attempted to frame and secure them. 
Discipline was not trivially enforced in practice; the tight bond between uniform and behaviour 
did not come automatically, but had to be deliberately trained and regulated. The corporeal 
repertoire of salutes, steps, and straight backs was far easier to inculcate than just sound and 
respectable behaviour, which was open to individual judgment. In practice it was easily thwarted. 
Members were simultaneously encouraged to wear the uniform with honour and devotion, and 
forbidden from showing it off outside of private, party events – arguably an invitation to 
                                                             
780
 „...maar zeker is, dat Mussert een zweep bij zich had, toen hij partijgenooten in de als zeer communistisch 
bekende wijk per auto ging bezoeken, terwijl zijn chauffeur een revolver droeg.‟, „De held van het “Blauwe 
Zand”‟, De Tijd, no 29 399, 15 May 1937, p. 6. 
781
 „Hoe Amsterdam heeft getemd‟, De Maasbode, no 27 410, 27 May 1937, p. 3. 
782
 jclb, „Hoe het Handelsblad het fascisme bestrijdt‟, VoVa, no 13, 31 March 1934, pp. 5-6. 
158 
 
insubordination, especially for younger members. Neither the NSB nor the NSAP possessed 
anything like the resources or opportunities to train their cadres into an actually militarily 
disciplined and smoothly functioning army, where each member stuck rigidly to a fascist moral 
discipline, always dignified, powerful, masculine, yet respectable. In an organisation of thousands 
or tens of thousands, individual misbehaviour was inevitable – as it was in all parties – and reports 
of infractions and crimes were quickly carried across the country. But mythopoeia did not end at 
the performative stage. The fascist press continued to engage in a battle for the significance of 
these performances, countering hostile outsiders’ portrayals of fascist misdemeanour, juxtaposing 
the image of a thuggish, criminal, foreign, or revolutionary fascism with their myth of a 
respectable, dignified, and patriotic fascism. 
 
VIII 
If uniforms were a keystone of unsympathetic interpretations of fascism, and an unreliable tool 
from a disciplinary perspective, the question is why both the NSB and the NSAP maintained its 
central place in their symbolic order, or indeed at all. Did the benefits outweigh the negative 
connotations of militarism, violence, and disorder? 
 One answer must be that some fascist performances appeared unconvincing, artificial, or 
even ridiculous, without uniforms. Once uniforms had been established as a core part of the 
mythopoeic repertoire, their absence became noticeable, and an object of scorn for inimical 
analyses. When in the aftermath of the Swedish uniform ban, Lindholm appeared at a large public 
meeting at the Stockholm Auditorium, newspapers made fun of the un-uniform impression that 
the fascists now made, the ‘confusion of shirts’. Lindholm, the regional Stockholms-Tidningen 
reported, performed in a blue shirt, ‘his SA-leader’s colour was a screaming red, and the standard-
bearing boys had both speckled and striped-shirted torsos – indeed, it was such a motley selection 
of shirt fabrics you could notice the irony’.783 Svenska Dagbladet also made note of how the SA-
men ‘performed in shirts of different colours, striped, and chequered, and single coloured…’ at the 
‘large National Socialist hallelujah-meeting’. The paper also took note of ‘a well-directed flag 
parade, led by a gentleman in a beautiful red shirt. … then came party leader Sven-Olov Lindholm. 
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He wore a pleasant blue shirt.’784 Several other papers took similar delight in pointing out these 
veritable anti-uniforms.785 Out of uniform, performances looked less organised, the collection of 
individuals less disciplined, and it heavily undermined the image of unity the NSAP and NSB were 
so keen to maintain.  
The contrast was at its most noticeable during a party convention, when the customary 
marches through the cities of Amsterdam, Gothenburg, ‘s-Gravenhage, or Stockholm, made a 
rather dismal impression when the parties tried to maintain some kind of dignified and 
disciplined front, without the clothing to visually tie the ranks together, and lend coherence to the 
demonstration. At the 1935 Amsterdam convention, Mussert complained how they were forced ‘to 
proceed through Amsterdam like prisoners-of-war, without flags, without music’ – an obvious 
contrast to the ceremonial display in the RAI-building.786 Photographs of the ‘civilian’ marches, 
even those made for fascist publications, are not instantly recognisable as displays of fascism [see 
also chapter 4, fig. 7]. The contrast between the brown-shirted columns of the 1933 årstingsmarsch 
and its 1934 equivalent in the rain speaks volumes. The NSB’s processions, with their dark-clothed 
participants, looked like a sad and dismal affair when robbed of their flags. Socialist Het Volk 
described the rainy regional landdag procession of 1934, where the Amsterdam city authorities 
forced the marchers to roll up their flags, as a ‘funeral procession’.787 Outside commentators were 
but all too aware of how fascism wanted to appear, and took much satisfaction in highlighting the 
contrast, as a handy metaphor for a movement in decline. Un-uniformed performances were far 
less photogenic, and made much less of a spectacle: discursive and visual representations of large 
meetings tended to be much more focused on the indoors, private, aspect of the event, with all its 
ritual and ceremony, and less on the public procession which instead became about the 
martyrdom of the party, the heroic discipline of respectable men in the face of uncouth Bolshevik 
agitators.788 
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 While the uniform lost its immediate mythopoeic strength in the face of the laws against 
political uniforms, and negative portrayals did not cease during the following years, both parties 
still benefited from the indirect transmission of images of uniforms to the public, through their 
newspapers, propaganda, and other publications. These had the advantage that, unlike the, 
doubtlessly more impressive, immediacy of an actually present uniformed army, they were tightly 
controlled and selected, framed by discursive reconstructions which directed the beholder’s 
interpretation. Both VoVa and DSN sold in disproportionately high numbers for most of the 1930s, 
and were a far more common point of encounter for outsiders with the fascist uniform than the 
physically present. It brought the otherwise private spectacle of the uniformed ceremony or ritual 
outside, while the distance between the mythopoeic uniform and the observer contributed to 
producing reverence and respect for the object. They ensured it was always accompanied by the 
appropriate fascist commentary, and through selection manufactured the special character of the 
uniform. It was removed from the mundane, secular world, and preferentially staged in a ritual 
context. While such imagery was not immune to deconstruction by a critical gaze, fascist 
hermeneutics helped offset rival interpretations. The extent to which this was effective can only 
be surmised, but it was safer than physically present uniforms on the street, unprotected by 
discursive fascist interjections, precariously open to (mis)interpretation. Hence the uniform was, 
in spite of the risks and drawbacks, not a lost battle in the thirties’ struggle for the meaning of 
fascism. The mythopoeic potential of the uniform was too powerful to be abandoned, and there 
were openings and opportunities to convey that mythopoeic force from inside, to the outside 
public.  
Nor was this purely a matter of propaganda strategy. Neither Mussert nor Lindholm were 
in a position to simply abolish the uniform in the party. Apart from the ridicule of the press, they 
faced the devotion of the cadres to the garments, so that mythopoeic strategy was also tied up 
with their fetishistic commitment to the symbol.  Attempts by the Haarlem Circle Leader to 
prohibit NSB-members from wearing the black shirt to Ĳmuiden celebrations of Queen 
Wilhelmina’s birthday in 1933 (the event was not meant to be exploited for propaganda purposes) 
were met with indignant responses.  
 
Some of our members will not go to Ĳmuiden, precisely because the black shirt has been forbidden 
to them; they say that they wish to bear witness to our loyalty to the Dynasty, and do that 
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preferentially in a black shirt, the dress of our Movement […] In my opinion every compromise is 
out of the question, and the wearing of black shirts ought to be encouraged under all 
circumstances, certainly not be prohibited, with perhaps as only exception in church.789 
 
In the years after 1933 the desire to wear uniforms in public was partially satisfied by the wearing 
of uniform-like clothes whenever possible – this habit in the NSAP has already been noted, while 
in the NSB this was rather more difficult, but still possible on rare occasions. For instance as the 
WA and NSB started infiltrating hiking organisations, they instructed members to participate in 
apolitical sport marches in identical clothing. For the traditional Four-Day march, NSB and WA-
members were informed of the desirability ‘that everyone will be as similarly dressed as possible’, 
giving a specific list of garments and colours to be worn (long-sleeved open-necked white shirt, 
short black trousers, orange lower socks, black upper socks, black shoes).790 In Sweden, the NSAP 
insisted that the ban against uniforms was ultimately temporary in nature, and its regulations 
even prescribed a quasi-uniform for the period when uniforms were banned: [d]uring periods of 
democratic uniform scares (uniform ban) a white shirt is worn (sport- or tennis shirt) as well as a 
brown motor cap. Note that boots and trousers are not [legally considered] uniform 
paraphernalia.’791  
It is remarkable that when Lindholm in 1937-38 identified uniforms as one of the most 
problematic aspects of the party image, rather than getting rid of them, the colours and design 
were changed. When on 28 October 1938, Lindholm gathered the leading party functionaries to 
explain the New Direction, he argued that ‘we have made a few mistakes. One of these mistakes is 
that we have used means and symbols which have scared off some of our countrymen 
[folkkamrater] and prevented them from joining us.’792 Apart from a change in name and most 
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crucially the party symbol, the swastika, he insisted that changing ‘certain forms of presentation is 
absolutely necessary’.793 This led to a break-away faction being formed under the leadership of SA-
functionary Nils Björkman, but Lindholm thought this was good riddance. ‘If you who leave us are 
such friends of Germany, or if you want to go dressed in uniforms so badly, that you do not wish to 
follow me in the future, you are free to go.’794 According to the police informant about two-thirds 
of the audience immediately left in silence. But in the resulting circular sent out to all members on 
1 November, notifying them of the changes, the idea of abolishing the uniform had been dropped. 
‘As you understand, sometimes the forms have to make way so that the content, the ideas, can be 
disseminated better’, but uniforms were not mentioned explicitly, and would continue to feature 
in the SSS.795 NSAP/SSS members were deeply committed to the uniform, as the Swedish and 
Dutch fascists generally were to their symbols. Only a few months earlier in the Netherlands, 
Mussert had tried to replace the party’s triangular black-red symbol as displayed on flag and 
insignia with an encircled wolfsangel, but had to compromise after an outcry from the cadres.796 
One party veteran wrote to Mussert: 
 
Leader, our Black Red flag, was to me and tens of thousands of others, everything. […] I know, that 
flag was only a symbol, but still, something has been taken away from me, and many other older 
comrades. And the emptiness has not been filled by the ‘newcomer’ by a long way yet. Us older 
ones MISS the good old Black-Red flag. […] And then my insignia, that strong, angular sign of 
honour, which as workers in the Movement. you have lent to [us]…? Must I put away my NSB-
memories and instead pin [on my clothing] this sweet round little thing [the wolf’s hook]…?797 
 
In the end Mussert had to concede that it was ‘impossible’ to be disloyal to the old symbols.798 
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 But in the end one of the most remarkable aspects of the NSAP’s and the NSB’s attitude to 
their uniforms and associated symbols during this period is how the fetishistic commitment was 
not just continuously propagandised, and demanded by members, but deliberately sustained in 
spite of all disadvantages, and ultimately through the bans integrated even further into their 
mythologies. The bans were not to be an obstacle to the continued acquisition of uniforms, whole 
or in part,799 and a uniformed show of force at meetings always remained desirable.800 The 
mythopoeic force of the uniform was pent up internally, only let out indirectly, through discursive 
reconstruction and visual representation. But in both parties’ myths, the NSB’s in particular, the 
struggle would one day conclude with a fascist victory, and that day the uniforms would appear on 
the streets of Sweden and the Netherlands again, and the fascists would march freely in their 
brown and black shirts for all to see. ‘Our faith is not in our brownshirts or our uniforms. When 
there is nothing else to attack, Social-Demokraten attacks our boots. But truly we will not for the 
sake of Social-Demokraten put on any democratic slippers to seem more peaceful. […]One day the 
working people itself will annul this curious clothing-ban.’801 The NSB promised: ‘[o]ne day the 
hour will strike, when we, bold and free in our uniforms, will march on the streets behind our 





Uniforms were a lynchpin in the symbolic order of both the NSAP and NSB, and fulfilled broadly 
the same function in both parties. They were powerful symbols and important aesthetic 
components of the external propaganda, a crucial part of the fascist myth, but their real 
importance was within the party, as an internal mobilising and integrating force. It was directly 
tied up with several key themes of the same myth of a holy army under one leader, in a fated battle 
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for the nation, and even Europe, destined to overcome its enemies. The narrative itself was trite 
for sure, but the uniform played a huge roll in allowing members to become protagonists in this 
myth. It enhanced the comportment of the wearer, and added a symbolic dimension to their very 
body, foregrounding its imagined masculinity.803  This seems to have fuelled what can only be 
termed a uniform fetishism amongst the cadres, implicitly encouraged by the leadership. Here 
some of Theweleit’s psychological insights are given more historical substance, in a cultural 
political context. The uniform was part of an integrated network of symbols that constructed the 
fascist myth in various forms, with props like flags and visual signs, and a distinct fascist corporeal 
repertoire, all being used in conjunction with clothing to further the mythopoeic project. It is 
curious to see just how similar the political culture around the uniform was in both Sweden and 
the Netherlands, underpinning a militaristic subculture of hierarchy and fantasy, more for the 
benefit of the members than propaganda. 
 The difference between the two parties was instead outsiders’ reactions, as shaped by the 
political climate stemming from the respective uniform bans. In neither case did media opinion 
seem to be particularly amenable to political uniforms, but in Sweden attitudes were far more 
relaxed towards the NSAP’s uniformed delinquency than in the Netherlands. The threat of civil 
war came up in both countries, but only the NSB faced actual rumours of coup d’états and illegal 
militia infiltration; correspondingly it also saw far more practical legal repression. In Sweden on 
the other hand, the mainstream press was quite happy to report on uniformed fascists with 
humour and light-hearted mockery, even in the left-wing press. While this made the NSAP seem 
far less dangerous than the NSB, it also severely undermined its credibility: unlike the NSB, the 
NSAP was portrayed as childish and silly, which was possibly worse than being considered 
dangerous. 
 In both cases the parties nevertheless throve of the associations of danger, violence, and 
masculine bravado that was inherent to the uniform. Marches, fights, expeditions into red 
neighbourhoods, and the carrying of weapons were a liability, but indispensable to maintaining 
the fascist myth in its fantastical dimensions. While patriotic symbols and imagery, and a 
discourse of law and order were enlisted to balance out the other associations, the fascist parties 
found themselves saddled with an awkward dilemma. The militaristic myth was essential to the 
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appeal of fascism, both to the cadres and potential newcomers, but its props and paraphernalia 
were an affront to conservative respectability, and fuelled hostile discourses which undermined 
that myth. In a way the bans against political uniforms cut the Gordian knot, as they restricted the 
uniform to the party internally, satisfying members’ desires, and guising this dubious side of the 
party from the public. But through discourse and insubordination the problem kept resurfacing 
throughout the decade. The allure of violence and power inherent to the uniform attracted and 


























4. The Spectacle: aesthetics, morale, immersion 
The centre piece of the NSAP’s and the NSB’s propaganda efforts every year was the party 
convention, the pinnacle of the party’s organisational capacities, and the greatest manifestation of 
the Movement to the public. Fascist rallies have attracted the attention of historians before, the 
NSDAP’s much-publicised Nürnberg Parteitage in particular. The fascist spectacles have been 
analysed quite extensively, with academic interest in the role of aestheticism in fascism,804 going 
back to Walter Benjamin’s The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction. A great deal of 
attention has been paid to the real political value of such performances and its imagery, rather 
than being dismissed as merely totalitarian window-dressing.805  
One angle through which such spectacle has been viewed is modernity and its 
technologies. Fascist rallies not only relied on modern technologies, but the format itself was 
symptomatic of modern mass politics. Bringing together ever larger numbers of people, in a single 
place to be ritually unified as an expression of political will was perhaps a uniquely twentieth-
century phenomenon, symptomatic of a new ‘totalitarian’ approach to politics.806 Accordingly, 
fascist parties were not the only ones to organise such political spectacles, even if theirs have been 
most deeply impressed on historical memory.807 In the Netherlands, the SDAP used mass rallies 
which symbolised the strength of the unified working class, replete with red flags and music. In 
1936 the SDAP managed to gather as many as 40 000 demonstrators in the market halls of 
Amsterdam.808 At the same time leading SDAP figures were keen to counter the fascists’ 
exploitation of myths and aesthetics to woo the working classes, developing a ‘festive culture’ to 
create a sense of socialist community.809 Nor were such spectacles, appealing to the audience 
through a heady mixture of sound, imagery, and pregnant symbolism a preserve of the rising 
socialist Left and fascist Right. In 1921, the Dutch Jesuit Jacques van Genneken founded the Grail 
movement, which controversially relied heavily on modern technologies to orchestrate ritualistic 
mass performances, as well as processions through the streets of the Southern Netherlands in 
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colourful uniforms, with battle cries, flags, and standards.810 Sweden on the other hand was not 
renowned for such modernistic spectacles; with its far more spread out population and isolated 
communities, political theatre of any kind was generally on a far smaller scale than in the 
Netherlands, with the possible exception of the famous 1913 Farmers’ March – which saw the 
involvement of fascist pioneer and sometime ally of Lindholm, Elof Eriksson.811 
Since the cultural and ‘performative turn’, the political spectacles of the interbellum have 
been analysed with the understanding that the propaganda of spectacle does not merely aim to 
deceive or blindfold its audience, but actively creates meaning, i.e. is a cultural process. Inspired 
by theatre studies since the nineteenth century, historians and other academics have connected 
performativity to theatrical concepts of direction, stage, actors, and mise-en-scène, and 
sociological discussions of ritual, as a means of furthering the understanding of political 
performances.812 One notable theorist of theatre studies who has turned to historical approaches, 
Erika Fischer-Lichte, argued that the interwar period was a time of fusion between ritual and 
theatre – looking particularly at the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany’s Thingspiel – giving rise to a 
new form of political mass spectacle that became ubiquitous in Europe.813 Ritual is here 
understood as a scripted form of symbolic communication, which reaffirms the ties between 
spectators and performers, and their joint commitment to a shared symbolic order, reifying the 
bonds of the community. Fischer-Lichte points to a crucial historical moment in the late 
Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century where research into ritual and theatre studies 
intersected,814 producing discussion of how theatre could build communities, and theatre 
techniques could be applied to ritual.815 She points to the political significance of mise-en-scène 
(Inszenierung) not just as an aesthetic criterion, manipulating how the performance is perceived, 
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but whether it is perceived as staged in the first place.816 This point about perceived authenticity 
has been picked up on by Jeffrey C. Alexander, who has also explored the interface between ritual 
and theatre, and the twin themes of authenticity and integration. The standard of ‘a performative’ 
in his reading is to be judged not by whether it is true or false, but felicitous or unfelicitous, where 
the former is perceived as authentic, the latter as artificial, i.e. the audience is ‘dis-enchanted’ and 
perceives the performance for what it is: a staged performance.817 Their theoretical framework is 
useful in the assessment of the impact of organised fascist performances, i.e. the conventions, and 
analysing the connection between the modern fascist party organisation, the myth, the 
performance itself, and the roles of actors and spectators – sometimes embodied by the same 
group. 
 Both Fischer-Lichte and Alexander rely on performativity as understood by Judith Butler, 
using her re-application of J.L. Austin’s concept to apply not to just discursive, but especially 
bodily acts.818 Butler’s work has been applied extensively in the previous chapter, but is of 
continued relevance here, as she has gone on to apply ideas of bodily performativity to politics in 
her 2015 Notes toward a performative theory of assembly. Verbalisation is the norm for expressive 
political action, but, Butler argues, acting in concert in an embodied form can challenge this 
through the plural and embodied form of assembly.819 While she specifically considers democratic 
and anti-authoritarian forms of assembly, there is no reason this notion cannot be applied to the 
politics of fascism. What her recent work highlights in this case is that there was a specific 
performativity of the collective and bodily presence of individuals, which could challenge political 
norms in unique ways. Previously William H. Sewell has argued for the significance of gathering 
large groups of people in specific spaces, to further political ends, but has rooted his analysis 
predominantly in how this collective presence changes the meaning of space, and the outlook and 
experience of participants, rather than analysing political assembly at the level of the immediate 
production of meaning, which is of primary importance for this study.820 As will be shown below, 
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bodily presence was central to the mythopoeic potential of fascist conventions, and was important 
both for how it created meaning, and its emotional impact on participants. 
This chapter will analyse the annual party conventions of the NSB and NSAP as a type of 
political spectacle that performatively constructed fascism through organised, collective, bodily 
performance. The party conventions of 1935 will be used as case studies, reconstructing their 
organisation and implementation closely to bring out their mythopoeic effects. These theatrical 
performances, manifesting the party as a unified force in action, were an unparalleled act of 
mythopoeia. This was a holistic event, where not just the actual spectacle of the political theatre 
was propaganda, but also the very act of organising it was performative, a construction of the 
strength and will of the party. At the same time the convention was an inimitable way of bringing 
otherwise isolated members together, reminding them of their greater purpose, and through 
integration reinvigorate them for future activism. In other words it was a mobilisation exercise 
which had a tremendous impact on party morale, something especially important for the widely 
scattered NSAP formations who struggled for years with few signs of progress, unlike the 
mushrooming and urbanised NSB organisation. 
 What made the conventions effective as mythopoeia was their overwhelming aesthetic 
and emotional appeal. The party organisations aimed to mobilise the party en masse, and valued 
the scale of the event perhaps more than anything else, enhancing the sense of collective 
belonging, so important for morale. The participants themselves became objects of mythopoeia, 
tools in the grandiose performance, designed to impress alternately members and outsiders. The 
nature of the spectacular was the result of the conventions’ holistic nature: close organisation and 
theatrical staging techniques, and the closely controlled and scripted nature of the performance, 
all contributed to creating a coherent narrative in which spectators and participants could be fully 
immersed. This analysis of fascist spectacle will show that, while the liturgical elements of a 
‘political religion’ were doubtlessly present, this dimension was largely ad hoc, and in service of a 
more central aesthetic register. More than anything this was a cultural event for the immediate 
physical performance of fascism, rather than the mystical worship of a transcendent principle, no 
matter how religious the rhetoric. The analysis here also goes beyond the focal point of ritual and 
theatre studies, community and social integration, to foreground the fantastical. 
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 This comparative analysis of the aesthetics of spectacle will bring out two functions of the 
Swedish and Dutch fascist conventions of 1935, but which were privileged in contrasting ways by 
the two parties. The function of rallies as propaganda is perhaps the most obvious, the other was 
as mobilisation to boost morale. For the NSB, propaganda was clearly the most important, 
something that can be linked back to the trajectory of its success, and the scale of its organisation. 
For the NSAP it was morale – the Swedish party did not enjoy the media attention of its Dutch 
counterpart, and its struggles with Swedish geography [chapter 1] made the need to reify the 
bonds between the members more acute. These two approaches to the fascist convention made 
for quite different events, which brings out the importance of the national context for the nature 
of fascist mythopoeia – both in the character of its enactment and its aims. Ultimately, this 
chapter aims to show how and why circumstances pushed the NSAP and NSB to organise two very 
different spectacles, but both of which from different angles sought to construct a fantastic 
fascism that could punch above their immediate political weight. In the general analysis of fascist 
mythopoeia and respectability, this analysis unifies the examination of specific myths, practical 
party organisation, fantasy, activism, and national contexts and political cultures, in what served 
as the definitive performance of fascism, a holistic unity through embodiment. At the same time it 
will show that no matter how spectacular, fascists were never in control of the public discourse 
about their events; even the greatest mythopoeic efforts could be unpicked. 
 
I 
When Lindholm broke away from the SNSP in January 1933, it took little time before party 
newspaper DSN announced the first NSAP party convention, the årsting.821 As fascists whose first 
direct experience of National Socialism was as guests at the August 1929 Nuremberg rally of the 
NSDAP, Lindholm and the Party Leadership had an impressive idea of what such an event could 
be like, and its importance for the movement.822 The trip had been arranged via Lindholm’s friend 
Max Pferdekämper, who as SNSP functionary was to learn from the propaganda and organisation 
of the Nazis. In 1980 he recalled the powerful impression the rally made on him: 
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And it was then a perhaps mile-long column of members [came], first and foremost SA-troops 
from different parts of the country, with their standards and flags; masses of viewers, there were 
raised tribunes on the side, there stood masses of people, and in the windows and on the roofs, and 
waving with flags, shouting and screaming. It was something altogether indescribable, something 
like that simply doesn’t happen in Sweden.823 
 
With this formative experience in mind, the NSAP set about organising its own annual party 
convention. The årsting was first held on the third and fourth of June 1933 in Gothenburg, where 
party headquarters were initially located and where fascists were most heavily concentrated in the 
country. Throughout the thirties it had a set structure. Over the course of two or three days around 
Pentecost, party members would gather for four main events: the ‘leader day’, a small scale 
meeting on the first day of the congress for functionaries, which dealt with practical matters of 
organisation and instruction; indoor party meetings focused on a series of speeches from the Party 
Leadership; an outdoor public meeting; and the uppmarsch, a ritual march through town in 
formation. These events were interspersed with a number of rituals and ceremonies, music and 
singing, while every evening was ended with a ‘comrade evening’, a festive occasion for the 
members to gather for food, drink, and entertainment.  
 It took the NSB over a year to organise its first landdag (the Dutch term for a large, 
organised gathering), which took place on 7 January 1933, in Utrecht. While Lindholm broke out of 
a pre-existing party and had a need to quickly consolidate his followers, Mussert used the first year 
of the party to lay the foundation of the organisation and establish a small following. Just like the 
NSAP’s first årsting, the first landdag was a small-scale affair to assert the presence and authority 
of the new party, to the public and to rivals, and instruct the members – a demonstration not of 
numbers, but of discipline.824 These first conventions of the NSB and NSAP were remarkably 
similar in some of the features they included, such as uniformed marches through the city, 
instructive speeches of encouragement from the Leader, and the affirmation of loyalty to his 
person. But the NSB conventions across the decade diverged from their Swedish counterpart in 
many ways. Rather than a strictly annual event, the landdag was organised whenever it was 
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deemed opportune by the leadership. Instead of lasting several days, it was always a short, 
concentrated affair, lasting from the afternoon until the late evening. Quite unlike an årsting, it 
was not a time for celebration or entertainment, leaving only a short break of about an hour for 
refreshments, while the rest of the day was typically scheduled with speeches. While a march 
through town from the railway station to the event building was always an important part of the 
convention, it never had the importance of the NSAP’s uppmarscher, and was redundant by 1936. 
Strictly speaking the last landdag of the NSB was in October 1935, after which they were replaced 
by the Hagespraak, a public open-air convention on the party’s grounds in Lunteren, on the 
Goudsberg. These Hagespraken made for a very different kind of event compared to the 
landdagen: the location of a hill-top meadow in the countryside made for a very different setting 
from the major Dutch cities, and threw up different organisational challenges.825 Their public 
character was of particular significance for these conventions, as they prohibited the wearing of 
uniforms, but also enlarged the scale of the event, as they attracted people outside of the party. 
The kind of organisation was also heavily altered to cater for this mixed public of members and 
curious outsiders. Nevertheless, the Hagespraken clearly fit in with the tradition of previous 
conventions, and retained their overall structure and ceremonial features, even if the purpose was 
rather altered. 
 In Sweden, the årsting were held once a year, bar 1936 when the party organisation 
focused on that year’s general election campaign instead. The first two were held in Gothenburg, 
but as the party’s centre of gravity shifted to the east, they were subsequently held in Stockholm. 
The two largest cities were an appropriate location not just for their size, but also because they 
were situated (very) roughly in the middle of Sweden, making the travel distance more or less fair 
for the members in the countryside. However, 1939 saw the event held for the first time in 
Sweden’s third-largest city, Malmö. This too corresponded to a geographical shift of the party’s 
propaganda and member concentration, this time focused on Scania in the south. The Malmö 
convention, or Öresundstinget as it was officially called, underlined the importance of access: for 
members in Norrland travel all the way to Malmö was virtually impossible, and a separate 
Norrlandsting had to be organised in Östersund in Midsummer. Otherwise the convention was 
held on the weekend of Pentecost, generally a popular time for these kinds of political events. 
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They were perhaps the only time of the year when people were guaranteed to have the time off 
work, and could take the time to travel to the city and be back home before Monday. Apply for the 
convention, ‘you’re free anyway’, as DSN put it.826  Additionally the weather was likely to be good, 
something of some importance for the impression the uppmarsch made. 
The NSB conventions were irregular, two in 1933, January and October, a regional 
convention in Amsterdam in 1934, another two conventions in 1935, and one Hagespraak a year at 
Pentecost in 1936-40. Plans had been made to have an urban landdag again in 1939, but this was 
cancelled due to the unavailability of extra trains; instead regional conventions were organised 
alongside the Hagespraak.827 In terms of locality there was a sharp divide between the urban 
gatherings in the major cities and the remote and difficult to access Lunteren in Gelderland. Why 
exactly Lunteren was chosen remains a matter of speculation – no relevant documents have been 
found pertaining to the party’s purchase of the land. The symbolism of ‘the centre of the 
Netherlands’ is obvious, but it was very inconvenient; by 1941 it was literally impossible to organise 
conventions there due to fuel rationing, while railway access was almost non-existent.828 The 
choice of place for the landdagen is rather self-evident: Utrecht was the place of the NSB 
headquarters, and conveniently situated within the Randstad. When the number of attendees 
grew too large to be contained by any public building in Utrecht, it moved on to Amsterdam and 
finally The Hague, the other major cities of the Randstad, easily accessible by rail from most places 
in the country. In Amsterdam it was the massive RAI-building which accommodated the event 
(also used for SDAP conventions), then in October 1935 a specially constructed tent in a field in 
The Hague outside the city centre was used, when the RAI-building also proved too small. 
 Attendance figures for the conventions are informative, and it is possible to reconstruct a 







                                                             
826
 „Du är ändå ledig under Pingsten!‟, „Upp till TINGS!‟, DSN, no 17, 26 April 1934, p. 10. 
827
 Circular, de Blocq van Scheltinga to District Leaders, Utrecht, 18 September 1939, pp. 1-2, NIOD: 123, 2.01: 
505. 
828
 Heijningen, pp. 81–83, 142–43. 
174 
 
 1933 1933 
Oct. 
1934 1935* 1935 
Oct. 
1936 1937 1938 1939 
NSAP/SSS 500 - 1700 1800 - - 2100 2300 1200 
NSB 500 5000 10 000 16 000 35 000 40 000 60 000 70 000 - 
Figure 1. Approximate numbers of attendees for the conventions according to the parties’ own sources. The 1934 figure for the 
NSB is for the regional landdag in Amsterdam, March that year. 
*The March 1935 convention in Amsterdam was held twice, as the RAI-building was not large enough, and could hold a 
maximum of 16 000 people. The NSAP convention included an additional 2-300 NU-members, bringing the total to over 2000. 
 
Comparing the figures, the most striking difference is the extremely rapid growth of the NSB 
conventions in its first years. The meteoric rise of the NSB has already been discussed, and the 
sense of mission and destiny that came with it – as well as the firm response from the authorities 
that it produced. The Dutch figures for 1936-38 need to be handled with caution, as these were 
public events attracting numerous non-party members. Moreover the figures were highly disputed, 
with wildly varying estimates depending on source. The NSB did not give a figure for 1939, only 
speaking of ‘tens of thousands’. Regardless, these were some of the largest political rallies ever 
seen in the Netherlands, and even as the NSB’s membership shrunk in the latter half of the decade, 
it still managed to get an ever-greater proportion of its cadres to attend the event.829 By 
comparison the NSAP saw an initial increase as the party grew and consolidated its organisation, 
before quickly stagnating, seeing only very modest growth until its collapse in 1939, partially 
caused by the unfortunate choice of location which effectively excluded the entire northern half of 
the country. In light of the party’s loud insistence that each convention was to be bigger and better 
than the last, the attendance in Malmö was downright humiliating, and reflected poorly on the 
‘New Direction’ of the SSS. The figures also indicate that the size of the NSAP peaked in the mid-
30s, at up to 12 000 members. The incremental growth of the årsting after that point to the 
improvements in the party apparatus in the later thirties. 1935 was in many ways a ‘year of 
consolidation’ for the party’s organisation, and the years that followed bore fruit in this regard. 
One thing that is not borne out by these figures is attendance at the adjacent public meetings, 
which were a standard part of the NSAP årsting; freely accessible, these could attract impressive 
crowds of up to 8000 people.830 Nevertheless, it is very striking that compared to the NSB, the 
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NSAP at best managed to mobilise perhaps just under a fifth of its members at the conventions, 
the NSB closer to eighty per cent. This can largely be explained by the geographical and 
infrastructural context, discussed in chapter one. 
 The enormous amount of time, money, and organisational skills that went into these 
conventions indicate their central role in the life of the movements. While the NSB and the NSAP 
had a particularly rich meeting culture, and were constantly engaged in bringing members 
together and the party to the public, these events stood out. The parties were convinced that ‘the 
best propaganda is and remains the public meetings and marches, where the people can see and 
hear themselves what the National Socialists want, and through which the lies of the Popular 
Front press fall to the ground like empty shells’,831 an explicit statement that events like these 
served to push their own idea of fascism into public discourse. 
 
II 
In 1935, it was time for Lindholm’s NSAP to demonstrate how far the fledgling movement had 
come in two years, and prove to the public and its rivals that the lindholmare were the only fascists 
in Sweden that mattered. 1935 was an eventful year for the party: the party headquarters in 
Gothenburg had been raided in February, starting a police investigation into illegal paramilitaries; 
Lindholm had been put on trial for libel as the editor-in-chief for DSN, and was sentenced to two 
months in prison, from March till May. 17 March saw the Stockholm city council elections 
[stadsfullmäktigeval], in which fascist parties increased their votes from 279 in 1931 to 6300; of 
these the NSAP accounted for just under half, the others going to SNSP and Martin Ekström’s 
National Socialist Block. To heighten the sense of change, the communists gained their first seat in 
the city council at the expense of the Social Democrats.832 By spring it was evident that the NSAP 
had managed to outgrow old and new fascist rivals, and gain a foothold in the capital, building up 
its organisation in Stockholm from scratch to a local membership of thousands, at a time when 
radical parties briefly seemed to be gaining ground. As Lindholm wrote to his followers on the 
DSN front page before going to prison, the first storm had been endured successfully, and now 
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‘[t]he time of great trials for which we have been waiting has begun’.833 It was with this sense of 
potential, new gains and new opportunities, and a gathering storm, that the Party Leadership 
decided to demonstrate the strength and mission of the movement, at the first fascist årsting ever 
to be held in Stockholm, named Sveatinget. To some extent the choice of Stockholm was a reward 
to the city branch for its success in the elections.834  
The orchestration of the third årsting of the NSAP in 1935 will be reconstructed as closely 
as possible; sadly far from all documents pertaining to this convention have survived, so it is 
necessary to also rely on materials from other ting. The third NSAP convention was particularly 
interesting, as it was held at a time when the party apparatus was being consolidated, at the same 
time as its centre of gravity shifted from west to east. Finally, on account of Lindholm’s prison 
sentence, it also shows the organisation in action without the Party Leader – judging by his diary 
entries, he did not get involved with the preparations until 27 May.835 
 Centrally the convention was organised by Gunnar Svalander, one of the most influential 
members of the leadership, who until 1936 (when he was ousted for conspiring against Lindholm) 
acted as Deputy Leader, Party Secretary, and Party Organiser: in other words he had considerable 
organisational experience.836 The årsting was first announced in DSN on 3 April, by Nils Dahlrot, 
the press chief, editor of DSN, and one of the party’s most popular speakers. His announcement of 
the first Stockholm ting started with an invocation of the experience of the previous year’s 
convention in Gothenburg, presenting readers with the myth of a classless folkgemenskap on the 
march. Notably he used the uppmarsch to evoke this myth, focusing immediately on the aesthetic 
impressions of the march. ‘It was 20 May 1934. The music resounded between the rows of houses, 
the flags were flying in the wind. But this was not a Marxist proletarian demonstration, this was 
not the bourgeois jogging procession of the Right, it was an emerging people’s movement which 
was marching forward.’837 As will be shown below, the experience of being part of such a march 
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was linked to the longing to once more tie the bonds of comradeship, and gain renewed energies 
for the struggle. Instructions for the convention were subsequently issued predominantly via DSN. 
The årsting was to start on 9 June, leaving the branch organisations less than two months 
to prepare and organise the attendees. The applications were due 25 May, but as was always the 
case, an additional week was conceded to slow members.838 The main thing that needed time was 
organising transport to the capital, which had the best railway connections in the country. 
However, long distance travel of this kind could be prohibitively expensive. Hiring extra trains to 
get formations to the city were an expense the party could not easily afford, and the party’s travel 
leaders’ organisation had to siphon off the costs to the membership. In 1934 the extra train 
between Gothenburg and Stockholm, the best connection in the country, cost 20 kronor (!) for a 
return ticket.839 By 1938 if not earlier, transport organisation was left specifically to the Circle 
Leaders, implying that local branches were too small to finance and organise travel for their 
members. Additionally it was much easier for the centre to control the few dozen Circle Leaders, 
rather than the countless local avdelningar.840 In the end twenty-seven buses were hired for the 
1935 årsting. There were also groups who travelled on the back of trucks, even if this meant 
standing up for the entire journey.841 Finally there were always a handful of members who simply 
walked the distance, even from Norrland, where the party organisation remained primitive, as did 
railway infrastructure. Beyond the details of organisation, such a journey was for some members 
simply a part of the adventure; most of the young members had never been to the big cities before 
in which the årsting were held, and to cross hundreds of miles on foot to get to the fabled event 
only added to the excitement.842 
Financing the årsting was always a challenge for the party, one which tellingly shaped the 
way it was organised. The largely decentralised organisation of transport and reliance on branch 
initiative was a reflection of the fact that the NSAP was barely equipped to handle the large sums 
that would be involved in arranging this centrally –that they in 1935 attempted but failed to hire 
extra trains is symptomatic, even though this was blamed on the state railway company.843 The 
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entry ticket for the convention itself was priced at 1 krona, slightly higher than the 75 öre at 
previous conventions, but one which virtually all members could afford, and added some 2000 
kronor to the organisers’ funds, and may well have been enough to pay for the use of Stockholm’s 
Auditorium building, the main venue. It seems the first Stockholm convention was rather more 
expensive than the party was used to, and members were encouraged to sort out accommodation 
at their own expense. Mass quarters were firstly reserved for female members, who could not be 
expected to sleep just anywhere.844 The archives do not show what other expenses the NSAP had, 
but by mid-April it was evident that the party budget could not manage both the convention and 
the impending summer propaganda campaign with members’ fees and tickets alone. Gunnar 
Svalander decided to start a short collection campaign for the party’s ‘war coffers’ (krigskassa) 
from 20 April to 20 May, using a coupon system by which the cadres could collect money from 
sympathisers; it was deemed undesirable to demand money from the members themselves, who 
were already under strain.845 
The main expense was probably hiring the various venues: apart from the main venue, 
Auditorium, the party hired the Victoria hall [Victoriasalen] for its ‘Leader day’, and three other 
smaller venues across Stockholm for minor functions on the second day. Auditorium (renamed 
Vinterpalatset in 1942), a concert- and cinema hall at the central square Norra Bantorget, and one 
of the largest buildings of its kind, could seat 1751 in its main hall, and 1952 after being rebuilt in 
the mid-20s.  
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Figure 2. Advertisement from Stockholms-Tidningen, 14 January 1914, displaying the seating arrangement in Auditorium. 
Auditorium provided an ideal space for the convention, an exciting two-tiered venue in which all 
members would be able to see the stage with ease, with its circular floor plan. The fact that the 
building was built specifically for viewing performances made it well-suited to this kind of 
political theatre. Additionally it was commonly used for public meetings by the Stockholm Local 
Group, especially when Lindholm visited. The Victoria hall by comparison was a more mundane 
building, suitable for an audience of a few hundred, but like Auditorium centrally located, on the 
picturesque Norra Tunnelgatan. For one function the party hired the house of the Christian Union 
for Young Women, another rather ordinary venue. The other venues were the Workers’ Union 
building, and lastly Manhem on Odengatan 42,846 a property owned by  Carl-Enfrid Carlberg, and 
one used extensively throughout the thirties and forties for pro-Nazi lectures and meetings.847 The 
choices of Auditorium and Manhem are obvious enough, and, in the absence of any direct 
evidence, one may wonder whether the NSAP got a good deal for using the property; Carlberg after 
all helped bankroll the movement in subsequent years. (Notably Manhem is also slightly further 
away from all the other venues – about 1.6 km from Auditorium, while the other venues were 
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between 700 m and 1.1 km away from Auditorium.) Regardless, the five venues were generally 
situated within a few hundred metres of each other, making it easy for the assembly to split up 
from the main venue and spread out to their respective functions within a quarter of an hour. 
Svalander and the other organisers then must have selected the venues firstly out of practicality, 
only secondly out of financial considerations, highlighting the importance of the årsting to the 
movement in spite of its perpetual financial problems. 
 As the ‘most important action of the year’ moved ever closer,848 DSN harangued the cadres 
to apply for the convention, emphasising the significance of the event for the party’s propaganda 
efforts, as well as promising an unforgettable personal experience; ‘[a]t least once a year you have 
to see thousands of comrades around you and march in mighty columns, once a year defy the 
howls of the enemies’, marking the event as a rite of passage.849 These mobilising messages 
underscore the mythopoeic potential of the årsting, bringing out the fantastic dimensions which 
the party leadership sought to evoke through their organisation. They also show that the 
convention as a mythopoeic spectacle was not only propaganda, but that its established mythic 
qualities were retrospectively employed to mobilise cadres and public alike. ‘It is not a small 
insider clique, which gathers in Stockholm this Pentecost, [rather] they are fighting battalions that 
march forward in the capital, to gather around their young chieftain.’850 To emphasise the point in 
later years, DSN would reprint photographs from former conventions to show readers what kind of 
spectacle they could expect. The capital was the fortress of the enemy, of capitalism and Marxism, 
but the fascists would gather in greater numbers than ever before, from all parts of the country, 
from all classes,  
 
and you yourself [Stockholm inhabitants] will be able to conclude that the newspaper press lies, 
when it claims that Lindholm’s militant organisation is a small clique, that the newspaper press 
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lies, when it claims that the NSAP consists only of school boys and offenders! Go out into the 
streets and behold the large marches on the first and second days of Pentecost.851 
 
Locals were encouraged to watch the spectacle of the marches; the convention was not just for the 
benefit of members, but also a strike in the battle for the myth and image of the party, the 
meaning of fascism in Sweden, an explicit counter-attack against the media discourse about 
fascism. In the run-up to the event, posters were put up all around the city proclaiming the event, 
announcing the time and marching route of the party. Flyers were distributed depicting the 




The busy programme for the three-day event, with its rules and regulations, were published in 
DSN. Members were encouraged to cut them out and take them with them. The first day of 
Pentecost was officially the first day of the convention, but the evening prior was the Leader Day. 
Non-functionaries were encouraged to travel to Stockholm to arrive on Saturday night. To ensure 
all formations arrived in an orderly manner, any larger groups travelling by bus or train had to 
assign a commander responsible for the party. Given that members were attending as 
representatives for their local branches (circa 130 out of 300 were represented at the convention) 
it was crucial that they were organised accordingly. To this end each branch was absolutely 
obliged to bring the venerated symbol of each formation, the standard, a crucial prop to mark the 
organisation and expansion of the movement across the country. For the two to three days each 
member was attending they had to bring their membership card, their own blanket (two if they 
were to sleep in the mass quarters), toiletries, and a bag for their own breakfast, as well as a copy 
of NSAP songs booklets and cash. Intriguingly for the overall impression the convention must have 
made, members were encouraged to dress in cheap civilian clothes [sämre civila kläder]. Wearing 
a uniform in public was of course out of the question. Within Auditorium it was permitted, and 
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the schedule left enough time for members to change if they so desired, but photographs show 
that in practice many members, apart from the leading functionaries, did not wear the full party 
uniform at these events.853 On the other hand, the party supply service noted that orders for 
equipment and accessories tended to increase quickly before the annual convention.854 
 Early on Saturday evening the first members arrived in Stockholm. Most came by bus or 
train, but some walked or cycled from Sweden’s northernmost communities within the Arctic 
Circle. Upon arrival members registered with the convention office, where they were greeted by 
Lindholm himself, who had travelled to Stockholm earlier that day with his trusted aide Per 
Dahlberg.855 Members were then directed to the sleeping quarters. At 8pm the functionaries 
gathered in the Victoria Hall. For the first time these also included local branch functionaries 
including council members and independent Section Leaders; nevertheless no more than 125 
functionaries managed to find their way to Stockholm by this time. This particular event does not 
appear to have been of much significance: after Svalander welcomed the functionaries, Lindholm 
gave guidelines for the party’s strategy in the coming year, after which the Stockholm District 
Leader Sven Rhenström chaired a discussion with the functionaries. In practice the discussion was 
very short, and local- and regional leaders had little input. DSN noted that ‘National Socialists are 
not friends of discussion’, but that the functionaries ‘think and act in the spirit of Lindholm’.856 
After a short speech on state law, the event was wrapped up with party songs. The small, private 
gathering was in no way spectacular – Lindholm himself observed in his diary merely the order of 
events and that it was ‘well-attended and with a good mood’.857 Decorations were minimal – two 
banners with guards and a large flag – and did not give the impression of a particularly ‘fascist 
space’. But as the 125 functionaries all sat politely in their chairs in the overly large Victoria Hall, 
listening to the representatives of the Party Leadership, an important function was fulfilled, that of 
reifying the bond of loyalty of the functionaries to Lindholm personally, and reinforcing his 
authority. Backed by a large yellow swastika on a blue background, the four speakers sat above the 
small group of functionaries, who were gathered at the front, intimately close. The intimacy of the 
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event, held in the convention’s atmosphere of general excitement before the opening day, may 
well have left the attendees with a renewed sense of loyalty to Lindholm.  At the same time the 
short event, that can have lasted no more than two hours, heavily underlined the hierarchical 
structure of the NSAP, the Leadership dictating to the functionaries, while the cadres were left out 
to be summoned the following day. 
 It was on Pentecost Sunday that Sveatinget truly started. Busses and trucks were still 
arriving from all over the country when Lindholm, who was staying over at a friend’s house just 
outside the city, drove in at 9am. A large audience had already gathered at Auditorium.858 People 
were arriving who had just come off the bus, others had stayed overnight in the houses and 
apartments of Stockholm party comrades, while a few hundred were walking from the mass 
quarters shared with NU on Regeringsgatan, a stone’s throw away from Auditorium, on 
Tjärhovsgatan – nearly an hour’s walk away on the other side of Stadsholmen, the central 
Stockholm island connecting the city districts.859 According to Lindholm’s diary and DSN, 1800 
party members were present in Auditorium for the opening at 10am, but this must be wrong – 
there are mentions of late groups, while just over 1800 is the total figure for the entire convention 
which DSN gives. 9-10am people entered the salon of Auditorium, occupied the seats along the 
curved walls and in the centre of the floor, and the balconies above the stage, while a band played 
marching music. Outside it was sunny, but thunder rumbled in the distance.860 
 The stage was decorated with long blue banners on either side, a swastika superimposed 
in yellow.861 Behind the centre stage was an enormous yellow flag, with a blue or red circle with a 
yellow swastika.862 All along the balcony hung coats of arms of the Swedish landscapes, from 
Lapland to Scania, mixed with various fascist symbols, swastikas and runes. By 10am the 
cylindrical domed hall was filled, not quite to capacity, with people; most in civilian clothes, some 
in uniform. Never before had so many of the NSAP gathered together. It was in fact the largest 
fascist meeting ever to take place in Sweden at this point. At 10am the band played some marching 
tunes – then, most likely to the cheerful sounds of the ‘March of the Leader’, Lindholm entered in 
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full uniform, followed by his colleagues. The audience rose, and greeted partiledaren with an 
ovation, salutes and shouts of hell Lindholm, which must have been acoustically overwhelming. 
The almost traditional fascist Leader entry, where the Leader walks between his followers who 
make a path through which he can pass, was not possible here.863 Lindholm must have used the 
front doors to make sure his entrance was not anti-climactically short, but as the floor plan shows, 
he would have had to rather awkwardly walk around the large shield-formed section of seats in 
the middle [fig. 2 and 3]. Then one of the Party Leadership, Carl A. Alfredsson, member since 1931 
(SNSP), DSN editor, District Leader for the West, and a party speaker, opened the årsting with a 
word of welcome; the exact contents of the short speech were not reported. Then followed the 
second part of the opening ceremony. To the music of Lindholm’s Friheten leve!, the massed 
standards of the party marched in, carried by members of the A-group in full uniform, while the 
audience saluted the banners. Thanks to an irate circular a few months earlier, members had 
learned to stand up when the massed standards entered, salute them as they passed, and end the 
salute the moment the standards were on the stage, and placed on the floor in front of the guards 
(this last part had caused confusion before).864 The lyrics of the song playing were a call to arms, 
proclaiming the imminent liberation of Sweden, employing imagery of marching ranks and raised 
banners, the Swedish landscape, and a youth army burning with passion in a struggle against 
bourgeois capitalist oppression.865 By all accounts the spectacle was electrifying; the militaristic 
symbols of the party joined together in formation were marched past the attendees, up the stage, 
where the uniformed guard took its place around the Leader, planting their standards on the floor. 
The Leader stood tall on the rostrum, his brown uniform contrasting with the surrounding sea of 
bright blues and yellows, all facing the audience, in an aesthetic performance of the party as a 
glorious, unified army destined for victory. The united party sat in the hall, looking up to a stage 
that showed a construction of the movement in mythic form, symbolised by the sensuous colours 
of the fabrics, the uniforms, the music, the Leader.  
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Figure 3. The NSAP salutes the massed standards at the opening of Sveatinget.. DSN, 1935: 46. 
Then Lindholm spoke to welcome the attendees to the ting, followed by another popular party 
song, Folk i gevär (A people in arms), thematically identical to Friheten leve!, but with a more anti-
Semitic emphasis, sandwiching the event opening between militaristic music dramatising the 
party struggle, while the movement found itself gathered with its leaders in the capital for the first 
time, at a politically heady time of growth and opportunity.866 The whole ceremony took a little 
over half an hour, an aesthetically intense moment which readied the audience for the drier parts 
of the årsting that followed. In Lindholm’s diary it is this first half hour which he emphasises, the 
‘heartfelt ovations, song and marching music’.867 
For the next two hours the audience was subjected to statistical and financial reports from 
the Party Organiser Gunnar Svalander and the Party Secretary L.E. Dahlin, and a speech on 
Swedish youth (marking the growing importance of NU) by S. Ahnfeldt, before a lunch break at 
12.40pm. At this point the hundreds of party functionaries that had arrived by now split up to 
attend events in the four other venues: for NU-functionaries, propagandists, independent local 
leaders, study leaders, treasurers, and women, a category of their own in the NSAP. Suffice to say 
that the convention continued with further speeches, with more song and music, until all 
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members were joined together again in Auditorium at 5.30pm, for the second spectacle of 
Sveatinget: the march. 
The 1935 convention featured two marches, one on each day of Pentecost. The first march 
was the longest, from Auditorium on Norra Bantorget to Vitabergsparken, a public park on 
Södermalm, the southern island district of Stockholm, and generally considered a socialist area. 
The second march went from Norrmalm (northern district) to Östermalmstorg, a public square 
with a less circuitous route from the venue.868 Interestingly there is one major difference between 
the marching route for the second day as described in the programme published in DSN on 29 
May, and the flyers encouraging citizens to watch the march.869 The latter includes the long, 
straight Karlavägen, a scenic avenue lined with blossoming trees at this time of the year, the 
former instead of curving north-east towards Östermalmstorg. Some sort of compromise had 
evidently been made, although none of the documents show why, and it would appear that the 
final, actual marching route was never published – a quite astounding piece of mis-organisation if 
that was the case. As the party’s 1938 rules and regulations (IF) point out, it was ultimately the 
police authorities who decided the final marching route, so that most likely a route change was 
enforced at short notice.870 The march on the first day took circa two hours, the second about one 
hour and fifteen minutes, probably to make sure that the convention could be concluded in time 
for participants to travel home in good time. 
The participants gathered on the square outside Auditorium, some 1800 NSAP-members, 
and for the first time also the NU, divided into six columns. In practice a march to the southern 
park to listen to a speech by Wilhelm Sterner, veteran speaker and Western District Leader, the 
action had high mythopoeic potential, which DSN would make the most of. In spite of the lack of 
uniforms, no one could have doubted that the marching columns festooned with blue, yellow, and 
red swastika flags, as well as NU’s ‘Odin flags’, was an army of sorts. In surviving copies of the 
party’s rules and regulations (TF), emphasis was always placed on ostentatious order and 
discipline, more important than numbers, whereby the marching columns where contrast with 
those of the Left.871 The detailed 1938 IF instructions for uppmarscher give some indication of what 
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the NSAP sought to achieve, although it does note that årsting had their own regulations.872 The 
entire marching army was led by a marching leader – in this case former SA-leader and future 
Eastern District Leader, Karl Erik Ekegren, i.e. someone with ample experience of propaganda 
marches, and presumably someone not too ‘screechy’, which IF noted should be avoided873 - a 
reminder of Judith Butler’s dictum that even speech acts are implicated in embodiment.874 
 
Every National Socialist, who has participated in one of the marches organised by the party, knows 
what a great propaganda value a well-organised [march] has. […] Since we National Socialists in all 
areas demand order and discipline, it is a matter of honour for us to order our propaganda actions of 
various sorts in such a way, that every folkkamrat who sees and hears us is impressed by the will to 
struggle, the will to victory, which suffuses each participant.875 
 
At 5.30pm the first column set in motion. 
 
There was pacing and precision, and one could see that those marching were freedom fighters. We 
understand very well that Stockholm’s capitalists and Marxist bigwigs, Jews and other parasites, 
were terrified at the sight of these columns. They could see that these people would not let 
themselves be compromised away; one could see that they knew what they wanted, that they 
marched towards a decided destination, the freedom of Sweden.876 
 
The columns, carrying a total of seventy flags representing the NSAP districts and 
branches of Sweden, marched for the next two hours following a circuitous route. At the front 
marched Lindholm and the Party Leadership. All columns marched three abreast, which made the 
columns oddly narrow, reducing the visual impact somewhat much of the time, but which would 
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also significantly lengthen the marching army, with a strong effect on the longer streets. Sveatinget 
marched south, with a route that took the army straight through Stadsholmen, the geographical 
and historic heart of StockholmHere the ranks of three filled the space neatly, while at the same 
time allowing the snaking march to uncurl to its full length all along the street. From the steeply 
elevated side streets and alleys east of Stora Nygatan onlookers would have been able to look 
down on the marching fascists. Doubtless this, and the exit from Stadsholmen onto Slussen (the 
sluice), was the thought-out climax of the march. Slussen provided an excellent vantage point 
from which to watch the procession snake along the street towards the southern district, probably 
the only point during the march from which one could see the army in its entirety. Evidently this 
part of the route was deemed good enough to repeat in its entirety at the 1937 årsting, when the 
party had clearly developed a better mise-en-scène to capture a shot of the mythic spectacle that 
the marching army created. (Evidently photographing their own spectacles was something the 






The resulting photograph displayed on DSN’s front page also gives a good idea of what the 1935 
march must have looked like. The booted fascists marched, shouting slogans and singing party 
Figure 4. The NSAP marches from Stora Nygatan onto Slussen at the 1937 convention. DSN, 1937: 38. 
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songs, marching music played, and the seventy flags flew brightly in the wind.877 Cutting through 
the old heart of the Swedish empire, towards the workers’ quarters, this was the NSAP pulling out 
all the stops in a holistic mythopoeic action, making use of the full fascist repertoire.878 This was 
intended as the ultimate manifestation of fascism in Sweden, a strong, disciplined, and unified 
army against the historical backdrop of Stadsholmen, conquering the capital and the enraged Red 
workers, a narrative unfolding right before the eyes of the public.879 A collective fantasy was being 
fulfilled in this moment. 
 
Column after column marched up, and one could see from the viewers, who by their thousands 
lined the pavements, that they were surprised. The newspaper press had not written anything 
about that freedom movement. ‘Imagine that the little Lindholm sect was this big!’ The 
Stockholmers truly got their conception of the National Socialists thoroughly corrected! After all, 
here they got to see with their own eyes that Sweden’s National Socialists are not a few hundred 
Furugårdian drunkards, but thousands of farmers and workers from all the lands of Sweden.880 
 
 The final stage of the mythopoeic march took the army into Södermalmen, taking long 
roads in a round-about way to Vitabergsparken. A public park set on a hill top, against the 
background of the imposing Sofia church, it had a natural stage with elevated places for the 
crowds to watch the meeting in the style of an amphitheatre. The army marched up the hills to the 
stage, where the speaker, Sterner, was waiting from the back of a truck draped with party flags. 
Here the standards massed in front of the speaker’s makeshift podium, making a wall of blue and 
yellow between him and the audience of circa 3000 that had already assembled.881 As a conclusion 
to this spectacle, Sterner held a speech of about one hour which attacked the evils of Bolshevism, 
in an obvious provocation of the Södermalm inhabitants, and a fitting end to the narrative that the 
march constructed. To complete the event, party speaker Ahnfeldt was attacked by two ‘Marxist’ 
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opponents, but the fight was quickly dealt with before police arrived.882 To the frustration of the 
NSAP, this was the main event of the convention dailies like the national Dagens Nyheter picked 
up on, devoting about half or the entirety of their brief reports to the fight.883 Svenska Dagbladet 
noted that ‘[t]he nazi meeting did not happen without one of the usual street disorders’.884 The day 
was closed with a ‘comrade evening’ at 9.15pm, giving the participants an opportunity to meet 
other members from all over the country and socialise, watch a recording of the previous year’s 
convention, and participate in song and music. 
 A few observations are in order about the second day’s march. Most notably this time NU 
was separated from the party, and instead the 270 or so youths gathered on Lovön, the palace 
island just outside the city. Here they were treated to an apparently downright fairy-tale-like 
speech by Lindholm, were rewarded distinctions, and had their standards consecrated by the 
Leader.885 From there on they marched back into Stockholm, past the royal Drottningholm palace, 
saluting as they went past in a sign of respect for the monarchy.  Lindholm himself was evidently 
impressed by the march, which was recorded on film,886 describing it as ‘very stylish and colourful 
with all the standards and blue shirts’. He was so inspired by the young fascists he went home to 
write a poem about them.887 The formal conclusion to the convention was Lindholm’s speech of 
little more than an hour, but it was the public meeting following the final march to 
Östermalmstorg which provided the grandiose ending befitting Sveatinget. 
 Once again the party was organised in marching columns, and in an hour and fifteen 
minutes the procession made its way through the northern district, repeating the previous day’s 
performance, but here they ran into more trouble. While the route was different, going past the 
party headquarters but avoiding Karlavägen, the same techniques were utilised. 
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Figure 5. The NSAP marches along Kungsgatan at the 1938 convention, while onlookers watch from the bridge.  
Photographer unknown. National Archives of Sweden, Marieberg, SO Lindholm’s collection, vol. 6. 
 
The long, central street was much busier than Karlavägen, with its tram lines and two-way traffic, 
which detracted a great deal from the overall impression. It did have the advantage of a large 
picturesque bridge over the middle of the street, from which crowds could view the entire train as 
it extended across the street. Unfortunately for the party, the marching columns were significantly 
marred this day by what was afterwards described as sabotage by the police. Apparently this had 
also undermined the march somewhat on Sunday, but was even worse now. Police constables 
walked along with the marching columns, which were obliged to maintain the same pace as the 
constables. However, as the police men walked at different paces, the columns ended up further 
and further apart, of a distance up to 200 m, something which seriously undercut the impression 
of a single unified army. According to the police this was so that traffic could continue to flow – 
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particularly important for the northern city area, and police had trouble handling traffic problems 
at previous NSAP conventions when spectators blocked the roads entirely.888 But as DSN bitterly 
pointed out, car drivers did not have a right to drive through marching columns. Nevertheless, in a 
show of respectability, the paper made sure to point out that they did not blame the police per se, 
but their political overlords.889 It is impossible to gather what the public really did think of the 
NSAP’s propaganda march, which greeted with straight-arm salutes and leftist spit alike.890 But 
when the convention arrived at the public square in Östermalm a crowd of some 6000 people 
gathered. The numbers were doubtlessly boosted by the location in the north-eastern districts, 
instead of the working class south, and Lindholm’s profile – ‘our greatest propaganda resource’, as 
Nils Dahlrot had called him earlier that day.891 
 The sky was clear, and the sun shone brightly on the large open space. Nils Dahlrot opened 
the meeting, then Lindholm commenced his speech, lasting an hour and a half. Unfortunately, 
after a march which already in several ways had not conformed to the NSAP’s plans, the electronic 
speaker system now turned out to be inadequate. The party leader was forced to shout his entire 
speech, in an effort to make himself heard to several thousand people on one of the largest public 
squares of Stockholm.892 DSN did not mention this defect, though it must have been obvious to 
everyone present. While Lindholm was a reasonably skilled orator, and had prior experience of 
crowds of this size, it is rather unlikely that he managed to make himself heard to the entire 
audience. The speech itself was filled with the usual fascist hobby horses, with attacks on 
capitalists, Marxists, Jews, the Social Democratic government, and democracy, and comments on 
fascist social, economic, and foreign policy. Stuffed with exclamatory statements, (the transcript is 
littered with exclamation marks, though one wonders whether that is because of Lindholm’s 
shouting), it was a rhetorically over-excited piece conveying little of substance. Nor was it meant 
to. Starting with a portrayal of the rise of the NSAP in the past two years, in the context of a 
supposedly faltering democracy, Lindholm ended the speech with an appeal to present sacrifice, 
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and the power of fascism to grasp and alter the course of Swedish history.893 In the rhetorical 
climax of the convention, Lindholm shouted: 
 
Yes – we wish to continue the history of Sweden, says the answer which resounds from the 
northern land’s fells to Öresund – from the western- to the eastern land! Yes – we wish to confess 
to the people’s will which flows in our own blood! Here we wish to found a free motherland for the 
workers, and here fight for that culture which can speak to Nordic hearts, to the people’s own 
soul!894 
 
In an idiosyncratic move, he proceeded to recite two stanzas from a poem (‘The Brooder’, 
Grubblaren) by Viktor Rydberg (1828-1895), one of Sweden’s most renowned Romantic poets.895 
One can only imagine the effect of shouting the stanzas across the crowd:896 
 
There are woven, circling in space, stars 
and thoughts, circling in human brains, 
there is woven generation, there is woven death, 
and the shape of things and the destiny of peoples. 
 
There patterns are made, shifting and bright, 
like nerve threads, quivering in desire and pain, 
but the pattern’s theme is eternally set, 
an unrelenting, ceaseless struggle for life.897 
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The poem, as Lindholm explained to his audience, compares human life to a weave spun through 
time and history, in which it is human action which forms the pattern. The interpretation linked 
the poem to core themes of fascist myth: nation, action, sacrifice, and struggle. Intriguingly this 
was not Lindholm’s own interpretation: the same stanzas are quoted by Are Waerland in his 1924 
popular philosophical tract Idealism och Materialism, and Lindholm was actually citing Waerland 
almost verbatim in his interpretation.898 (Conveniently Lindholm left out the stanza in between 
the two he recited, which emphasised the smallness of humans, and their lack of perspective in a 
nihilistic vein which is also present in Grubblaren – ‘We believe ourselves to will, even to be able 
to [act], / but are mere thread figures in the weave’.)899 Invoking the poem mythopoeically 
interweaved the party struggle with Rydberg’s epic vision of human destiny and the search for 
meaning, elevating the actions of the past two days to a cosmic stage. At the same time it lent the 
party myth as presented here a touch of the glory and respectability that clung to the national 
poet. After explaining the meaning of the poem to the NSAP, Lindholm ended his speech with a 
poem of his own, ‘The people that strikes’ [Folket som slår], a poem which was printed in full in 
DSN several weeks later: ‘We shape Your destiny, Sweden, with the powerful voice of love, / and 
sing praise of your future, from thousands of young breasts! / Fly out, our freedom flags in the 
wakeful spring of struggle - / the dawn is rising – labour’s people strike!’.900 It was, in his own words, 




As far as the NSAP organisers were concerned, Sveatinget was a success. Lindholm described a 
great mood at headquarters the following days, and DSN had enough material to celebrate the 
convention for weeks.902 The next issue on 12 June headed the front page with a grand acclamation 
of the convention, ‘[a]gainst lies and oppression’, calling it a ‘tremendous freedom demonstration 
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against the terror laws of capital-democracy’.903 Apparently hundreds of photographs had been 
taken, though only eleven of those made it into the party newspaper, as the paper’s finances did 
not permit for more to be printed.904 DSN interviewed the organisers of the event, who were 
universally pleased with the outcome. Gunnar Svalander noted drily that: ‘[t]he convention has 
been executed in a desirable fashion in its organisational aspects. It is only pleasing to note that it 
in certain cases has exceeded all of our expectations. But nothing is so good it can’t be better’.905 
The treasurer, Carl Kristern, thought the convention was the most impressive one yet, though he 
lamented that the organisation could not afford as much music as desirable. The DSN’s reporting 
is typical: simultaneously effusive in praise, portraying the event as exceedingly impressive, while 
at the same time leaving room to push members to do better. The interviews with the rank-and-
file members all spoke of the fantastic atmosphere, the great propaganda, and the invigorating 
and inspiring effect of being together with so many comrades from all over the country, an 
excellent antidote to the isolation many experienced the rest of the year.906 In a private letter from 
Svalander to District Leader Arvid Gerhardsson, who did not attend the convention, he noted that 
it was needless to say how other comrades had felt about the årsting, but one thing he could 
assure Gerhardsson. ‘Never before has the militant spirit been so powerful and never before have 
the followers given their leader greater evidence of immortal loyalty and dedication [in all 
capitals]. It would have done you well to have been among us, comrade.’907 
 In the 1980s, Lindholm said that the party’s outward activity in the second half of the 
decade largely followed a set pattern, of which årsting were one part.908 Comparing the 1935 
Sveatinget to its predecessors and successors this seems to indeed be the case, but it is important 
to note that these spectacles, as comments from the organisers imply, were not the same year-on-
year, but developed over time. As the attendance figures show, until 1939 the party managed to 
mobilise more and more members for the årsting, even while absolute party membership figures 
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declined. While the organisation failed to get an extra-train from Gothenburg in 1935, the 1937 and 
1938 conventions were both far better served by public transport.909 But the key improvement over 
the years was the improving presentation of the convention in party media. Specifically the 
photographs of the 1937-39 conventions are markedly better than those of 1933-35, paying far more 
attention to the framing of the shot, composition, and timing. In fact 1935 appears to have been 
something of a low in this regard, with the 1934 Gothenburg årsting resulting in both more 
photographs in DSN, published in a special issue, with additional artists’ representations, and 
more impressive ones. The pictures were a means for 
 
[o]ur sympathisers around the country to get an impression of the massive following, the 
conditions, and maybe also the atmosphere. And through the photographs the convention 
participants get a valuable memory of the unforgettable days of struggle, a link which will tie them 
ever closer to [their] comrades, and urge them on to new and powerful efforts.910 
 
But if the following Stockholm årsting were notable improvements on the 1935 success, this 
probably owed a great deal to repetition.911 The 1937 convention’s marching routes were almost 
identical to those of 1935,912 and only the first march of the 1938 convention took a new route 
altogether.913 In all other regards the proceedings followed a nearly identical structure and order to 
those of 1935, so that in some ways Sveatinget was trend-setting for the rest of the decade. This was 
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When in October 1935, the Dutch landdag in The Hague began, the NSB already had an 
exhilarating year behind it. Membership had been growing steadily, if not quite as fast as in the 
two years before then, and the convention in March, in Amsterdam, had been a resounding 
success – in fact it claimed to be the largest political convention of its kind in the Netherlands ever. 
Even more beneficial for the confidence of the young movement were the results of the Provincial 
Elections in May that year, which rewarded the NSB with 7.94% of the vote, an unprecedented 
first time result for a new party, confirming all the hopes of the leadership. At the end of the 
month, Mussert undertook his famous journey to the Dutch Indies, staged to elevate the Leader in 
the eyes of his followers. It was also a time of reflection for the party, as the Leadership conferred 
what steps to take next, to ensure continued growth and the hoped for seizure of power. The 
image of the party was at stake here. The NSB was at this point under heavy attack from the party-
political press.914 It was heavily associated, by much of the public but also many members, with the 
Italian and German regimes, just when public opinion was turning against these countries. In 
Germany the previous year’s Operation Hummingbird massacre of the SA disillusioned much of 
respectable opinion, while the Kirchenkampf unified confessional opinion against fascism.915 As 
the convention speeches were prepared, the Catholic District Leader d’Ansembourg wrote to 
Mussert that it was crucial to show at this point that the NSB did not just go along with everything 
that happened in Germany.916 At the same time, the positive reputation which Mussolini had 
enjoyed in the Netherlands in the late twenties was taking a turn for the worse,917 particularly as 
the Colijn government struggled to respond to the controversial invasion of Abyssinia.918 By 1935, 
in contrast to the NSAP’s trajectory in the same period, the composition of the NSB membership 
was changing ideologically, reflected in increasingly explicit anti-Semitism, as more Germanophile 
fascists started to join the cadres.919 Internally, the Leadership was pondering how to mobilise the 
membership more effectively, worrying that the expanding party bureaucracy was stifling 
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enthusiasm [chapter 1].920 In summary, while the May elections had confirmed the party’s 
remarkable growth, it was also running up against more and more obstacles and uncertainties; 
here too, as in Sweden, a creeping sense of crisis set the tune for the fourth national convention of 
the NSB. 
 In the summer, planning for the next landdag started at Headquarters in Utrecht. This 
meeting provides some interesting insights into how the event was shaped early on. Some of the 
present District Leaders (Limburg, Groningen, Friesland) reported that the attendees of the 
previous convention in Amsterdam were enthusiastic and satisfied with the event, although one, 
Bakker, thought that one convention per year was enough. However, the General Secretary and 
Deputy Leader, Van Geelkerken, had the impression that some attendees did not like the massive 
scale of the Amsterdam convention. It lacked the intimacy of previous events, and some had left 
complaints. But, Van Geelkerken noted, ‘the members forget, that the convention is held to make 
an impression to the outside’, not for the benefit of the participants. Mussert agreed: ‘[t]he 
massive character of the convention is necessary to show to the outside world how strong our 
Movement is, while the necessity is also felt to bring members, who live far away, amidst their 
comrades for once’.921 The initial date suggested by Van Geelkerken was 31 August, to coincide with 
the Queen’s birthday, but Mussert argued for the autumn, so that it could re-mobilise members 
after the lax summer period. A date was not decided on yet, but most likely it was the extra weeks 
required for the building of a tent which ultimately placed the date in October. In a foreboding 
comment, Mussert said that: ‘[h]olding a convention in October is, with an eye on the season, not 
feasible. [Even] if we were to do so in September, we would need to be lucky to get dry weather’.922 
 Later that same month the Centrale Inlichtingendienst (CI, Central Intelligence Service) 
reported to the government that the NSB leadership was planning on organising a convention in a 
field on the outskirts of The Hague, to be held in the beginning of October. For the event a colossal 
tent would be imported from Köln, to be constructed under the supervision of a German engineer. 
One hundred WA-members would be recruited to build the edifice in a work camp, over the 
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course of approximately one month.923 Requiring thirty train carriages to transport the tent 
materials, the final result would be 160 x 125m, 9000m², with seating space for 35 000 people. Two 
45m towers connected by a bridge would give the guards an overview of the entire terrain. The 
initial location did not work out for reasons not apparent from the documents, while the request 
to hire a second location from the city council was rejected.924 The third option ended up being an 
hour’s walk from the railway stations, meaning attendees were going to have to make their way 
back from the landdag late at night, in the dark. Located in the Escamppolder of Loosduinen, a 
meadow in ‘s-Gravenhage, provisions for clean water and electricity would also need to be 
installed at considerable expense. In the following years these problems were circumvented by 
purchasing the Goudsberg ground in Lunteren for the Hagespraken. 
The same organiser of the previous landdagen, Jacob de Vries, was in charge of 
organisation, assisted by Johannis Sandberg. The Circle Leaders were in charge of collecting the 
funds, and recruiting members to attend the rally.925 Documents from the district party 
administration of Limburg & North Brabant show detailed plans were made to ensure all outward 
aspects of the convention did not only proceed smoothly, but with militaristic discipline. Nothing 
could be left to chance. Headquarters issued instructions to the branches which insisted that ‘[i]t 
is for us fascists of the greatest importance, that the travel by extra-train and the marching 
through The Hague happens with the most consummate order and regularity’.926 Circle- and 
Group Leaders were instructed on how to lead their subordinates to the trains, signs were made to 
identify each Circle and their train carriages, a precise marching order was assigned, groups were 
to march in ranks of four, the trains to be entered from front to back, signs held at a specific height, 
and so forth. A veritable hierarchy of train-leaders was created, with insignia designed for the 
purpose (a black band with a train wheel). The NSB landdag was remarkable for the centralisation 
of its organisation, and the micromanagement of the branches from Utrecht, not just in 
comparison to the NSAP’s Sveating but in its own right. Circulars for other NSB conventions show 
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that this was by no means unusual; instructions detailed to the point of confusion, complete with 
images and diagrams, seem to have been the norm.927 
This level of organisation required a great deal more financial muscle than the NSAP could 
ever manage – especially considering that the NSB had already organised a convention that year, 
and run an election campaign. The fact that, instead of holding the convention over the course of 
two or three days, it was all done in one created its own costs and challenges. The single greatest 
expenditure was the extra trains which this required – the NSB could not afford for buses and the 
like to turn up late as they did at Sveatinget. There was very limited local organisation of transport 
to the convention; instead Mussert himself ensured that there were extra trains for the entire 
country to bring the tens of thousands of members to The Hague and back in one day. The bill 
from the Dutch Railway Service came to f 33 290.45, but was easily covered by the tens of 
thousands of travellers.928 It also made train travel much cheaper compared to that of the Swedes. 
Whereas extra-trains in Sweden could cost as much as 20 kr, the Hague convention tickets, which 
also served as train tickets, cost f 1.25-2.50. The administration divided the country into five zones 
– the closer members lived to The Hague the more expensive the tickets, as a means of subsidising 
those further away.929 It was an excellent arrangement, but it did require conventions to be held 
during low-travel seasons, and within the Randstad; when the Hagespraken were held during 
Pentecost in rural Gelderland, the railway services could not only not provide extra-trains, but 
discouraged the NSB from using the services at all.930 
Actually getting the members to The Hague was left to the Block Leaders, under the 
supervision of the Circle Leaders. Mussert ordered the Circle Leaders to ensure at least two-thirds 
of the members were present – a rather more dictatorial approach to recruitment than the NSAP 
ever attempted – and they were to personally take charge of the party apparatus to achieve this 
goal.931 Surviving functionary reports show that landdag-representatives were assigned to the 
branches, to ensure that sufficient members were recruited.932 Within the branches, these 
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representatives also sent circulars to mobilise the cadres: ‘every “WAPENSCHOUW” [military 
review] of the movement is a mighty Monument, in which we, in sight of the entire people, show 
our determined will to, in spite of all resistance, as the Leader said: “win the soul of the Dutch 
People” for the National Socialist idea’.933 Block Leaders subsequently walked the neighbourhoods 
and sold the tickets door-to-door; evidently a very effective method. The first announcement of 
the convention in VoVa was on 10 August, and the tickets went on sale 12 August.934 
To further encourage attendance VoVa, like DSN, periodically published articles to inspire 
members. On 17 August it promised a ‘massive march’ to the landdag, and in subsequent weeks 
articles describing the elaborate and impressive preparations of the tent were printed, offering 
members a look behind the scenes.935 These were alternated with circulars from Headquarters, 
emphasising the absolute importance of the convention, not just as propaganda, but for the future 
of the movement, and by extension the nation. ‘This Landdag will be an event in the Netherlands, 
which does not know its equal. The Landdag will leave a mark on the Netherlands of 1935, which 
will experience how a will has come forth from the Dutch people, to escape from a regent-regime 
which threatens to suffocate this people.’936 It was promised that everyone would be able to see 
the speaker’s podium this time.937 The stated purpose of the convention according to one circular 
from the party’s Central Election Bureau was to awaken that part of the people that is not yet 
aware that the NSB is on the march to power. To encourage a maximum number of participants, 
the party Film Service did a report on the building of the tent at the work camp, (‘Behind the 
Screens of our 4th General Landdag): ‘[f]or those who currently still hesitate, seeing this film will 
help them make up their mind, while it will encourage others to bring more interested parties to 
The HAGUE.’938 
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The tent was itself an attraction. It cost the NSB f 3414.66, arranged by the firm L. 
Stromeyer & Co from Konstanz, which specialised in these kinds of textile and wood 
constructions.939 It would be a feat of engineering, and allow the NSB to hold the largest private 
political landdag in the Netherlands ever, if not the largest rally as such. Building the tent took 
weeks. The work camp at the Leyweg recruited unemployed NSB-members and WA-members, 200 
in total according camp documents, and between 65 and 175 at the same time, depending on the 
workload.940 The construction was a propaganda effort, a sign of the party’s dedication to honest 
work and a respectable manifestation of fascist order and discipline. Sadly for the NSB, this effort 
badly backfired when the Dutch autumn climate made itself felt a little more than usual – as 
Mussert had predicted months earlier. 
On 19 September the organiser, de Vries, wrote to Mussert to inform him that constant 
rain had made the field exceedingly soggy, which forced the workers to labour in the mud. The city 
authorities managed to drain the waters enough to make conditions bearable, and even in the 
storm that followed the ‘spirit among the comrades [was] excellent’, but there was a silent longing 
that the Leader would visit them and eat with them at least once before the landdag. ‘This would 
mean more to them, than speeches and tokens of gratitude.’941 Then disaster struck as a second 
storm completely destroyed the tent, requiring the entire event to be postponed by one week, to 12 
October [figure 6]. 
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To compound the embarrassment of fascists trying to build a hubristically large tent in a soggy 
field in Holland during autumn, mutiny followed on the night of 3-4 October. Workers prevented 
the camp authorities from calling headquarters, there were instances of vandalism, and the head 
guard was beaten up. Most of the WA-guards had joined the mutineers. Police and gendarmerie 
had to be called in, until the situation was defused by Van Geelkerken. Parts of the workforce had 
to be evicted from the camp.942 Apparently the trigger for the mutiny was Mussert himself, who 
was scheduled to visit the camp to raise morale, but cancelled on account of a cold. In an 
extensive disciplinary investigation into the mutiny which took the rest of the year, it came to 
light that workers were unhappy with the poor living conditions, arduous working hours, lack of 
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decent uniforms or boots, and perhaps above all the incompetent and antagonising camp 
leaders.943 Needless to say, the mutiny was widely reported on in the press, which rather 
undermined the propaganda value of the work camp, although it seems some of the worst 
incidents remained a secret to all except the CI.944 The fact that the workers were recruits from the 
WA, supposedly a model of discipline, made the whole episode even more embarrassing. ‘The W.A. 
stands and falls with discipline; without discipline no guard, no troop, no banner. Discipline can 
only be maintained in a group when it is in extremis ensured that a given order is followed 
unconditionally by every man’, as a reprimanding circular to all WA-commanders put it.945 An 
appeal had to be made to the cadres for further donations, so that the extra costs could be 
covered.946 
 The tent and the mutiny were doubtless the biggest headaches for the organisers, but 
there were other difficulties as well. While holding the landdag on a Saturday made good sense in 
terms of members’ availability, the scheduled closing of the convention late at night offended 
Calvinist members. The Ĳmuiden Circle wrote to de Vries, complaining that it ended far too late, 
and reminded him that ‘the press, especially the Christian press, would probably exploit it as 
desecration of the Sunday, and use it as evidence for their readers that the N.S.B. is not all that 
concerned with the veneration of the Sunday.947 This was an issue that had already been raised 
previously in regard to NSB marches on Sundays, ‘a stone of offence’.948 Specific requests were 
made for the convention to be over at 10pm, so that no one would be forced to travel past 
midnight, but the final schedule shows that the organisers did not meet this demand.949 It was the 
kind of issue that holding the later Hagespraken on the second day of Pentecost avoided, except 
then the organisers ended up on the wrong side of the Catholic members, who had nowhere to 
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hear Mass in the Reformed community of Lunteren, and had to make special arrangements in 
neighbouring towns like Ede and Barneveld.950 The demands of Dutch confessional respectability 




The obstacles that the Hague convention threw in the organisers’ path were ultimately 
surmountable for the quite large and experienced party apparatus, and on 12 October the landdag 
could go ahead. VoVa had been subjecting its readers with landdag-related material for weeks, 
with articles, drawings, instructions, and poetry, and now they could finally experience the highly 
anticipated spectacle that had been promised.951 Nor was it just the party that got to enjoy the 
event: more than a dozen newspapers, including all the major national dailies (bar Het Volk), had 
been invited to attend the convention, to ensure that they could report on it accurately and in 
their own words to their readers. Such invitations have survived for the landdag in Amsterdam 
earlier that year, but it is also evident that papers like the NRC, Algemeen Handelsblad, De 
Standaard, De Telegraaf, and De Maasbode all accepted for the fourth General Landdag.952 Where 
Sveatinget was above all a mobilisation action with a Stockholm public, the fourth Algemeene 
Landdag was a propaganda event, principally staged for the benefit of the national public. With 
this in mind, the transition to the all-public Hagespraken was a natural one for the NSB. 
 As a silver lining to the postponement of the landdag, 12 October 1935 was a clear and 
sunny day. The performance started immediately when the first trains arrived at 3pm at the twin 
Hague railway stations. A crowd had already gathered at the stations, aware that something major 
was afoot.953 ‘From the North and from the South, from all social strata, from all social ranks and 
professions, the pioneers of a new volksgemeenschap are come together.’954 Photographers and film 
cameras were ready to document the arrival of the participants. As they arrived, they were 
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immediately assembled by station and Circle, for the public march to Loosduinen. Thus long twin 
columns where formed, one from the HSM station, and one from the SS-station (closed since 
1973).955 The precise route that had been planned out has not survived, but from the station to the 
Leyweg is a fairly straightforward route, just under 5.5 km. Under ordinary circumstances such a 
march would have taken a little over an hour, but with more than 30 000 participants it was 
expected to take until right before the official opening of the convention, at 7.25pm.956 
 The march itself was, in spite of its impressive size, not quite the fantastic spectacle that 
the organisers might have hoped for, although it was an improvement on the previous landdag 
march in Amsterdam, when participants were forced to roll up national flags in what was 
described as a walk of shame [chapter 3]. The mayor of ‘s-Gravenhage had imposed considerable 
restrictions on the procession, on the basis that the NSB was on the list of dangerous revolutionary 
organisations. The police directed the members to their places on arrival, and they were only 
allowed to march on the condition that ‘the aforementioned participants are not allowed to form 
speaking choirs, not allowed to sing, not allowed to play music, no banners and signs with slogans 
and no flags, with the exception of national flags’.957 Combined with the lack of any (visible) 
uniforms the whole procession had a distinctly bourgeois appearance, not least with the marching 
leaders in long winter coats and Homburg and Fedora hats. Apart from Mussert’s characteristic 
military-style jacket, only Van Geelkerken seemed to have tried constructing some sort of semi-
uniform for the march, with a wide waist belt and shoulder strap, and shiny leather boots peeping 
out underneath his long coat. The white shirt rather undercut the whole impression however, 
making him look quite peculiar [figure 7].  
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Figure 7. The march leaders, with Van Geelkerken on the far-right. Note the triangular signs denoting Circle groups. 
             Het Landdag Gedenkboek, 1935. 
 
VoVa ultimately opted to describe it as ‘an impressive procession of workers, for whom the streets 
had been kept free’.958 If, apart from the sheer numbers, the march was not spectacular, at least it 
was thoroughly respectable, something much commented on in the conservative press, which 
admired the order and discipline of the organisation, and the lack of unrest that accompanied this 
performative demonstration of the NSB.959 A VoVa poem about the march exploited this 
impression, contrasting it with the image of the uncouth left-wing protesters that lined the streets, 
the real threat in the royal residence of The Hague.960 In a reminder of the international context in 
which the NSB was viewed by the Dutch public, the procession was occasionally harassed with 
cries of ‘Abyssinia!’.961 Quite unlike the NSAP’s uppmarscher, what this march had in numbers, it 
lacked in style, with very few parts of the fascist mythopoeic repertoire being enacted. But then, 
the real spectacle was going to be in the giant tent, carefully staged in a controlled environment 
away from undisciplined and critical spectators, with no room for the spontaneous. (There is an 
interesting echo here of Fischer-Lichte’s description of nineteenth-century theatre laws which 
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sought to eliminate the uncertainty of audience interaction from the performance – rowdy 
audiences were a nuisance to be eliminated, and the emphasis was placed on quiet and emphatic 
watching.)962 
 As the procession entered the Leyweg just before seven it had become dark, so that the 
marchers could from a distance see glowing letters at the entrance of the convention terrain, 
spelling out HOU ZEE, ‘as a symbol of our radiant self-confidence, our hope for the future of the 
entire Dutch people’.963 At the entrance the two columns split, and then divided into sixteen 
groups to be seated in designated places in the tent.964 All NSB reports proudly mention how 
smoothly this occurred, and the detailed organisation that was required. It would seem that the 
NSB realised that organisation itself had mythopoeic potential. The tent was impressive. It created 
a majestic space, well-lit and festooned with endless rows of vertically suspended orange-white-
blue flags. The stage was painted in black and orange, with an enormous golden rampant lion as 
backdrop for the rostrum. A special podium had been constructed for the music band, orchestra, 
and women’s choir. 
 
Figure 8. The tent on the inside as the landdag is about to begin. Note the wide central aisle.  
Het Landdag Gedenkboek, 1935. 
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 At 7.25pm Van Geelkerken opened the landdag. The audience could follow the 
proceedings in their programme booklets, a high quality production (in marked contrast to the 
cheap and flimsy booklets the NSAP used) of fifty pages, illustrated, and consisting mostly of 
advertisements.965 After ten minutes, Mussert entered. Here the large central aisle between the 
seats allowed the Leider to, now in an all-black uniform with the obligatory belt and shoulder strap, 
walk amongst his followers, saluting them as they thronged around him [figure 8]. The contrast 
with Stockholm’s Auditorium is intriguing: the seating must have been purposefully arranged to 
set the stage for this fascist ritual. In other words the mise-en-scène had deliberately excluded a 
vast expanse of central seating that would have made the proceedings easier to see for the actual 
audience, for the sake of enacting aesthetically appealing and dramatic rituals, but paradoxically 
not necessarily ones observable to the spectators. Afterwards it was reported that some members 
were disappointed that they had not been able to see or hear enough of what was going on – but 
as propaganda it was a success.966 It was a striking illustration of the priorities of the landdag: 
outward propaganda first, morale and mobilisation second. Subsequently the audience listened to 
two short speeches, one by the dour volkse Calvinist E.J. Roskam on the idea of the Leader and the 
Dietse state, one by d’Ansembourg on Church and State.967 In less than an hour since Mussert’s 
entry, it was time for the next ritual: the oath-taking ceremony. 
 Six-thousand new members of the NSB swore their oath to the Leader, in an impressive 
demonstration of the growing strength of the movement. More than two months before, the head 
of Department I (Organisation and Statistics) had informed all districts and branches that it was 
Mussert’s wish that several thousand new members would swear their oath to him personally at 
the next landdag. It was a striking use of physical bodies as a ritual resource, a mass imbued with 
fascist symbolism.968 Consequently, from 1 August all new members were prohibited from taking 
the customary oath, so that these could happen during this ceremony instead. ‘It is not necessary 
to tell you, that this massive oath-taking during the Landdag must be entirely successful and leave 
a grand impression on everyone present. Each administrative functionary must therefore do 
everything possible to make sure that no available member will miss this unforgettable 
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solemnity.’969 VoVa reported on the ceremony in its special landdag issue with great detail, giving 
Mussert’s dramatic speech to the new members in full. Mussert embodied the priest-figure in this 
baptismal ritual, bathed in a patriotic orange light while looking down on this new addition to his 
growing army, presumably occupying the tent’s central aisle which led up to his pulpit. 
Aesthetically it was a composition which fused a heady mixture of elements that constructed him 
simultaneously as fascist Leader, priest, general, and patriot, framed by the myriad national flags, 
highlighting the connection between national, and party destiny. Mussert spoke: 
 
History will elevate you to [be] saviours of our People and of our Fatherland [ons Volk en ons 
Vaderland], if you accept your part in the battle. Then may this hour remain in your memory for as 
long as you live, and may you at the end of your days remember with satisfaction the deed, which 
you perform today. Your people calls you, you report, and the N.S.B. accepts you. God be with 
you.970 
 
After the Leader had brought out the transcendant significance of this moment in time, the 
anticipatory atmosphere was built up further as music started to play; photographs suggest the 
lights were dimmed.971 As the tens of thousands of spectators watched in complete silence, the six-
thousand initiates answered the Leader ‘with a thunderous “Yes!”’, arms raised in salute. The 
women’s choir hummed the national anthem, again punctuating the national importance of the 
consecration. 
 
The solemnity with which our General Leader took the oaths of six-thousand new members, after a 
speech which made a profound impression not just for the way in which it was formulated, but 
which more than ever made the National Socialist sense of reality shine brightly, formed without a 
doubt one of the pinnacles of the Landdag. For it was not only a call [appèl] for these six-thousand 
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men, standing with raised arm before their leader in the cleared space around the podium… It was 
also a call for the entire N.S.B.972 
 
To further mark the occasion the following part of the schedule was dedicated to the collective 
singing of party songs, in what must have been an elated atmosphere after the tension of the 
grandiose liturgy; an outburst of joyful and triumphant music after the pressure of a carefully 
directed performance. The organisation made sure to use this opportune moment to also collect 
funds for the party.973 This was one of the twin pinnacles of the landdag – the other would follow 
after the break. 
 Thanks to a system by which coupons had been sold in advance for 15 cents, attendees 
could quickly get their food and drink without delay, and all 35 000 people were processed 
without any hiccups. Even Het Volk wrote that this part of the convention went smoothly, if only 
mockingly to cast aspersions on the rest of it.974 The three hundred or so toilets that were installed 
just outside the tent seem to also have done their job.975 It is a point of interest that only one hour 
had been assigned for the break. The attendees had little time to socialise; getting food and drink, 
using the toilet, and maybe buying something at the Nenasu stall would really have been all 
members had time for in the throng – a sharp contrast with the ‘comrade evenings’ of the NSAP.  
 At 10pm everyone was seated again, for another indispensable fascist ritual: the 
paramilitary procession. This event had been prepared and practised months in advance; since 
August WA-commanders had been drilling the rank-and-file for this moment, under the oversight 
of WA-leader J. Hogewind. The WA assembled in ranks of eight – something that proved to be a 
challenge as most troops had not done this before – carrying signs to denote their company. Six 
different ‘model marches’ were to be performed. The instructions were an instance of painstaking 
military discipline, detailing the precise positions of the fingers, angling of the head, arm 
movements, etc.976 Diagrams were provided.977 The whole performance was quite challenging for 
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the actors, not least as many of the WA-companies did not have much space or opportunity to 
actually practise this style of marching.978  
On the day, at the given sign, the WA-drums and horns started to play, and the 1200 fully-
uniformed men entered the tent through the south entrance. For this moment Mussert was 
standing on a central podium from which he watched his troops, with Hogewind at his side. The 
audience applauded and cheered; with thumping steps the jackbooted WA marched past the 
Leader up to the north side, and turned around the corner to fully circle the platform. On account 
of the muddy soil that had been caused by the poor weather of previous weeks, wooden boards 
had been placed all over the ground. With evident satisfaction VoVa reported how this made the 
WA’s leather boots resound all the louder as they marched, a fetishistic detail repeated by the 
commemorative Landdag Gedenkboek.979 Admiringly the VoVa report described the uniforms, 
stature, and appearance of the paramilitaries.980 As they crossed the centre again, the music 
players separated from the rest of the group, before the whole army came to a halt as indicated by 
the jaloneur – an easy way of directing even inexperienced troops981 – between Mussert’s platform 
and the front stage on the west side. That way the whole procession, spectacularly outfitted in 
flawless black uniforms, with striking black-and-red standards, was arranged to be facing both 
Mussert and the audience simultaneously.982 Finally at the very end came the WA camp workers 
and cooks in their own attire, carrying the tools of their trade over their shoulder, taking up 
position at the far back. According to VoVa the spectators watched the performance with great 
enthusiasm, in a ‘spirit of young heroism’.983 It was perhaps the most well-prepared and militaristic 
NSB performance yet, for a colossal crowd including film cameras and journalists, an ostentatious 
demonstration of fascist organisation and discipline, unity and loyalty, and of power. The more 
sinister implications of this mythopoeic spectacle could not have been lost on the audience: here 
was the NSB with an army of its own, a disciplined force of real, uniformed soldiers, absolutely 
loyal to their Leader who promised a rapid seizure of power. Given the ubiquity of propaganda 
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images from Nazi Germany, displaying precisely these kinds of ranked ‘black soldiers’, the 
association must have been inevitable. The very bodies of the WA-men were symbolic,984 the 
marriage of masculine body and black uniform infusing their very presence with a mythopoeic 
potential, their every movement a promise and a threat of power and violence, of war. 
 Now, with Mussert in the middle of the tent, the audience on one side, and his 
paramilitary army on the other, he started his speech which would conclude the landdag. It went 
on for well over an hour, (dashing any hopes that Reformed attendees would get home before 
midnight), using his return from the East Indies and the unexpected rise of the NSB which defied 
all expectations, symbolised by the arduous landdag preparations, as a starting point. Then 
followed a rather dry account of the political chaos and decline of the Netherlands and the 
incompetence of its governments, before offering a solution to these problems, and the coming 
task of the Movement. Aspects of the somewhat generic speech were reminiscent of Lindholm’s a 
few months earlier. ‘Great things are afoot; we feel the greatness of this time and our own 
insignificance, but also our responsibility and our determination and our faith, that we will be 
shown the way, if we take the truth and love for God and our neighbours as a guide line for our 
thinking and our actions.’985 His last words for the audience were a pious encouragement to work 
harder for the Movement, closing with the words of William of Orange from the national anthem. 
 
But you workers, carriers of the Movement, you are also the protectors of the future of your people. 
Nothing may stop you from fulfilling your duty. Work and pray, and may God give us the power to 
lead our people out of its great distress [nood]. ‘Loyal to the Fatherland, I remain unto death.’986 
 
The speech was interrupted on numerous occasions by more or less spontaneous applause, and 
shouts of agreement from the audience. With the final thunderous ovation, the fourth Algemeene 
Landdag was at an end, and the tens of thousands of members made their way to the railway 
stations in the moonlit night. Apparently there were still some members of the public out to watch 
the procession back, but no particular efforts appear to have been made for this occasion. 
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According to VoVa, everyone returned with an invisible bond, that this farewell was the promise of 




Unlike the Swedish 1935 convention, the Algemeene Landdag was subject to close media scrutiny, 
making a different kind of analysis possible. The aftermath of this grandiose political theatre, of a 
scale and type the Netherlands was hardly accustomed to, emphasises two points. Firstly, the NSB 
had managed to largely fulfil the goal of creating a spectacle that made a lasting impression on the 
audience, directly and through the media. Secondly, the mythopoeic qualities of the spectacle 
were effective, but volatile – some were interpreted precisely as the party could have wanted, 
others backfired badly. There is no such thing as a homogenous audience, especially not in the 
Netherlands.988 Ultimately, in spite of the Leadership’s priorities, the landdag may well have been 
more effective as an exercise in morale and mobilisation than propaganda. 
 Most remarked on was the orderly march from the train station through the city to the 
tent, bringing out the performative qualities of organisation, in a way that gave the movement an 
aura of respectability, and was an antidote against accusations of political dilettantism.989 The 
confessional dailies were invariably concerned with law and order and obedience to authorities in 
their reports, and could record with satisfaction that the march took place virtually ‘without 
incident’ – only three troublesome communists needed to be arrested. Catholic De Maasbode 
noted the military-style marching in ranks of four from the train station, and described in detail 
the extensive organisation to it readers.990 Local newspaper De Haagsche Courant took a similar 
approach to its report on the convention. Orthodox Calvinist De Standaard noted that, apart from 
the ‘understandable’ mutiny at the work camp, organisation was good.991 There were also some 
hints that these outsider newspapers were impressed with the spectacle: Catholic De Tijd wrote 
how ‘[a]cross these paths thousands went from all parts of our land – 35 000 men and women in 
total – to the central point: a tent, so gigantic in dimensions as one has never seen in our country 
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before.’992 Evidently impressed the article continued to describe how the crowds chanted ‘Hou Zee’ 
in a ‘thunderous choir’ while Mussert ascended the podium, until he, underneath the image of the 
great golden Dutch lion, greeted his devotees.993 
 Outsiders were by no means insensitive to the spectacle, and there is ample evidence that 
the ostentatiously detailed organisation of the event made an impact, but it is also clear that little 
of this was taken at face value, and that none of the major dailies cared to emulate VoVa’s 
rapturous discourse. While all approved of the orderliness of the event, there were hints of 
dissatisfaction that such a large police force was required in the first place. De Standaard 
remarked snidely that ‘[t]hanks to the cooperation of the authorities and organs of the democratic 
state, which the N.S.B. intensely hates and undermines, the participants arrived safely on the 
terrain’,994 while SDAP paper Het Volk noted how the large police force and gendarmerie ensured 
the complete isolation of the Nazis from their surroundings, hinting at their social-political 
isolation as well. ‘Once the Congress visitors were on the terrain … there were no signs left in the 
city, that there at the Leyweg the gentleman Mussert and his compatriots celebrated a rather bleak 
party.’995 
 The report from the predictably hostile Het Volk shows that a positive predisposition 
towards the mass rally was required to read the spectacle the way the NSB intended it to be. Of 
course the organisers were not so foolish as to invite Het Volk reporters to the convention, but this 
did not prevent them from sneaking in. Their report revealed some distinctly farcical elements to 
the rally. Inspecting the tent during the break, apart from catering arrangements, the reporters 
also noticed the floor boards that had been required. These proved to be rather insufficient 
however, so that people were at constant risk of putting their feet in the mud. The secret reporters 
themselves ended up covered in filth up to the knees by the end of the night. Moreover: 
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We saw the Convention in the way the majority of the 35 000 present must have seen it: a forest of 
hundreds of posts, stretching into an unspecified distance, garlands of little lamps, metres of flag 
fabric, and somewhere, very far away, a brightly lit orange spot: that would be the podium…….. […] 
There was nothing to see. Mussert could appear and disappear, we didn’t see him. … yes, six-
thousand members could be taking an oath, without any one of us even catching the slightest 
glimpse of what appeared in the beacons.996 
 
Yet, Het Volk continued, this did not prevent their fascist neighbours from shouting and crying 
with zealous enthusiasm at the spectacle which they could not see any better. The reactions of the 
fascist audience was in fact one of the things that most baffled and alienated outsiders. De 
Standaard in particular found it ‘peculiar’ how the participants invariably required only a raising 
of the voice and a bit of rhetorical bombast before breaking out into applause and hou zee-chants. 
Judging Mussert’s speech demagogical nonsense, De Standaard figured that ‘any good speaker 
could get an equally powerful applause out of this ignorant public, if he directly after Mussert had 
proclaimed the precise opposite’.997 ‘That that freethinking part of the population without 
principles [liberals] is enraptured by this is bad enough, but that people who want to be Christians 
let themselves be misled by these sophisms is tragic.’998 
It turned out that it was precisely in its most successfully spectacular, its most impressive, 
aspects that the convention failed to strike the right note with outsiders, and greatly offended 
their sense of respectability. The militaristic, even aggressive values the rally demonstrated made a 
particularly bad impression on the Calvinist audience, especially the WA-procession. ‘We 
experienced a procession of perhaps a thousand blackshirts, which reminded us a lot of the 
famous parades in Potsdam under a certain monarch. If grim faces and hard stomping are 
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synonymous with heroic courage, then Mussert does indeed possess an elite corps.’999 Sarcasm 
aside, the WA gave the impression of being a downright dangerous force. In an extra-large font the 
article noted how these troops could only mean the NSB was planning to take power illegally. Here, 
mythopoeia failed to mesh with respectability, and spilled outside its boundaries. 
 
Eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth is the doctrine. We will only recommend these words in 
particular to those participants of the Landdag, who stayed over with ‘comrades’ in The Hague 
because they had religious objections to travelling back by train on the night of Saturday to Sunday. 
Such meticulous Christians really should try to harmonise this language and morality with that of 
Holy Scripture.1000 
 
NSB patriotism and royalism in particular were questioned by De Tijd in a front page article three 
days later, revealingly entitled ‘Nürnberg in Holland: Everything is German’.1001 It reported: 
 
In the Hague the N.S.B. had held a convention, which was a consummate imitation of the Parteitag 
in Nuremberg: processions, glorification of old Germanic society, condemnation of Jewish 
international Marxism, veneration of heroes and the dead with ‘Ich hatt’ einen Kameraden’ and 
finally a sort of deification of the leader, or at least of the Führerprinzip’.1002 
 
The choice of performances, staging, and rhetoric at the landdag were evocative – but of an 
example from abroad. In articulating a certain myth of fascism the NSB had come rather close to 
its German counterpart, a likeness which antagonised Dutch Christian audiences dismayed by the 
Church Struggle in Germany, and undermined NSB claims to be respectably nationalist. At the 
same, legitimating rituals of respectability like the singing of the national anthem De Tijd deemed 
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‘an aggravating usurpation of the song of Nassau for the advantage of Mussert’s personal glory’.1003 
The celebrated sending of telegrams proclaiming the loyalty of all participants to the Queen and 
Crown Princess during the rally, demonstratively printed on VoVa’s front page, was termed 
‘propagandistic messing-about’ [propagandistisch gesol]. The Catholic newspaper was generally 
the most sensitive to and critical of these kinds of political theatre, and gave scathing and sarcastic 
reviews of NSB meetings throughout the decade, pointing to Germanic barbarisms and 
hypocritical Pharisaism.1004 In other words those performances which were bound to appeal only 
to the fascist cadres and did not conform to any more general (particularly Christian) notions of 
respectability could not simply be neutralised by ostentatious demonstrations of patriotism, 
religiosity, and Orangism. Rather it seems that mixing these elements was an infelicitous choice, 
which to a critical audience marked the performance as inauthentic; a cynical display covering a 
sinister load. 
 Ultimately it was the members themselves on whom the whole event had made the 
greatest impression, in spite of how the mise-en-scène had been for the benefit of the press and 
cameras. Mussert received letters from his devotees to personally thank him for the landdag, with 
‘praise for the wonderful organisation and order, and then praise for the incredible work such as 
the construction of the tent’, and satisfaction at his speech.1005 Members and VoVa readers could 
not possibly have missed the great effort that had gone into this, and were probably less critical of 
the flaws in the organisation, especially the mutiny and misdemeanours at the work camp, which 
remained largely a matter of internal discipline. Whether these few letters were representative at 
all is impossible to say. More may have been written, but they are but a small sample out of the 35 
000 attendees. Combined with letters from other conventions, one can at least reconstruct how 
some members experienced the event, and what the myth it created meant to fascists. For 
instance a branch leader in Bremen, Germany, asked Headquarters if they could send some of the 
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posters from the 1935 Amsterdam convention, ‘such ones as hung up in the R.A.I.-building, since 
many of our Bremer Comrades have never seen such a thing [before]’.1006  
The desire for mementos, as well as the sale of illustrated convention albums, highlights 
what an extraordinary experience the spectacle was to many attendees. ‘I feel the urge to prove 
my upright loyalty to you [Mussert] this way. A day like last Saturday gives you something which 
nothing else is capable of. It is a pity, that not all of our opponents can experience a day like that, 
maybe then they would change their minds’.1007 To these people the spectacle was not just 
propaganda, but a transcendent manifestation of fascism as it truly was, above the realm of 
everyday life and mundane politics, something that was difficult to put in words and could only be 
experienced through the senses and emotions, through bodily presence. A landdag was a moment 
when people were in the direct presence of mythopoeia as it happened. To some it exposed the 
seams of the process, undermining the performances. To others the spectacle was overwhelming, 
and the immediacy of it all chimed emotionally with their beliefs about what fascism was, what it 
meant to be part of the Movement. To them the performance was authentic, reifying the collective 
myth as constructed by the party. 
 
IV 
Comparing the 1935 Hague landdag and the NSAP’s Sveating that year, what stands out is the 
completely different press reactions, or lack thereof. If the Dutch fascists got a rather mixed, not to 
say negative, response to their convention, the Swedes found that while press reports tended to be 
ostensibly neutral, they were also sparse and minimal to the point of non-existence. The lack of 
media attention was deeply frustrating to the NSAP, and contributed to the specific ways in which 
their conventions were organised. In 1935, as during the rest of the thirties, newspapers generally 
reported only on the lindholmare when there were fights or breaches of the law; this convention 
was no different, with for instance Dagens Nyheter’s report focusing almost entirely on the minor 
fight with communists that broke out in Vitabergsparken. For the 1937 årsting the same paper only 
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printed eleven lines for its report, while in 1938 no report was published at all.1008 For the 1939 
Öresundsting the national daily only reported on the fact that NU had broken the uniform law, 
when the youths famously removed their shirts in front of the embarrassed police, but made no 
mention at all of the actual convention.1009  
The voluminous reports on the NSB’s conventions –consistent for the rest of the decade – 
are striking, but easily explained by the far greater size of the Dutch party, and the political furore 
it caused in the Netherlands. Much of Dutch politics in the 1930s was focused on the NSB, and how 
it should be dealt with, a key theme of both the 1935 and the 1937 elections, so that extensive 
media attention came naturally.1010 The fact that Mussert was already a known political figure 
when the party was founded also helped, and ensured the initial interest from the liberal press.1011 
 Hence the NSAP ting had different priorities from the Dutch landdagen. While the NSAP 
kept angling for media attention, for instance through inclusion of the sometimes rowdy NU, or 
repeated (and repeatedly declined) invitations to journalists to attend,1012 it always recognised 
attention was at least currently limited, and organised conventions accordingly. In broad terms, if 
the Hague convention was above all staged for propaganda, the Stockholm convention was a rally 
to boost morale, mobilising the members to strengthen the bonds of comradeship. Sveatinget was 
for the spectators, a spectacle put on to draw in the members, to strengthen their loyalty to 
Lindholm and to the party, remind them of the greater struggle to give them the willpower to 
continue, even in isolation. Even if the performance was dwarfed by its Dutch equivalent, it felt 
grandiose to the (mostly young) participants, who had often never been in Gothenburg or 
Stockholm before, let alone such a large political rally – perception counted for everything here. 
The fact that some members travelled as far as from Överkalix to Malmö (c. 1800 km) to enjoy 
these events is indicative.1013 In the Netherlands on the other hand, the audience was more part of 
the convention, i.e. a piece of the performance, itself propaganda.1014 This also explains the heavy 
emphasis on corporeal discipline in the NSB documents. The fact that members’ complaints about 
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poor seating and vision were repeatedly met with the emphasis on propaganda speaks volumes. 
The point was the members’ presence, not their enjoyment.1015 The drive to summon ever greater 
numbers to the landdagen and later Hagespraken as a symbol of strength and unity were central to 
the NSB’s conventions. As indicated earlier, even as the NSB declined, year-by-year a greater 
proportion of members attended the conventions, while the mixing of members and non-
members in Lunteren was a powerful symbol of the supposed equivalence between Movement 
and nation. 
 Beyond membership figures, organisation and resources were crucial to managing these 
performances. Summoning the 35 000 or so to The Hague in 1935, or the tens of thousands more to 
Lunteren in later years, required an elaborate organisation, simultaneously centralised and with 
authority down to the smaller branches, and the financial structure to support it. The tent 
construction, transport arrangements, and ticket system of the NSB demonstrated the efficiency 
and reach of the party apparatus, and demonstration was partially the point. Being able to manage 
such a large-scale event within three years of their first public appearance, after an election 
campaign, the NSB showed the party was capable, disciplined, ordered, and a respectable force in 
politics: one of the real parties, not like the fascist dilettantes of the past who never acquired a 
single seat in parliament. NSB organisation was performative, and in terms of mythopoeia as 
much part of the convention as the proceedings on the day itself. Rather than just presenting a 
‘natural’ image of the event, hiding the underlying artifice, NSB discourse actually exposed the 
construction, work, and organisation that lay underneath the performance, proud of the modern 
technologies and skills it had harnessed, the organisational muscle and discipline it managed, the 
work ethic of its labourers. That the landdag programme booklet on its cover featured the workers 
of the camp, tools slung over one shoulder, is a clear statement of this point.1016  
By contrast the Swedes could not really visibly impress with their organisation, and lacked 
the financial capacity and acumen, so instead put a characteristic emphasis on the will to sacrifice 
of the cadres that was required to mobilise the few thousand. The NSAP’s inability to effectively 
gather its members for the convention, hampered by infrastructure and geography, prevented an 
emulation of the propaganda of scale of the NSB (or the example on contemporaries’ minds, the 
Nazi state). But the Swedish party nevertheless did manage to put on a spectacle, and succeeded 
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in places to put on a rather impressive performance with the limited resources at its disposal. The 
choice of the Auditorium, a space with which the party had ample experience from past meetings 
there, and the effective use of decorations created a good atmosphere for staging their rituals, and 
all accounts suggest participants were taken in by their surroundings, and enjoyed the intimacy. 
But most important, and impressive, was the uppmarsch. The emphasis on a public march as the 
principle piece of propaganda was interesting in light of the relatively few attendees, but made 
sense given the lack of press coverage. This was a way of bringing the spectacle directly to the 
public, without any intermediaries, a point emphasised in the party’s own discourse. At the same 
time it was the kind of performance that financially required little more than the members’ bodies 
on the street, and was effectively incorporated in the overall structure and schedule of the 
convention. As seen, the routes – paying close attention to space, setting, and symbolism – as well 
as the discursive reconstruction of the march, were used to great effect to maximise the 
mythopoeic potential of this political spectacle, and minimise the significance of low numbers. 
The surprising efficacy of the Sveatingsuppmarsch is evident in comparison to the NSB’s 
march through The Hague, (they were no longer a feature with the Hagespraken). While the 15 
minute WA-procession inside the tent demonstrated all the qualities of organisation and 
discipline essential to fascist myth, the city march was unimaginative, and had little going for it 
but the sheer number of marchers. This is particularly obvious when comparing the photographs: 
even the NSB’s own photographers failed to take any impressive or striking pictures of the march, 
while the NSAP’s show that the party managed to fully utilise its greater freedom in the use of flags 
and symbols. While uniforms were as lacking in the NSAP march as in that of the NSB, the small 
Swedish contingent gave a far stronger impression of an army, while the NSB looked like a rather 
strange procession of bourgeois, be they very many. 
The NSAP photographs point to the issue of technology and technique in presentation, 
which foregrounds how the fascist spectacles changed over time. The NSAP clearly improved its 
photography and staging after 1935, and subsequent photographs look much better than those of 
the first half of the decade. The party also managed to print more photographs in the party press 
in subsequent years. 1935 was a year when the NSAP was still consolidating its organisation, while 
in 1936-38 the party moved to Stockholm and expanded financially, buying its own printing press 
(if never the elusory rotational press) and city properties to house the DSN offices. Capturing the 
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moment on camera, and distributing the images to a wider audience was an important part of the 
mythopoeic project, and in this regard the NSAP would not peak until 1937-38. The NSB by 
contrast had very quickly acquired the technological equipment and competence to record the 
spectacle, and its profitable printing presses were always equipped to produce myriad pictures for 
a wider audience. The party also sold gramophone recordings of the speeches in 1934.1017 The rather 
handsome and well-designed commemorative books for each of the landdagen and Hagespraken 
show off not only the financial capacity but also the commercial competence of the Leadership, 
advertising them as collector’s objects, an investment even.1018 The point should not be 
exaggerated however: the books produced for the 1935 Amsterdam Landdag were still not sold out 
one year later, so that it is perhaps more a point about the NSB’s willingness to commercialise its 
activities.1019 
NSB conventions did change significantly after 1935: whereas NSAP årsting seem to have 
remained surprisingly static in many respects, the Dutch party was developing the mise-en-scène 
for the Hagespraken every year, researched already in some detail by René van Heijningen. The 
large hilltop meadow was an excellent place for audiences of up to 100 000 people, albeit without 
shelter from the elements, though that never became a problem. Compared to the landdagen it 
had none of the viewing problems vis-à-vis the seating, as the audience could be freely gathered as 
one large mass in front of the large central tribune – that being said, managing the vantage of tens 
of thousands of people in a largely flat field presented its own difficulties. These were overcome 
over the years by the building of a large stone wall-like structure, heavily reminiscent of some of 
the Nuremberg structures, which was to be a lasting monument to the regenerative movement 
that had captured the Netherlands.1020 (The wall still stands to this day, be it heavily neglected.) 
The tall structure rising before the audience made an imposing stage on and before which to pose 
standard-bearers, and from which Mussert could speak, elevating his small figure before his 
devotees. The party also continued to experiment with other tall but impermanent structures with 
which to dominate the field of vision: seven enormous black-red banners behind the rostrum, and 
party flags encircling the grounds captured the eye in 1937, while 1938 saw the raising of a large 
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mast, on which flags of the ‘liberated’ nations (Italy, Germany, Portugal, Spain) and the 
Netherlands were ritually raised. Grand and imposing structures remained a key element of the 




One sentiment that emerged from time to time in both Sweden and the Netherlands was the 
notion that if political opponents had been able to experience a convention in person, they would 
feel differently about fascism. This foregrounds the crucial point about the importance of physical 
presence to these spectacles. Unlike any other kind of propaganda, or any other kind of meeting, 
the spectacular landdag or årsting was an overwhelming appeal to the senses, a way of accessing 
the emotions through sensory stimulus: beautiful sights and sounds, the feeling of being part of a 
mass, the throng of bodies pressed together, the symbolism, uniforms, music, applause and shouts 
and chants, maybe even the smell, were all a way of conjuring the myth through an immersive 
spectacle.1021 The thing that made it all a spectacle was the holistic nature of the fascist 
conventions: this was mythopoeia through a tightly organised and prepared, carefully directed 
and staged performance, in which actors were closely following a script designed to draw in the 
audience. Without the interjection of critical hermeneutics, attendees were not only faced with a 
holistic performance of fascist myth, but were made into participants or fellow-actors – scholars 
such as Fischer-Lichte in theatre studies have previously identified this co-participation of 
spectators in the acting, seeing it primarily as a means of social integration.1022 This was a rare 
moment for someone to actually experience the fascist myth, identifying with it by being part of its 
mythopoeia. This was the realisation of a fantasy. Given that this moment depended on a 
harmonious entanglement of personal and party understanding of the fascist myth it was hardly 
likely to have the kind of impact on outsider observers that fascists imagined, but it does cast a 
spotlight on the paramount importance of physical presence in fascist spectacle. 
 Only through physical presence could the spectator be immersed in the myth, which was 
perhaps the most effective way of communicating the authenticity of the performance. Discursive 
reconstruction in party organs, communicating the experience to the myriad absent, was 
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ultimately a very flawed instrument in conveying the performance intact. Even if film and 
photography could add to the presentation, through framing and selection, sound and sense were 
omitted, largely lost in translation. Reports helped underpin and clarify the narratives that the 
performance meant to convey, but a textual reconstruction of jackboots rhythmically pounding 
the floor is a far cry from the experience of seeing, hearing, and feeling it. Holistic sensory 
immersion required physical presence, and was ultimately needed to convey authenticity, that is 
to say to neutralise critical faculties and lead to an acceptance of the myth at face value.1023 
 What this analysis of fascist conventions gets at is that spectacle had a decisive role to play 
in mythopoeia: spectacle is symbolic of the wider fascist mythopoeic project in Sweden and the 
Netherlands in the 1930s, and shines a spotlight on the fantastic element inherent to fascist myth. 
As has been noted repeatedly, fascist myth relied on fantasy, a personal and collective fantasy with 
multiple and sometimes conflicting dimensions. The fantasy was one of being a part of an epic 
narrative largely cast in a military and religious register. There were obvious parallels here to 
Gentile’s understanding of political religion: the sense of communion inherent to the liturgical-
style rituals, dedication to a common faith, etc.1024 But focusing on the religious aspects of this 
political theatre is misleading. While faith was psychologically an important part of this, fantasy 
and immersion are key to understanding the construction and appeal of the Swedish and Dutch 
fascist spectacle. The sense of the sacred and divine were merely means to that end.1025 
Rather than religion, Jeffrey Alexander’s notion of re-fusion is appropriate here: the 
performance re-fuses the disparate elements that constitute it into a seamless whole for the 
audience, and rather than appearing contrived conveys an aesthetic truth, allowing the 
psychological identification of the audience with the myth.1026 The analysis here also conforms to 
the ideas of a number of scholars of fascism about the importance of aesthetic impressions, and 
the concomitant emotional response, and the role it played in facilitating individual identification 
with a (collective) myth, which explains the impact on morale. Mabel Berezin argued that in 
Fascist Italy, public rituals were a liminal space in which identities could be formed, where 
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emotion helped obliterate the old self and create a new one.1027  Anette F. Timm more recently 
made the point that emotion could lead to feelings of empowerment, blurring the distinction 
between emotions and ideology.1028 Rather than focusing on the religious aspects or liturgical 
nature of these rituals, this chapter has highlighted the corporeal and somatic factors that 
facilitated this identification: overwhelming sensory impressions, bodily presence and the literal 
incorporation of the audience.1029 In an interpretation by David D. Roberts, the difference here is 
that political religion is ultimately an interpretation of ritual as referring to underlying ideology, 
rather than a cultural interpretation which sees meaning precisely at the level of the performance 
itself.1030 Within the framework of performativity theory, meaning cannot be understood beyond 
the performance – ontologically myth did not ‘exist’ outside of the performative-mythopoeic 
spectacle, because performative acts are by definition non-referential.1031 
While other performances on a smaller scale offered the observer glimpses of this myth, a 
spectacle was not just something bigger but qualitatively different. Spectacle was congruous with 
the fantastically epic proportions of the political myth – Lindholm and Mussert constructed the 
struggle in cosmic and divine terms respectively – but also offered the observer a way into being 
part of it.1032 The army metaphor is apt here: the observer becomes a soldier, a knight under the 
aegis of the Leader in a heroic battle against evil. Immersion was a gateway to participation, of 
fully going up in the narrative and becoming a protagonist in the story – ‘achieving harmony 
through becoming a work of art oneself’.1033 Ideally the observer did not just witness fascism as 
myth, but became a fascist;1034 in this the fascist conventions offered something few if any other 
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We had comparatively many people at our meetings, and of course this could depend on curiosity 
(after all people imagined that we had the Germans behind us) – but it was also because we said 
something completely different from the same, old, boring party drivel, we came with something 
new.1036 
 
This thesis has been about how this ‘something new’ of Lindholm’s NSAP and Mussert’s NSB was 
conveyed to their audiences. The premise of the research was that the ‘new’ with which the 
fascists came did not reside in their message, but the form, that is to say the performances, and by 
extension the performative of their myth. While it has been impossible to get a sense of the extent 
to which this actually attracted new members and voters, it is evident that this was a major reason 
for some members to stay and dedicate themselves to the party. 
 It has been shown throughout that fascist mythopoeia was a major mobilising force, and 
improved cadre morale. Mythopoeia had the potential to create a feedback mechanism of 
ceaseless mobilisation: identification with the myth raised morale and pushed the cadres to 
further activism and sacrifice, which could be used to enact mythopoeic performances that 
required those resources, and fed back into the cadres’ identification. The evidence for this is the 
strongest in the Swedish NSAP, where the perpetually under-resourced party managed to 
overcome its small size and financial difficulties numerous times through the dedication of young 
fanatical activists who worked hard and with little sign of success in the foreseeable future. The 
NSB makes a less strong case, as there appeared to be a weaker activist spirit, and the branches 
were more tightly controlled by Headquarters. 
 This points to another finding, which is that while fascist mythopoeia seems in the first 
instance to be above all a matter of propaganda, in reality it was frequently for the benefit of the 
members themselves, who one may assume already believed in or identified with the myth. 
Different priorities are evident between Lindholm’s and Mussert’s parties, where the former was 
far more concerned with sustaining morale while the latter emphasised expansion and quick 
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success – this can be explained almost entirely by the sharply divergent growth trajectories of the 
two parties in 1933-35. This is at its clearest in the completely different attitudes to the party 
conventions: while the NSB recognised the benefit of bringing members together and allowing 
them the experience of being part of a greater force than their local branch, it repeatedly 
prioritised appearances for the benefit of the press, and largely used the cadres as part of the 
performance, rather than the performance being for them. This was a peculiarity of these political 
performances, that the spectator was often also the actor.1037 
 This again foregrounds the importance of identification to fascist mythopoeia. 
Identification was to be part of the ‘something new’, which was something that transcended 
everyday life and ‘normal’ politics. Integration with a collectively constructed myth was a means 
to realising a fantasy, which can be seen as the personal dimension of political myth. A myth of a 
glorious army, led by a prophetic Leader, guiding his manly and disciplined troops to a 
predestined victory, was a narrative that permitted members to cast themselves as protagonists, 
actors following a script, in a myth that transcended fiction, a higher truth. The almost mystical 
aspects of this identification process left their evidence in the fetishism for the props which 
underpinned mythopoeia: the standards and symbols, the whole repertoire of salutes and slogans 
and marches, and of course the uniform. This explains how myth could generate quite such 
extraordinary enthusiasm and self-sacrifice, seemingly without reward.1038 Functionaries could be 
quite explicit about the mobilising instrumentality of myth: ‘[t]o create a youth movement and 
advance it, there has to be an integrating, inciting element: a myth. A thought of incredible stature, 
which unites everyone and drives them forward in dedicated work for its realisation.’1039 But what 
people like Arne Clementsson perhaps did not anticipate was that in organisations prone to 
factionalism, internal groups developed vested interests in specific myths, which could be at odds 
with changing party tactics. Paradoxically, the means that generated cohesion and loyalty could 
end up also tearing the party apart, as we saw in the NSAP/SSS in 1938. 
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 Fetishism revealed an interesting pressure behind the mythopoeic process, namely a 
grassroots demand for myth and its constituent performative elements. Embodied identification 
probably played a powerful role here: the invitation to ‘live the myth’ as it were, by integrating 
members physically into mythopoeic performances, was liable to produce strong personal 
(fetishistic) attachments. Much as the removal of beloved symbols was unacceptable to the cadres 
of both parties, and the uniform was considered indispensable by all, so a ‘normal’, respectable 
party leader could hardly be countenanced. While both Lindholm and Mussert showed signs of 
reluctance to act the part of the Leader in the style of Hitler or Mussolini, there was strong 
pressure from the rank-and-file to construct such a myth, and by extension sustain the collective 
fantasy that drove activism. 
 This is where the theme of respectability and its ambiguous relationship to fascist myth 
comes out strongly. These demands from below could push at the boundaries of respectability 
that the leadership was willing to transgress. To simplify, it has been clear that the NSAP and NSB 
started out in different places, and that the twin pressures of respectability and mythopoeic desire 
pushed them in opposite directions. The NSB, led by a bourgeois civil engineer, heavily appealed 
to Dutch conservative standards of political respectability, before giving in to internal pressures 
and introducing increasingly dubious elements (e.g. wolf’s hook symbols, Germanic-pagan 
elements) which conformed to certain fascist myths, but undermined the image of respectability 
in the eyes of the public. The NSAP on the other hand started out as a left-oriented party 
emphasising militarism and revolution, before embarking on a ‘New Direction’ that naturalised 
uniform paraphernalia, party name, and symbols, to the dismay of the radicals. This confirms that 
respectability had a sort of limiting effect on fascist mythopoeia, with fascist parties moved by two 
forces that pushed in opposite directions. The image construction of fascist parties then seems 
guided by a dynamic paradox. Given that much of the disapproval of the public was from a 
patriotic angle – questioning the nationalist credentials of fascist myth that appeared imported 
from foreign countries – this is a problem quite specific to the fascist movements of Europe that 
operated within democratic societies, constantly pushing them towards an awkward compromise. 
 Yet the dynamic between myth and respectability was not a straightforwardly dialectical 
one. This is especially clear in the mythopoeia of Mussert’s persona, which tried to mythicise 
precisely those dimensions that were symbolic of his respectability, such as his social status as 
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civil engineer. His evolution into biblical prophet married myth and respectability in one figure, 
using positive Christian elements to elevate him to providential Leader. Other aspects of fascist 
myth had an inherently respectable dimension to them, and depended on perspective. The NSB 
tried to exploit this more than the NSAP. The paramilitaries were a cornerstone of the army myth, 
but they were also constructed as models of respectability: neat and trim, perfectly disciplined, 
and a bulwark of law and order against godless communism. Similarly the NSAP utilised the heavy 
military presence in its ranks as a demonstration of respectability, deliberately posting uniformed 
army supporters alongside its processions to not just reinforce the idea of the fascists as powerful 
army, but also one with the support of patriotic and respected soldiers and officers. Myth and 
respectability were not always clearly distinguishable in the mythopoeia of the NSB and NSAP. 
It is precisely in these respects, where mythopoeia was susceptible to multiple layers of 
interpretation, that public debate was at its most intense. Shows of organisation, discipline, and 
power, could be admired, by the conservative Right especially – and where they were lacking the 
parties faced relentless mockery – but they also raised the spectre of violence. Street fights come 
out of this as a major problem which threatened to undermine the respectability of both parties, 
as it facilitated an interpretation of fascism as a force of disorder. Such opposing interpretations 
quickly led to a construction of fascism as neither mythic nor respectable, but grotesque. Fascists 
were depicted as uncouth thugs, their leaders as gangster bosses and Hitler-parodies, or in the 
Swedish case as undisciplined juveniles. It appears that in the small democracies fascist 
mythopoeia could never entirely divorce itself from respectable concerns, and carried an innate 
risk of undermining itself. 
Respectability, then, was not simply a limiting factor on mythopoeia, nor was the dynamic 
it produced consistent or predictable. Its role in Sweden and the Netherlands was very different, 
and one can see from how the parties were founded that it played a crucial role in the initial 
cultural construction of the fascist parties, and their later development. Swedish and Dutch 
fascists were faced with rather different strategic requirements produced by their social-political 
environments, but in both cases, mythopoeic desire could trump rational strategy. The internal 
pressure to sustain mythopoeia was powerful, and overrode considerations of respectability and 
public image. The backlash against Lindholm’s ‘New Direction’ is illustrative: the leadership may 
have considered many of the mythopoeic props to be inimical to success, but to at least a core of 
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the party they were the raison d’être of fascism. In the comparison both cadres’ are seen to have 
developed a specific fascist subculture, but more so in the NSAP than the NSB: the latter was 
always more outward looking, thriving on media attention from the very beginning, while the 
Dutch party apparatus was far better organised to instil discipline. 
This characterisation of Swedish and Dutch fascism as subcultural highlights how not just 
myth, but the particular performative methods of mythopoeia such as embodied identification, 
are something that generated extraordinary loyalty to fascism, be it understood as the party, the 
Leader, or ‘the idea’. This research has shown that there was a personally transformative potential 
in participating in mythopoeia, which can explain the dedication of some members through all 
adversities. The wider significance is in explaining the initial emergence and persistence of minor 
fascist movements in unlikely places, not just Sweden and the Netherlands, and the fanatical 
loyalty of some of its cadres which allowed them to punch above their weight. The comparative 
angle shows that this was not just the fluke of a specific fascist party, but a feature that could 
potentially be generalised for fascism across Europe. However, their differences however show 
that this is a point about survivability and persistence rather than success – the NSB after all 
enjoyed exponentially better results than the NSAP could ever hope for. For ‘stable democracies’, 
it highlights that political failure in its own right was not enough to eliminate fascist challengers. 
The implications for neo-fascism could be important. 
This has raised a number of further questions and venues for future research. Fascist 
endurance and loyalty were not in any way universal; member turnover could be high, and 
branches disappeared over time. Mapping out the persistence and activism of the NSB and NSAP 
in specific regions would add valuable nuance to the picture painted here. The comparison of 
localities over time, such as the disproportionately NSB-supportive urban centres and the NSAP-
dominated villages of Norrland, or the ephemeral outposts containing only a handful of activists, 
would add another important dimension.1040 One area left open for research by this thesis is the 
social dimension of mythopoeia. We can speculate that fantastical myths were more likely to 
appeal to some social groups than others (such as youth and students), but this needs to be 
verified. Second to this, what myths appealed to what social groups is another important question: 
can we trace these in internal party factionalism over mythopoeic projects, and can we see 
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propaganda apparatuses targeting specific groups with specific myths? It is not unlikely that a 
social perspective could shed further light on why mythopoeic tactics changed the way they did 
over time. There is also more to be learned about the relationship between myth and 
respectability legally. Local court records could shed light on whether mythopoeia continued in 




These relatively small fascist parties, which did not play much of a role in the wider European 
context, have here been portrayed as independent and critical agents. Their failures and relative 
mediocrity were not the result of unthinkingly copying German methods. Rather they adopted 
and adapted fascist cultural techniques and strategies reflexively, and forged their own myths and 
identities.1042 While much was copied from other models, the copycat stereotype is a crude 
dismissal of the complexities of such adoption, and the variety of fascist political culture in Europe. 
Working against the grain of their national social and political cultures, the NSAP and NSB created 
new structures and performances to convey their own myths to the public, but perhaps especially 
to their own members. These parties – especially the NSAP – come out looking surprisingly 
introverted. 
 Fascist myth was far more open-ended and varied than some historians have suggested. 
Not just palingenetic, the myths of fascism emerge as multiple, varied, without a core, and 
mutable.1043 Fascist myth was not static.1044 The study of fascist myth as a performative, operating 
in time, has shown that mythopoeia was a site of mutation and innovation, highly susceptible to 
internal and external pressures. Whatever the ‘something new’ that fascists brought to modern 
European politics, we cannot make a priori assumptions about its nature. 
Instead, the core concept of mythopoeia as a performative emphasises instability, 
contingency, and mutability in fascist myth and practices. The semiotic character of fascism as an 
empty signifier made it prey to a ceaseless and dynamic interplay between national, international, 
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and transnational influences, which constantly changed the terms of the public discourse around 
fascism. It is evident that in the fascist movements, there was reflexive engagement with their 
foreign counterparts – in the form of foreign regimes, movements, as well as an international 
phenomenon – both in their own right, as well as through the often hostile national press with 
which they debated, with a central preoccupation with respectability.  Mutation in the 
mythopoeic trajectory of the NSB and NSAP show that whatever difficulties they faced, these were 
not caused by any kind of stagnation that has been attributed to mimetic fascist organisations. 
Instead, how the fascist regimes reflected back on the movements, and the national discussion 
thereof, was a constant force for fascist change.  
This argument can be extended to the study of fascism generally. In Swedish and Dutch 
scholarship Roger Griffin’s ‘palingenetic ultra-nationalism’ is still somewhat in vogue.1045 But 
elsewhere, debates about the definition of fascism are fortunately well on their way out, and some 
historians have called for examining how contemporaries understood their own political 
categories as a mode of inquiry instead, which is precisely what mythopoeia has done here.1046 
Some scholars have defended their definitions of fascism from accusations of essentialising 
tendencies, describing them as ‘heuristic’ or unavoidable ‘working definitions’, but this has not 
avoided severely limiting how we understand the historic horizons of fascism. A definition of 
fascism has not been required for this thesis, which has allowed us to see the contested nature of 
that sign, and by extension the open-ended trajectory of that sign’s political devotees, who in the 
1930s, year on year, could still go in different directions.1047 
This is also an important insight for the recent transnational turn in fascism studies, and 
demonstrates some of the usefulness of the performative-mythopoeic approach to myth. 
Conceptualising fascism as performative and predicated on a contingent and diachronic process is 
one way to situate fascism at an intersection of national and international contexts, and be 
sensitive to the transnational exchange of ideas – myths, specific mythopoeic techniques, 
competencies, resources, and so forth. Marrying cultural approaches to fascist myth with the 
transnational turn, mythopoeia allows us to see the diachronic (semiotic) construction of fascism 
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by contemporaries, paying attention to the transfer and exchange of specific myths and 
techniques in doing so. The transnational approach has a penchant for understanding fascism as a 
contingent and ever-developing phenomenon, constantly changing as it crosses borders, and 
mythopoeia and performativity are tools which match that approach neatly.  The relationship of 
the Nazi regime to the NSB and NSAP has already hinted a little at what transnational influences 
on the European development of fascism (as understood by contemporaries) could look like, but 
there is the potential for research to undercover much more extensive networks of transfer and 
exchange, especially between movements (the Netherlands and Belgium, and the Scandinavian 
countries come to mind). 
 It was always the premise of the thesis that myth was central to fascist politics, but what 
has been brought out of this is the value of recognising the place of myth in fascism as a 
performative process, which in these terms can be shown to drive fascist strategy and tactics, 
responding to various contexts and influences. In other words, mythopoeia made fascist politics 
highly contingent.1048 It was in the nature of myth that it could change and be deliberately 
manipulated, and here it has been shown how in practice the modern party organisation after the 
First World War had found new ways of doing so. What was quite unique to fascism however is 
that it operated as an empty signifier, which allowed self-styled fascists to treat the process of the 
creation of cultural meaning with the cavalier disregard for ‘truth’ that so concerned Johan 
Huizinga at the beginning of this thesis.   
Huizinga’s concerns about the immediate political future of Europe in the 1930s went 
beyond fascism. This study of the relationship between mythopoeia and respectability is situated 
in the greater context of the new forms of politics that emerged in the interbellum, and its 
intersection with the new Right. The expansion of the franchise, the experience of mass 
mobilisation, the recent emergence of the modern mass party organisation, and the development 
or democratisation of media technologies, all fed into the new dynamics and functions of myth-
making in politics. The consequences for political organisations, tactics, and cultures were not 
limited to fascism. As such, the conclusions of this research open up venues of enquiry for the 
wider study of interwar European history. The examination of the semiotic construction of 
political concepts at the interface of myth and practical organisation in dynamic relation to public 
                                                             
1048
 What has been identified as the ephemerality and hollowness of fascism, see: David D. Roberts, Fascist 
Interactions, p. 274. 
235 
 
discourse is surely a fertile field more generally. At the same time, the historical application of new 
political techniques in Sweden and the Netherlands has shown there were no hard borders around 
these countries that made them into impregnable ‘peaceful islands’. Rather, even if physical 
political violence was limited here, the politics of violence, its rhetoric, aesthetics, and tactics,1049 
easily made their way into the ‘stable democracies’, demonstrating a spill-over effect which ought 
to make us attentive to the political-cultural integration of these countries with their more 
tumultuous neighbours. There were no solid boundaries to political conflict. Even if new political 
forms were not necessarily wielded effectively or even competently, it is worth noting how these 
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